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Abstract 
This thesis reflects upon several decades of research into Lean Production systems, 
highlighting the need for further investigation using an empirical study of exemplar 
implementations of Lean. The initial point of departure is an analysis of the current 
views of Lean based on a detailed literature review. The resulting Views of Lean Table 
provides a framework for the investigation of an exemplar Lean operation, viz the 
Nissan Sunderland Plant, widely regarded to be one of the most productive automotive 
plants in Europe. The exploratory nature of this investigation, and unique opportunity 
for access, argued for the use of an inductive single case study as an appropriate 
research approach. A four phase approach was used to; a) identify views of Lean, b) 
gain an initial understanding of the Nissan Production Way at the Nissan Sunderland 
Plant, b) acquire a detailed description of the Nissan Production Way and c) to assess 
the level of intrinsic motivation amongst employees. 
 
The primary objective of this research is to establish whether our current knowledge of 
Lean sufficiently encapsulates the concept’s many facets. Detailed semi-structured 
interviews with Nissan Production Way experts revealed that Nissan Sunderland 
Plant’s production system uses a large number of elements in contrast to the relatively 
narrow list of ‘Lean’ elements cited in the Views of Lean Table. In contrast to academic 
theory there was a focus on extrinsic motivation with low intrinsic motivation offset by 
the plant’s continuous fight for survival and ‘whatever-it-takes’ attitude. In practice 
Lean is viewed as an overarching philosophy with a toolkit encompassing a wide range 
of tools which are used when they are suitable for the task in hand. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Lean Production continues to generate debate four decades on from the generally 
accepted introduction of the phenomenon to the West in 1977 by Sugimori et al. (New 
2007; Shah and Ward 2007). It is widely accepted that Lean Production is not confined 
solely to Japanese concepts but is influenced by the West (Ohno 1988; Petersen 2002; 
Black 2007; Reichhart and Holweg 2007; Schonberger 2007; Towill 2007) and is 
heavily inspired by the Ford Production System (Ohno 1988; Pettersen 2002). Despite 
continuing to garner a significant level of interest, and being based / adapted from pre-
existing concepts, Lean Production is still to be fully understood. 
 
The origins of Lean lie within the automotive industry, one of the most important 
industries in the world (Womack et al. 1990). Whereas in the 1950’s American 
automotive manufacturers dominated the global car market this has changed 
significantly. Today Volkswagen is the world’s biggest car maker, although this title has 
been tightly contested by Volkswagen and Toyota for several years (Taylor and Taylor 
2008; Tovey 2017). As a result, Lean in the automotive industry continues to be of 
significant interest. Between 1988 and 2011 26% of Lean Production journal articles 
covered Lean in the automotive industry.  (Jasti and Kodali 2015). 
 
At the time of this study Lean in automotive research was primarily focused on 
technical aspects, the tools and techniques themselves. More recently research has 
become multi-disciplinary. Once such example is Jones et al. (2013) whom argue that 
Lean in the automotive industry silences employee empowerment, despite 
management claims to the contrary. Managers create illusions of empowerment under 
the guise of consensus decision making favouring efficiencies over employee welfare. 
Despite the continued focus on Lean in the automotive and manufacturing industries 
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Jasti and Kodali (2015) claim that “many researchers are applying Lean principles in 
manufacturing field instead of applying across all activities of an organisation” (p882).  
 
In the UK alone the automobile industry turned over £69.5bn, employed ~800k people, 
produced 1.6m cars across 15 car plants, and added £15.5bn in value to the UK 
economy in 2015 (SMMT 2016a). In June 2016 UK car production hit a 16-year high 
following an 11th consecutive month of growth (SMMT 2016b).  The UK’s biggest 
producer of cars is the Nissan Sunderland Plant which produced 477k cars in 2015 
(SMMT 2016a). Despite its status as UK’s biggest car production plant research on the 
plant and its production system, the Nissan Production Way, are limited. Existing 
research focuses on specific elements rather than providing a holistic view.  
 
Despite the threat of the strong pound, economic recession and constant pressure to 
reduce costs the plant continues to attract investment. In 2015 Nissan invested a 
further £137m for production of the Juke and a new press line. This brings total 
investment in the plant to in excess of £3.3bn (Nissan 2011b; SMMT 2016a). The Nissan 
Sunderland Plant is in a continuous fight for survival, competing for new car models 
against plants in the Renault-Nissan Alliance. The future of the UK following it’s exit 
from the EU will have an impact on future investment at the plant (Macalister 2016) 
however the Nissan Sunderland Plant has thus far continued to survive, secure new car 
models and ultimately be successful. The plant’s manifestation of Lean (The Nissan 
Production Way) can arguably be regarded as well-honed and its status as the most 
productive plant in Europe (SMMT 2011; Burn-Callander 2012; Kelly 2012; Moss 
2012), as well as being the UK’s biggest car producer, make the Nissan Sunderland 
Plant worthy of research.  
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At this time of this study empirical Lean research was in its infancy (Shah and Ward 
2007) and was arguably focused more on the tools / technical aspects of Lean than 
offering a rounded view. The complex and context dependent nature of Lean suggested 
that academia would benefit from novel empirical approaches (Taylor and Taylor 
2008). The limited research on the Nissan Production Way, the Nissan Sunderland 
Plant’s reputation as an exemplar Lean operation, and the importance of the plant to 
the UK economy make Nissan an ideal case to help address the following research gaps: 
 
1. A need for further empirical studies of exemplar Lean operations 
2. A lack of rounded Lean studies focusing on both technical and human elements 
3. A lack of knowledge regarding the Nissan Production Way 
 
To address these research gaps this research’s objective is as follows: 
To establish whether our current knowledge of Lean sufficiently 
encapsulates the concept’s many facets. 
 
The remainder of this chapter provides a historical account of the Nissan Sunderland 
plant before providing an overview of this thesis. 
 
1.1 NISSAN SUNDERLAND PLANT 
In 1984 the UK Government and Nissan Motor Co signed an agreement to build a car 
plant in Sunderland. The UK’s flexible labour market, the relative ease of laying-off staff 
compared to other European countries, promise of tough cost-cutting targets by 
Nissan’s British management, and a £40 million UK Government grant were likely to 
have helped land the deal (Rhys 2001). The plant started production in 1986 and by 
1987 had agreed a single union deal with the Amalgamated Engineering Union, begun 
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exports of left-hand drive vehicles to mainland Europe, and completed phase two of the 
plant’s construction which included a plastics injection moulding plant, press shop, 
engine assembly plant and paint shop extension.   
 
The 1990’s signalled a decade of continued investment and growth for the plant. The 
plant attracted over £500m of additional investment bringing total investment to in 
excess of £1.5bn. The plant began producing three new models (Micra, New Primera, 
Primera Estate) and Nissan’s new car-carrying ship arrived into the Port of Tyne 
following its maiden voyage from Japan. By 1999 the plant had produced in excess of 
two million vehicles and was named the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Most Efficient 
Car Plant in Europe for the fourth year running. The plant produced 105 cars per 
employee – 29 more than their nearest rivals (Harrison 1999)  
 
Despite Nissan Sunderland’s success Nissan Motor Co. was on the verge of bankruptcy 
in 1999. Donnelly et al. (2005) explained Nissan’s problems as “complex rather than 
monocausal… bound up with the overall stagnation in Japan’s economy in the 1990s and 
the rising strength of the yen, which hampered exports” (p432). A lack of control over 
supplier costs, over capacity, poor internal communications, and too wide of a product 
range (50 car models produced from 25 chassis) were likely causes to Nissan’s money 
problems (Donnelly et al. 2005). In contrast Renault saw revenues grow by 33% 
between 1996 and 1998 with its plants nearing full capacity. The heavy concentration 
of sales to Western Europe in a rapid globalising industry made Renault vulnerable to 
takeover (Donnelly et al. 2005).  Renault needed a partner to help the company into a 
major global auto-maker and Nissan, whose domestic market was in decline and had 
billions of dollars of debt, needed a substantial cash injection.  
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On 27 March 1999 the Renault-Nissan Alliance, a strategic partnership formed through 
a cross-shareholding agreement with Renault buying 36.8% of Nissan stock for $5bn, 
was formed. Carlos Ghosn, Carlos Ghosn, now CEO of Nissan and Renault, led a 
restructuring of Nissan’s operations cutting costs, streamlining operations which 
included the loss of 21,000 jobs (thus not adhering to the concept of lifetime 
employment), improving manufacturing capacity utilisation by 29% and achieving 
further savings through alliance synergies (Renault-Nissan 2009). Donnelly (2005) 
noted that Ghosn moved fast to improve communications, establish English as the 
company-wide language, reduce Nissan board membership and remove promotion by 
seniority in favour of a merit system. The Nissan Revival Plan focused on a wider goal 
of repositioning Nissan “in the market place for long-term growth and to identify where 
market and technological complementarities and other synergies could be identified and 
achieved” (p434). Included in this plan were targets to be profitable by the end of 2002 
and the reduction of business debt by 50% by 2003 (Donnelly et al. 2005). Renault also 
benefitted from the alliance through benchmarking Nissan’s manufacturing operations 
and the synergies an alliance could provide (Renault-Nissan 2009). 
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Figure 1-1 Renault-Nissan 2008 combined sales and production sites 
Source: Renault-Nissan (2009: p5) 
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Now part of the Renault-Nissan Alliance the Nissan Sunderland Plant continued to 
secure new car models throughout the beginning of the 2000s despite increased 
competition from Renault and Nissan car plants. The next generation of the Primera, 
Almera, and Micra (which ramped up production in a European record of five weeks) 
were built at the plant. However the strength of the British Pound which increased the 
price of each car by 30% resulted in a warning by CEO Carlos Ghosn that production at 
the facility could be halved which resulted in a £40m aid package from the UK 
Government to avoid a reduction in production and job losses (BBC 2000; BBC 2001a; 
BBC 2001b). Despite being recognised as the most productive plant in Europe for the 
seventh year in a row the impact of the strong pound led to cost-cutting measures 
including plans to relocate the purchasing department which resulted in the threat of 
the plant’s first ever strike by the single union (BBC 2003; Gow 2003; Jay 2003; 
Maguire 2003). The threat of strike action continued following Carlos Ghosn’s (Nissan 
and Renault’s CEO) remarks at the Detroid Auto Show suggesting that Nissan 
Sunderland Plant may lose its most important model should the UK stay out of the Euro 
(BBC 2004). Following promises of discussions and clarification regarding the future of 
the plant’s employees the single union ended strike threats at the end of January 2004 
(Binns 2004). 
 
Following the plant’s 20th anniversary in 2004 the plant produced it’s 4 millionth car, 
the Micra C+C entered production, the plant’ £2 million wind turbine plant opened 
(estimated to save £800,000 per year producing 5% of annual electricity), and the Note 
and Qashqai both started production in 2006. Between 2007 and 2008 more 
investment followed with the extension of the plant and axel shop, the creation of an 
additional 928 jobs to help meet Qashqai demand, and the start of production for the 
Qashqai+2 (SkyNews 2007; Nissan 2008b; Nissan 2008a). Faced with continued 
pressure from Carlos Ghosn (CEO) regarding the plant’s future should the UK not join 
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the Euro, by the autumn of 2008 a European economic downturn forced the plant to 
reduce production, schedule non-production days, bring forward the Christmas 
shutdown, and in January 2009 make 1,200 staff redundant. (Hotten 2008; Johnson 
2008; Massey 2009a). In response to the UK car industry’s requests for assistance the 
UK Government launched the Car Scrappage Scheme in April 2009 and, with similar 
schemes launched across Europe, this had positive impact on demand. Production at 
the plant for 2009 Q3 increased by 24,000 units leading to the creation of 350 new 
temporary jobs to cope with the demand. Nissan Sunderland Plant also secured a 
£200m from the European Investment Bank and a £21m grant from the UK 
Government to secure the contract for the plant to build Nissan’s first electric vehicle – 
the Nissan Leaf. The UK government also announced a £5,000 grant for those wishing 
to buy an electric vehicle. (English 2009; Manufacturer 2009; Massey 2009b; Massey 
2010) 
 
In 2010 the Qashqai’s continued success led to the plant introducing a third shift on the 
model’s production line. Both the Qashqai and Qashqai+2 both had model updates 
whilst production of the Nissan Micra moved to India (representing 4 in every 10 cars 
built at the plant) and the plant began production of the new Nissan Juke. As of this 
date the plant produced four models at the plant – the Qashqai, Qashqai+2, Note, and 
Juke. During 2010 the plant achieved record annual production figures with a total 
output of over 423k vehicles, an increase of 25% over the previous year (BBC 2010; 
Nissan 2010b; Nissan 2010a; Hughes 2011).  
 
In 2011 the Japan earthquake resulted in a components shortage affecting all Nissan 
plants as well as plants of competitors Honda and Toyota (Arnott 2011; Milmo 2011). 
Despite the impact of the earthquake the Nissan Sunderland Plant, celebrating its 25th 
anniversary, beat the previous year’s record production, and was credited with helping 
9 
 
Nissan to achieve strong first half earnings. Nissan Motor Co. also announced that the 
next version of the Qashqai would be designed, engineered, and built in the UK giving 
the plant a further boost (Arnott 2011; BBC 2011; McAteer 2011; Nissan 2011a; Nissan 
2011b; SunderlandEcho 2011; SMMT 2012).  
 
Further investment followed between 2012 and 2015 as the company announced that 
the plant was to produce a new compact car – the Nissan Invitation. Production of the 
plant’s new lithium batteries (2012) and Nissan Leaf (2013) began. The plant also 
announced that it had secured investment to begin production of the Infiniti Q30 in 
2015 – a new model under Nissan Motor Co’s luxury Infinity brand. Construction of a 
new Infiniti production line began in 2013 covering a space of 25ksqm including body 
assembly, trim and chassis, and engine assembly. These additions to the plant resulted 
in a combined additional investment of over £375 million, a £9.3m grant from the UK 
Government, and resulted in the creation of over 600 jobs at the plant and many more 
in the supply chain (BBC 2012; Reed and Stacey 2012; Phillips 2013). 
 
Today, in 2016, the Nissan Sunderland Plant directly employs over 6,700 people and 
continues to be a success despite a challenging economic and political outlook. The 
results of the UK’s European Union Referendum do however create some uncertainties 
over the plant’s future – the UK’s new role in Europe is currently unclear. Despite this 
Carlos Ghosn (CEO) remains cautiously optimistic that Nissan Sunderland Plant will 
remain “an important partner for Europe” once trade negotiations are completed. 
However future investment decisions are on hold until the UK’s trading arrangements 
following it’s exit of the European Union are made clear (Thomas 2016). 
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1.2 RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
This thesis includes a study, carried out in 2009, of the Nissan Sunderland Plant. The 
research’s objective was to compare our view of lean (as of 2009) with the 
implementation of lean in an automotive plant. The Nissan Sunderland Plant was 
chosen for study due to its established implementation of lean. This thesis can be 
broken down into the following stages: 
 
Stage Purpose Methods 
1. Literature 
review 
To identify our theoretical interpretation of 
Lean 
Literature review and 
consensus analysis 
2. Methodology 
Review of existing methodologies and 
justification for approach 
Literature review 
3. Initial study of 
the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant 
To gain a general understanding of life at 
Nissan Sunderland plant to aid in the 
formation of protocols for the primary study. 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
4. Expert 
Interviews 
To identify the technical and human elements 
of the Nissan Production Way 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
5. Employee 
Survey 
To gain further insight into the human 
elements of the Nissan Production Way 
Survey 
6. Discussion and 
Conclusions 
To review all findings and address the research 
questions which emerged throughout the 
study 
 
Table 1-1 Thesis Stages 
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis’ research questions are as follows: 
 
RQ1. What is our theoretical / academic view of Lean? 
RQ2. What is the Nissan Production Way? 
RQ3. How does practice compare to our theoretical / academic view of Lean? 
RQ4. Is intrinsic motivation necessary for the success of a Lean 
implementation? 
 
The following chapter, the Literature Review, answers RQ1. The Literature Review 
provides a detailed review of Lean and introduces the Views of Lean Table which is 
developed throughout this thesis. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 focus on the Nissan Production 
Way at Nissan Sunderland Plant and answer RQs 2-4. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review was conducted alongside the empirical study in 2009. Key 
themes are explored before presenting the Views of Lean Table – a high level view of 
our academic interpretation of lean (as of 2009). Finally, section 2.7 (p58) provides a 
brief review of updates to Lean literature since 2009. 
 
2.1 DEFINING LEAN 
There are “numerous academic and practitioner books and articles yet we still do not 
have a precise and agreed upon way of defining or measuring Lean production” (Shah 
and Ward 2007: p786). The term Lean production was coined by Krafcik (1988), 
subsequently adopted by the International Motor Vehicle Programme and used in the 
book ‘The Machine That Changed The World’ (Womack et al. 1990). The term Lean 
production was used to contrast the Western ‘mass production’ system with Toyota’s 
system (Holweg 2007). The use of the term was seen by the programme as “an 
acceptable way of describing  [Toyota Production System] without offending the other 
sponsors of the IMVP research” (New 2007: p3547). There are differing views as to what 
constitutes Lean. Whereas it is commonly accepted that Lean is derived from the 
Toyota Production System the concept has continued to develop over time (Radnor 
2010).  
 
2.1.1 TOYOTA PRODUCTION SYSTEM 
The Toyota Production System was introduced to the West by Sugimori et al. (1977). 
Despite the phenomenon being referred to as the Toyota Production System by its 
creators (cf. Ohno 1988; Shingo 1989) the terms Just-in-Time and Toyota Production 
System are often used interchangeably (Holweg 2007; Schonberger 2007; Swamidass 
2007) and are both still in widespread use (e.g. Cua et al. 2001; Fullerton and 
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McWatters 2001; Yasin et al. 2001; Black 2007; Lee and Jo 2007; Matson and Matson 
2007; New 2007; Swamidass 2007; Towill 2007; Bayo-Moriones et al. 2008). Just-in-
time is also commonly used to describe the approach to manufacturing which 
originated from the Toyota Production System rather than the system itself (Sohal et al. 
1989; Bayo-Moriones et al. 2008; Taylor and Taylor 2008). The meaning of Just-in-
Time “ranges from an emphasis on inventory reduction and elimination of waste to a new 
vocabulary of ‘pull’ versus ‘push’ system” (Ramarapu et al. 1995: p39). 
 
The Toyota Production System is a product of gradual evolutionary change originally 
developed in response to the then current market conditions (Spear and Bowen 1999; 
Holweg 2007; Taylor and Taylor 2008). The first published extensive description of the 
Toyota Production System in English is Sugimori et al.’s (1977) ‘Toyota production 
system and Kanban system: materialisation of Just-in-Time and respect-for-human 
system’ (New 2007). The journal article defines the phenomenon as a method which 
shortens the production time by having the minimum stock necessary, and having the 
right parts at the right time.  
 
The Toyota Production System can also be viewed as creating “a community of 
scientists. Whenever Toyota defines a specification, it is establishing sets of hypotheses 
that can then be tested. In other words, it is following the scientific method” (Spear and 
Bowen 1999: p98). The tools and practices are not fundamental to the production 
system but are countermeasures in response to a problem which are temporary until 
improvements are made. Emphasis is placed on completing tasks at the lowest level 
with large scale improvements involving directly affected employees and their 
superiors being brought together to form improvement teams (Spear and Bowen 
1999). The Toyota Production System adopts a ‘scientific-Taylorist’ approach and has 
commonalities with Fordist and Taylorist principles (Adler and Cole 1993). The 
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ultimate objective is “to visualise such wastes as overtime and line-stop, and to urge each 
workshop to become capable in improvement” (Sugimori et al. 1977: p562).  
 
The secrets of Japanese manufacturing are fundamentally sound common sense 
management practices (Mehra and Inman 1992). Just-in-time is a basic policy pursued 
by all Japanese automakers. Just-in-time for deliveries of components and in-house 
production was introduced before 1950 at Toyota and in the mid-1950s at Nissan. 
Compared to traditional mass production Just-in-Time required faster setup times, 
tighter synchronisation, mixed scheduling to avoid specialised under-utilised workers 
and broader job specifications to allow easier rotation of staff thus reducing staff 
numbers. Quicker throughput led to rapid feedback and as a result defectives were 
reduced and learning rates improved (Cusumano 1988). The essential components of 
Just-in-Time are Kanban, standardisation, multifunction workers and production 
smoothing (Goyal and Deshmukh 1992). Just-in-time is interdepartmental bringing 
benefits which include increased productivity, better quality, less scrap, increased team 
work and less Work In Progress (Goyal and Deshmukh 1992).  
 
Just-in-time has been classified as a method, concept, goal, belief, philosophy, system, 
approach, process, strategy, program, a state of mind and just common sense 
(Ramarapu et al. 1995; Vokurka and Davis 1996). However, many authors label the 
phenomenon a philosophy (Sohal et al. 1989; Goyal and Deshmukh 1992; Mehra and 
Inman 1992; Ramarapu et al. 1995; Vuppalapati et al. 1995). The labelling of Just-in-
Time / Toyota Production System as a philosophy could have emerged through 
recognition of Just-in-Time / Total Quality Control / Quality Circles as a holistic set of 
principles. However the philosophy label could be viewed as being a bit of a stretch 
(Schonberger 2007). 
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Just-in-time’s basic tenet is “to minimise cost by restricting the commitment to 
expenditure in any form, including manufacturing or ordering materials, components, etc, 
until the last possible moment” (Sohal et al. 1989: p15). Just-in-time requires 
participation by a number of stakeholders and for quick response to changes in market 
demands requires a high degree of organisation. The approach gained attention in 
Japan in the early 1970’s and by the mid 1970’s the approach had been adopted by 
many Japanese companies (Sohal et al. 1989). Despite classing Just-in-Time as a 
philosophy Mehra and Inman’s (1992) working definition of Just-in-Time refers to the 
phenomenon as a strategy:  
 
“Just-in-time is a production strategy that strives to achieve excellence in manufacturing 
by reducing setup times and in-house lot sizes through the use of group technology, cross-
training of employees, and sound preventative maintenance. Additionally, Just-in-Time is 
a vendor strategy that yields higher levels of productivity and quality by minimising 
vendor lot sizes and their lead time through the use of sole sourcing and quality 
certification of suppliers” (p172). 
 
2.1.2 LEAN PRODUCTION 
Lean production arose “in one country at a specific time because conventional ideas for 
the industrial development of the country seemed unworkable” (Womack et al. 1990: 
p17). There are differing views as to what constitutes Lean. Whereas it is commonly 
accepted that Lean is derived from the Toyota Production System the concept has 
continued to develop over time (Radnor 2010). The distinguishing feature of Lean from 
other production systems is “the factory physics of Lean production (reduction of 
capacity and inventory buffers, requiring reduction of system variability)” (de Treville 
and Antonakis 2006: p102).  
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Lean can be viewed as being a wider concept which is not confined to a company’s 
manufacturing operation (Karlsson and Ahlstrom 1996). Lean cannot be seen as an 
answer to a specific question but as an intended direction. The purpose of Lean is to 
lower costs through eliminating non-value adding activities. This is achieved primarily 
by limiting inventory, the most important type of waste due to it hiding problems and 
being wasteful itself. This can be achieved through lot-size reduction which requires a 
reduction in setup times to ensure a constant cost-per-unit but also increases flexibility 
(Karlsson and Ahlstrom 1996). One method of reducing setup times is Shingo’s single 
minute exchange of dies method (Shingo 1985). Lean also seeks to eliminate waste by 
reducing work-in-progress, transportation and by increasing quality (Karlsson and 
Ahlstrom 1996). Lean’s principles regarding production are; (i) Just-in-Time logistics, 
(ii) responsibility for quality with production, (iii) group technology in components 
production, (iv) economies of cooperation, (v) autonomation, and (vi) self-inspection 
and multitasking (Dankbaar 1997). Lean is “providing car manufacturers with the 
needed flexibility, without giving up the advantages of the traditional system of mass 
production, including the undeniable productivity of the assembly line” (Dankbaar 1997: 
p15).  
 
Kaizen (continuous improvement) is sometimes regarded as the second most important 
Lean principle after removing non-value adding activities. Improvement activities 
should move from having no explicit organisation towards Quality Circles. Quality 
Circles “became the hottest Japanese management topic by the early 1980’s” 
(Schonberger 2007: p404). As interest in Quality Circles decreased they were renamed 
to Small Group Improvement Activities removing the word quality to broaden the 
concept’s scope. Despite the name change Small Group Improvement Activities did not 
gain traction and the concept largely faded into the background (Schonberger 2007). 
Karlsson and Ahlstrom’s (1996) conceptualisation of Lean is shown in figure 2-1. 
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Karlsson and Ahlstrom (1996) cite pull instead of push as being fundamental to Lean 
production. Push and pull are differentiated by who triggers the order release, 
downstream (pull) or upstream (push) (Kim et al. 2002). 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Conceptualisation of Lean Production 
Source: Karlsson and Ahlstrom (1996) 
 
Karlsson and Ahlstrom’s (1996) research positions Lean Production as a wider 
‘umbrella concept’ encompassing many Lean concepts including Lean Manufacturing. 
Whereas there is merit in highlighting the use of Lean principles outside of production 
the use of terminology is confusing. The re-purposing of existing established 
terminologies (Lean Production) to encompass a wider phenomenon will inevitably 
cause confusion to what is already a phenomenon whose functional elements are 
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complex, inter-related, and context-dependent (Taylor and Taylor 2008). Bhasin and 
Burcher’s (2006) attempts to define Lean is clouded by the interchangeable use of the 
terms Lean manufacturing, Lean production, and Lean. Taking a prescriptive approach 
to defining Lean they argue that there are a set of technical requirements which 
companies more-or-less fully practice when implementing Lean.  This arguably ignores 
any company context and instead suggests that Lean is transferrable. 
 
Requirement Definition 
Kaizen Continuous improvement 
Cellular manufacturing “A philosophy that attempts to recognise and exploit similarities 
among components. Components are grouped into families based on 
similarity in shapes or production processes or both. Machines are 
then grouped into cells to produce these components” (Al-Mubarak 
et al. 2003: ; p278). 
Kanban A scheduling system facilitating Just-in-Time production which 
aims to pull the right volume and type of component ‘Just-in-Time’. 
Single piece flow Lot size of 1 
Process mapping “Process mapping consists of constructing a model that shows the 
relationships between the activities, people, data and objects 
involved in the production of a specified output” (Biazzo 2002: ; 
p42) 
Single minute exchange 
of dies 
A method for reducing machinery changeover times  
Setup change / kaikaku Kaikaku = breakthrough improvements (in contrast to incremental 
improvements conducted through Kaizen). 
Supplier development Helping to improve supplier operations to ultimately increase 
quality and/or lower cost. 
Supplier base reduction Reducing number of suppliers 
Five S “A formalised approach to housekeeping and workplace 
organisation” (Melnyk et al. 1998: ; p73) 
General visual 
management 
The use of visual aids to help manage production (i.e. signs and 
charts). 
Total productive 
maintenance 
Total Preventative Maintenance aims to maximise quality and 
quantity of production through improving production equipment 
effectiveness (Raouf 1994) 
Table 2-1 Technical Requirements of Lean 
Adapted from:  Bhasin and Burcher (2006) 
 
Lean Production’s mutually reinforcing practices can be grouped into several 
complementary subsystems which include Just-in-Time, Total Quality Management, 
Total Preventative Maintenance, Kaizen, Design for Manufacture and Assembly, and 
supplier management with “human resources management practices under the respect-
for-workers umbrella serving as the glue to hold the system together” (de Treville and 
19 
 
Antonakis 2006: p102). Total Productive Maintenance aims to maximise quality and 
quantity of production through improving production equipment effectiveness (Raouf 
1994). At the heart of the Lean Production is the aim of reducing non-value adding 
activities through continuously improving processes. Lean Production considers there 
to be seven wastes (Ohno 1988); 
 
1. Defects 
2. Overproduction 
3. Inventory 
4. Motion 
5. Transportation 
6. Waiting 
7. Over-processing 
 
Reducing these seven wastes not only increases plant efficiency but can also help to 
identify more serious problems. For example, too much stock could hide problems with 
defects. Narasimham et al (2006) argue that Lean operations differ from ‘low 
performers’ in their increased use of “statistical quality control, benchmarking, in-house 
technology development, customer orientation, integrated product development, teams, 
and advanced manufacturing technologies” (p452).  In contrast de Treville and 
Antonakis (2006) claim that the distinguishing feature of Lean Production is the 
reduction of buffers and variability. “Lean production is an integrated manufacturing 
system that is intended to maximise the capacity utilisation and minimise the buffer 
inventories of a given operation through minimising system variability (related to arrival 
rates, processing times, and process conformance to specifications)” (p102). They claim 
that Lean Production practices can be divided into two categories with a third category, 
respect for workers, combining all of the practices together: 
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1. Leanness practices:  
Kanban, reduction of setup times, flow-based layout, production 
levelling, continuous improvement. 
2. Variability reduction:  
Involvement of employees in setting Standard Operating Procedures, 
standardisation, statistical process control, jidoka, poke-yoke, clean and 
tidy plant to allow for easy identification of problems, short-cycle times 
and Total Quality Management which emphasises “the elimination of 
variability in incoming raw materials through a variety of supplier 
management tools and practices” (p104).  
3. Respect for workers: 
Sugimori et al. (1977) highlights the respect-for-human-system as a key 
element of the TPS which is cited as considering worker safety, 
empowering and using full capabilities of workers and eliminating 
workers’ waste movements. This includes making maximum use of an 
employee’s knowledge, offering competitive wages and giving teams 
responsibility for quality, allocating tasks, discipline and supporting 
fellow team members. 
 
Whereas Narasimham et al’s (2006) focuses on tools and de Treville and Antonakis 
(2006) focus on buffers and variability, Shah and Ward (2007) propose a more general 
and encompassing definition of Lean. “Lean production is an integrated socio-technical 
system whose main objective is to eliminate waste by concurrently reducing or minimising 
supplier, customer, and internal variability” (p791). Hines et al (2004) argue that Lean is 
moving away from eliminating waste and towards creating value (figure 2-2).  “The 
further above the cost-value equilibrium a product/service can be positioned, the more 
attractive proposition it is to the customers. The cost-value equilibrium denotes the 
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situation whereby the product provides exactly as much value, which the customer is 
willing to pay for, as the product costs” (Hines et al. 2004: p997).  
 
 
Figure 2-2 Relation of Value, Cost and Waste  
Source: Hines et al. (2004) 
 
Lean Production is widely acknowledged to focus on the elimination of waste and 
reduction of variability. Lean Production is effectively a ‘tightly coupled system’ of self-
reinforcing components. “Lean production may be viewed as a configuration of 
practices/tools because the relationships among the elements of Lean production are 
neither explicit nor precise in terms of linearity or causality” (Shah and Ward 2007: 
p791). The complex, context-based nature of Lean makes it extremely difficult, and 
perhaps problematic, to propose a universal set of elements. Given the interchangeable 
use of terminologies it is also evident that academia has thus far been unable to agree 
on commonly accepted terminologies. This is discussed further in the following 
subsection. 
 
2.1.3 ARE LEAN AND TOYOTA PRODUCTION SYSTEM DIFFERENT? 
There is a lack of clarity as to what constitutes Lean (Hallgren and Olhager 2009). The 
continuous development of Lean has resulted in “significant confusion about what is 
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Lean, and what is not” (Hines et al. 2004: p997). Shah and Ward (2007) identify the 
confusion surrounding the phenomenon and attempt to further define, and identify the 
elements of Lean Production. To achieve this aim an in-depth literature review was first 
conducted to establish aspects of Lean Production which “eliminate or minimise 
different aspects of variability” (p792). These scale items were then refined through a 
series of structured interviews followed by a pre-test with practitioners and academics. 
Manufacturing firms with over 100 employees primarily sourced from a Lean 
consultancy company formed the sample. Shah and Ward (2007) claim that this sample 
is “well-suited to the purpose of this study because it consists of a set of manufacturing 
firms that are at various stages of implementation of Lean practices” (p792). Sixty-three 
responses were used in the pilot study (9% response rate), whereas 295 responded to 
the large-scale survey (13.5% response rate). The result is a set of ten distinct 
dimensions (see table 2-2) of a Lean system three of which measure supplier feedback, 
one which measures customer involvement with the remaining six addressing internal 
issues including setup time reduction. 
 
Shah and Ward’s (2007) approach to identifying dimensions of Lean provides a set of 
measurement scales which can be utilised in future research. The ten dimensions offer 
a neat and concise view of what Lean Production entails, and what needs to be present 
for a system to be considered to be Lean. The measurement scales are based on existing 
literature resulting in conclusions that are still heavily bound by theory, rather than 
practice. Additionally, existing research focuses heavily on the technical elements of 
Lean to the detriment of human elements which are under-represented and this is 
clearly reflected in the ten dimensions (see table 2-2). The idea of Lean being a set of 
dimensions can be seen as a restrictive view given the all-encompassing aim of Lean, 
viz, to reduce non-value adding activities. Whereas these ten dimensions may very well 
be ‘stereotypically Lean’ they may not all occur in practice. For example Hyundai’s 
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manifestation of Lean does not include pull and employee involvement (cf. Lee and Jo 
2007). 
 
Dimension Measure Definition 
Supplier 
feedback 
Supplier feedback Provide regular feedback to suppliers about their 
performance 
Just-in-Time 
delivery by 
suppliers 
Supplier feedback Ensures that suppliers deliver the right quantity at the 
right time and place 
Supplier 
development 
Supplier feedback Develops suppliers so they can be more involved in the 
production process of the focal firm 
Customer 
involvement 
Customer 
involvement 
Focus on a firm’s customer and their needs 
Pull Internal issues Facilitate Just-in-Time production including Kanban 
cards which serves as a signal to start or stop production 
Continuous 
flow 
Internal issues Establish mechanisms that enable and ease the 
continuous flow of products 
Setup time 
reduction 
Internal issues Reduce process downtime between product changeovers 
Total 
productive / 
preventive 
maintenance 
Internal issues Address equipment downtime through total productive 
maintenance and thus achieve a high level of equipment 
availability 
Statistical 
process control 
Internal issues Ensure each process will supply defect free units to 
subsequent process 
Employee 
Involvement 
Internal issues Employees’ role in problem solving, and their cross 
functional character 
Table 2-2 Ten Distinct Dimensions of a Lean System 
Source: Shah and Ward (2007: p799) 
 
The difference between Lean Production and earlier concepts needs to be resolved if 
theory and empirical work are to advance in this area. There are many descriptions of 
Lean Production and its underlying components. These have become increasingly 
expansive and are very general. For example despite Monden (1983) cites Just-in-Time 
as a concept within Toyota Production System whereas Just-in-Time has become 
known as the system in the US. “The price paid for lacking a clear, agreed-upon 
definition is high because empirical testing of inexact and imprecise concepts leads to a 
body of research that examines slightly different aspects of the same underlying 
constructs masked by different terminology” (Shah and Ward 2007: p785). There is a 
continuing emergence of high quality empirical studies within the automotive sector 
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(Taylor and Taylor 2008). Despite this Shah and Ward (2007) claim that empirical 
work is in its infancy. Figure 2-3 provides a view as to the existing knowledge of Lean 
production. 
 
Figure 2-3 Existing State of the Conceptual and Empirical World Related to Lean 
Production 
Source: Shah and Ward (2007) 
 
Hall (2004) argues that the Toyota Production System and Lean Production are 
separate constructs with significant differences. He argues that the Toyota Production 
System spends more time creating standardised work and emphasises worker 
development. However, as any implementation of Lean principles is likely to have a 
varying level of standardisation this doesn’t seem to apply in practice. Lean Production 
can be argued to be a more up-to-date term for the Toyota Production System which is 
more palatable for other manufacturers (Wu 2003; Liker 2004; Black 2007; New 2007). 
This was correct when the term was coined by Krafcik (1988). However since this time 
the concept has evolved, progressed, and been adopted in areas other than its 
manufacturing roots (Hines et al. 2004; Schonberger 2007).  
 
Lean is different from the Toyota Production albeit still heavily grounded, or based 
upon, the system’s original principles. The term Lean is neutral allowing for recognition 
of the Western modifications which have moved the concept forward beyond its origins 
(Schonberger 2007). The dissemination of Lean Production principles to other business 
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functions and the adaptation of Lean Production to fit company culture (e.g. Hyundai - 
cf. Lee and Jo 2007) has proved that Lean is not restricted to the manufacturing 
environment, or a rigid set of tools. Lean is arguably not something you can define as a 
system or an off-the-shelf solution. Lean is a set of overarching principles accompanied 
by a toolkit of best practice tools that have emerged, and evolved over time and will 
continue to do so. “Production is Lean if it is accomplished with minimal waste due to 
unneeded operations, inefficient operations, or excessive buffering in operations” 
(Narasimhan et al. 2006: p443). 
 
This research has already established that there is an element of confusion surrounding 
Lean. Shah and Ward (2007) have already utilised existing knowledge to redefine what 
we already know. Their definition of Lean represents a widely-accepted view and will 
be adopted by this research – as will using the term ‘Lean’ to refer to the phenomenon 
which began as the Toyota Production System. Further development, and clarification 
of Lean, cannot come from repeatedly revisiting the current body of literature. Lean is a 
continuously evolving concept and therefore requires frequent empirical studies of 
exemplar Lean operations to ensure theory does not fall behind practice. “By 
experimenting with novel approaches – both methodological and pedagogical we may 
derive original insights which will be of benefit to practice, improve our knowledge and 
extend our understanding” (Taylor and Taylor 2008: p487). The following section 
discusses the implementation of Lean. 
 
2.2 LEAN IMPLEMENTATION 
“There is still a general misunderstanding of the contingent nature required to apply Lean 
thinking” (Hines et al. 2004: p998). In many companies the implementation of Lean is 
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only skin deep (Hines et al. 2004; Schonberger 2007). Womack and Jones (1996) 
suggest that there are five steps to Lean thinking: 
 
1. Specify the value desired by the customer. 
2. Identify the value stream for each product/service providing that value and, 
challenge all of the wasted steps. 
3. Make the product flow continuously. Standardise processes around best 
practice allowing them to run more smoothly, freeing up time for creativity and 
innovation. 
4. Introduce pull between all steps where continuous flow is impossible. Focus 
upon the demand from the customer and trigger events backwards through the 
value chain. 
5. Manage towards perfection so that non-value adding activity will be removed 
from the value chain so that the number of steps, amount of time and 
information needed to serve the customer continually falls. 
 
2.2.1 DESIGN RULES 
Both Black (2007)  and Spear and Bowen (1999) have attempted to capture Lean in a 
set of rules. Whereas Spear and Bowen’s (1999) rules are more of a guiding set of 
principles which attempt to capture the “tacit knowledge that underlies the Toyota 
Production System” (Spear and Bowen 1999: p98) Black (2007) makes reference to 
specific practices. Spear and Bowen (1999) argue that the integral use of a scientific 
approach, viz defining a specification then formulating and testing hypotheses, is what 
makes Toyota a flexible, creative, continuously learning company. Their four rules of 
Lean are: 
 
1. All work shall be highly specified as to content, sequence, timing and outcome 
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2. Every customer-supplier connection must be direct, and there must be an 
unambiguous yes-or-no way to send requests and receive responses 
3. The pathway for every product and service must be simple and direct 
4. Any improvement must be made in accordance with the scientific method, 
under the guidance of a teacher, at the lowest possible level in the organisation 
 
In comparison Black’s (2007) four design rules are more specific: 
 
1. Production levelling - consistent daily output based on daily, monthly and 
yearly demand. 
2. Single-piece flow - requires a redesign of production lines to arrange 
assemblies into either u-shaped cells or parallel assembly. 
3. “The machining or processing time for any part in any machine in the cell is less 
than the necessary cycle time” (p3641). 
4. Kanban - “The manufacturing components are connected to final assembly with 
Kanban links which withdraw material from the subassembly and component 
suppliers cells as needed by final assembly and give production orders to all the 
suppliers automatically. This rule governs the maximum inventory in any link” 
(p3641)  
 
Whereas Spear and Bowen’s (1999) rules are generic and widely applicable Black’s 
(2007) rules do not consider the impact contextual factors have on the ability for 
facilities to use a rigid structure. Similarly Black’s (2007) implementation strategy 
(table 2-3) is also rigid, taking the view that these elements can be universally applied. 
This strategy is based “the methods used by many companies to successfully implement 
Lean manufacturing” (p3645). 
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Steps Detail 
1. Level and balance the manufacturing system, smoothing 
the material flow  (Monden 1983): 
Levelling involves the development of mixed model final 
assembly. Level or smooth the demand on the cells or the 
suppliers. Balancing is getting the output from the cells to 
match the needs of final assembly 
• Establish the daily demand 
• Develop mixed model final 
assembly; takt time 
• Balance the output from the 
suppliers 
• Develop single-piece flow in the 
subassemblies 
• Sequence subassemblies with 
order of assembly 
• Design Rule 1 
2. Design or reconfigure the manufacturing system: 
Design and implement manufacturing and assembly cells. The 
design of the manufacturing system must consider the design 
of the product and the need of the internal and external 
customers while meeting the functional requirements for 
system stability  
• Standard work for operators in 
cells 
• Design/implement manufacturing 
cells (Black, 1991) 
• Design Rule 2 
3. Setup reduction, changing methods and designs to 
reduce setup time (Shingo, 1985): 
Setup time is delay time. Affects lot size. Optimum lot size is 
one. Use SMED because it involves everyone on the factory 
floor. Permits small lots and creates flexibility.  
• Teach everyone SMED 
• Develop one touch setups in the 
cells 
• Operators perform changeovers 
4. Integrate quality control into the manufacturing system 
(Shingo, 1986): 
Does the manufacturing process satisfy the design 
specifications every time? Inspection to prevent the defect 
from occurring (Poka-Yokes). 
• Inspect to prevent defects (Sekine, 
1990) 
• Use the seven tools for quality 
control and line stop 
• Teach everyone quality 
• Zero defects via Design Rule 3 
5. Integrate preventive maintenance (Nakajima 1988): 
Do the machines and people behave reliably? Design 
equipment to be reliable. Design methods to check people 
and methods for people to check machines, identify and solve 
problems. System will breakdown if machines and support 
equipment fail. 
• Machines designed for reliability 
using Total Preventative 
Maintenance (Nakajima, 1990) 
• Operators solve problems 
• Operators perform daily 
maintenance 
6. Integrate production control, link the cells, pull material 
to final assembly: 
Control the where, when, and how much material. The design 
of the manufacturing system defines flow and the Kanban 
operates within the structure. This is integrated production 
control or Kanban (Black, 1991). 
• Link the cells 
• Pull material to final assembly 
• Kanban drives the production 
• Design Rule 4 
7. Integrated inventory control: 
Reduce the work in progress in the links that connect the 
cells. This is control of the quantity of material in the links. 
Minimised and optimised and controlled by the internal 
customers, the users of the materials (Black, 1991). 
• Gradually remove inventory from 
links 
• Expose problems 
• Solve problem, improve system 
TPT 
8. Integrate the suppliers: make them Just-in-Time 
manufacturers just like you: 
Suppliers become remote cells. Suppliers become partners. 
Relationship built on trust. This is how real technology 
transfer takes place. 
• Suppliers are sole source 
• Teach suppliers steps 1 – 7 
 
9. Autonomation: autonomous control of quality and 
quantity within the manufacturing system: 
Automate the integrated pull manufacturing system. 
• Design/implement Lean 
manufacturing cells 
• Apply computers, robots, 
automation 
 
10. Design the Lean enterprise around the L-CMS • Design new products concurrently 
with customers in mind 
• Design/implement Lean 
manufacturing with Lean machine 
tools 
Table 2-3 Lean production methodology for implementation 
Source: Black (2007) 
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2.2.2 IS LEAN UNIVERSAL? 
At first glance providing a set of implementation rules offers a clear formula for 
companies to follow when implementing Lean initiatives. However it can be argued 
that “Lean is not a system with universal applicability” (Cooney 2002: p1144). Just-in-
time, a core component of Lean, can only be applied under certain conditions which 
include production levelling and strong relationships with suppliers. Just-in-time may 
also be unsuitable for a company’s workforce (Cooney 2002). Adopting Lean “involves a 
complex evolutionary process of organisational learning and interpretation” (Lee and Jo 
2007: p3665). Consequently, there is no universally applicable method for 
implementing Lean. Companies create their own Lean production system by “selecting, 
interpreting, and transmuting TPS [Lean] principles to meet its own business context” 
(Lee and Jo 2007: p3665).  
 
After recovering from an economic slump during 1997 and 1998 Hyundai took the 
decision to create their own unique production system; Hyundai Production System.  
Hyundai’s Production System deviated from Toyota’s minimising worker involvement 
through investments in automation and adopting a push system rather than the pull 
system and Just-in-Time advocated by Lean (Lee and Jo 2007). There are several 
factors distinguishing the Hyundai’s Production System from the Toyota Production 
System. Firstly there is a reliance on “engineer-driven workplace innovations and 
operational control, rather than the full utilization of worker capacity and involvement, 
highlighted by TPS” (Lee and Jo 2007: p3674). Secondly suppliers lack the resources to 
be defect-free and flexible to allow the meeting of orders. Consequently, Hyundai and 
its suppliers are unable to protect against untimely deliveries and defects as they 
cannot maintain a buffer. This combined with the supplier dominated market condition 
has led Hyundai to adopt a push production model rather than a pull (Just-in-Time) 
system (Lee and Jo, 2007). Thirdly problematic labour relations have resulted in a lack 
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of worker involvement which is vital to implementing and maintaining Just-in-Time. 
Furthermore, the distrust between workforce and Hyundai has led to interferences and 
the inability of Hyundai to apply performance based Human Resource Management 
practices and to fully utilise labour (Lee and Jo, 2007).  
 
These factors have resulted in Hyundai forming their own production system out of 
efforts to emulate Toyota’s. Like the Toyota Production System, this effort has occurred 
over a long period of time and was very much an evolutionary process. Lee and Jo 
(2007) claim that although the Hyundai Production System deviated from Toyota 
Production System concepts it has achieved results such as utilisation ratio, product 
quality and inventory of parts which are comparable to the Toyota Production System. 
The authors also highlight that in 2003 Hyundai’s productivity was less than half of 
Toyota. However, despite this statistic price competitiveness has been maintained. Lee 
and Jo’s (2007) research adopts a contingency view and suggests that corporate culture 
cannot be changed to accommodate the Toyota Production System but that a company 
can use and modify Lean principles to fit in with their company culture. Wallace (2004) 
supports the notion that Lean principles can be modified to adapt to differing company 
cultures. He states that the Lean has been “amended and hybridised across the globe to 
‘fit’ to local, regional, national and organisational cultures” (p750). 
 
Regardless of Japanese manufacturers’ competitive price, features and reliability in 
premium sectors European and US competitors have commanded more respect than 
their Japanese counterparts. The premium sector continues to be dominated by 
German brands including Mercedes, BMW and Audi (Oliver et al. 2007). Key influencers 
of car buyers reinforce the view of cars as a statement rather than a function. There are 
contradictions between Lean thinking and the nature of premium brands. One of the 
key aims of Lean is the reduction of waste. The practice of over-engineering cars above 
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functional requirements is in stark contrast to this goal. Furthermore whereas external 
considerations are the main driving factor for Japanese manufacturers German auto 
producers are driven by engineering sophistication (Oliver et al. 2007). 
 
“German producers such as Mercedes have continued to out-sell Lexus, especially in 
Europe” (Oliver et al. 2007: p3736). Japanese manufacturers are focusing on pleasing 
the needs of the market at the cost of risking product identity. Too much attention on 
the customer potentially results in products being created that are similar to pre-
existing products. Additionally, it can also stifle radical innovation. Real brand value is 
intangible and is partly a social construction. The role of opinion leaders is highlighted 
as is the impact of societal views. Lean would view over-engineering and the focus on 
one area, to the detriment of another, a waste. However, the trade-offs inherent in Lean 
work against an important factor in the premium markets; product personality. Oliver 
et al. (2007) argue that Japanese manufacturers have not achieved universal success in 
all segments. 
 
2.2.3 IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
Matson and Matson (2007) highlight twenty potentially troublesome Lean issues (table 
2.4) which were identified by “previous surveys of Just-in-Time [Lean] companies” 
(p433). Their research found that poor production quality and poor quality of supplied 
parts were the most frequently cited problems.  This list of issues is based on 
previously known or suggested issues. Sources utilised were primarily published in the 
1990s and can therefore not be posited as new or up-to-date. The continuously 
evolving nature of Lean systems may result in new issues which Matson and Matson 
(2007) is not equipped to identify. However, this research does provide value in 
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empirically testing the prevalence of these potential problem areas and how often they 
typically occur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-4 Potentially Troublesome Just-in-Time/Lean Issues  
Source: Matson and Matson (2007) 
 
Lean implementation issues can include employee resistance, management resistance 
to sharing authority with employees, lack of supplier co-operation and demand forecast 
uncertainty (Yasin et al. 2001). To enhance the success of Lean implementation firms 
should systematically train both management and staff. This will help to create an 
organisational culture consistent Just-in-Time philosophy and will help prevent lack of 
support and resistance to the changes (Yasin et al. 2001). Quality, cost and philosophy 
criteria for suppliers should be defined by establishing new supplier interaction 
procedures. Private sector organisations should identify where standardisation, 
automation and simplification are needed through analysis of operations. “Operational 
processes and procedures should be re-engineered based on the operations analysis prior 
to the implementation of Just-in-Time” (Yasin et al. 2001: p1202). Without addressing 
these issues supplier and human related problems are likely to arise (Yasin et al. 2001).  
1. Lack of supplier support 
2. Supplier inability to deliver materials on time 
3. Substantial distance between suppliers and customers 
4. Poor production quality 
5. Poor quality of supplied parts 
6. Difficulty establishing systems to support JIT 
7. Poor and/or inaccurate data 
8. Difficulty establishing accounting practices to support JIT 
9. Training difficulties 
10. Lack of JIT information 
11. Lack of top management support 
12. Lack of employee support 
13. Union difficulties 
14. Difficulty achieving setup time reduction 
15. Difficulty laying out the facility to support JIT 
16. Difficulty implementing smaller lot sizes 
17. Unstable customer schedules/scheduling 
18. Difficulty with large number of items produced and/or amount of material handed 
19. Forecasting inaccuracies 
20. Difficulty justifying JIT 
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It is important to focus on “driving out volatility” in Lean implementations (Towill 2007: 
p3626). General Motors was found to be the worst original equipment manufacturer in 
terms of overall induced supplier uncertainty whereas Nissan was found to be the best 
(Toyota were a close second). US plants were noticeably worse than their Japanese 
counterparts (Towill 2007). The original equipment manufacturer can have a negative 
impact on the supplier’s efforts to implement Lean due to pressures to meet 
requirements or uneven and unpredictable demand (Matson and Matson 2007). Lean 
implementation is a long-term goal. “The ideology, objectives, practice, and outcomes of 
successfully implementing TPS are less transparent than many gurus and management 
consultants will admit” (Towill 2007: p3624). 
 
2.3 HUMAN ELEMENTS OF LEAN 
The focus on efficiencies possible through Lean implementation has arguably 
overshadowed the effects of Lean on the workforce. Current Lean literature, 
particularly in Operations Management, focuses on the technical elements of Lean. 
Interest in human issues in Operations Management has recently increased, however 
“the topic is infrequently covered in Operations Management research journals” 
(Neumann and Dul 2010: p924). Hines et al. (2004) argue that “Lean should be regarded 
as more than a set of mechanistic hard tools and techniques and the human dimensions of 
motivation, empowerment and respect for people are very important” (p998). It is 
essential for future studies to address the imbalance between the number of technical 
and human focused studies to ensure that we fully understand the phenomenon. 
Therefore, this section will provide a brief overview of Operations Management 
research focusing on human factors. 
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“In the 278 pages of The Machine That Changed The World there is not a single quote 
from the people who work within the system… Books like The Machine That Changed The 
World just look at the numbers without any regard to the human costs of Lean work 
implementation. They talk about high productivity and extol the fast assembly-line speeds. 
But on these lines, workers must work every second of every minute, without a moment 
for a break” (Mehri 2006: p25)  
 
Conti et al. (2006) conducted a mixed-method study to assess the impact of stress on 
workers in Lean environments. The research used existing frameworks to underpin 
their empirical study including the ASSET questionnaire which is designed to measure 
mental and physical job stress. Participants were from twenty UK production facilities 
which had implemented Lean to ‘some degree’. A questionnaire completed at each site 
by manufacturing and human resource management used a five-point Likert scale to 
assess the degree to which ten key Lean elements were implemented (table 2-5).  These 
elements shared some similarities with Shah and Ward’s (2007) ten dimensions (see 
table 2-2) of Lean; (i) supplier development/feedback/partnerships, (ii) preventive / 
productive maintenance, (iii) Kanban / pull, and (iv) low setup / setup reduction. An 
observational study was also conducted and the findings triangulated with the 
management questionnaires. Finally, workers completed a questionnaire to establish 
the perceived work practices at each production facility. A panel of Lean practitioners, 
consultants and researchers assessed the validity of the items (Conti et al. 2006). 
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Table 2-5 Lean Production Elements, Definitions and References 
Source:  Conti et al. (2006) 
 
Lean was found to not be inherently stressful (Conti et al. 2006). The level of stress in 
Lean operations is affected by management decisions concerning the design and 
operation of production systems. Whereas Lean implementation can result in 
performance improvement this is not dependent on utilising stressful practices. Stress 
levels do not increase in line with improvements. Benefits achieved through being Lean 
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are not conditional on the use of stressful practices. Low job control, typical of Lean 
plants, can actually decrease job stress through removing frustrations including 
inability to locate correct parts, or fitting poorly designed parts (Conti et al. 2006). Lean 
also has the potential to be intrinsically motivating (de Treville and Antonakis 2006). 
However, the level of intrinsic motivation will differ significantly depending on the 
specific configuration of the Lean operation.  
 
The use of a highly specific concise set of Lean items to assess levels of Lean could 
result in an inaccurate assessment of the participants’ level of Leanness. The focus on 
UK plants arguably prevents Conti et al. (2010) from being able to provide a conclusion 
that is universally relevant due to the likelihood of Lean being adapted to suit national 
contexts (cf. Cooney 2002). 
 
Employee approval of Lean Production at an American car plant which transferred 
ownership from a U.S. company to a Japanese company was low (Shadur et al. 1995). 
The transfer of the facility, and its employees, occurred after the negotiation of 
redundancy pay and was therefore not viewed positively, particularly by personnel 
with long service records. Whilst union representatives acknowledged the system’s 
improved efficiency they expressed concerns over employee welfare, particularly 
concerning a perceived increase of stress and pressure. Additionally Lean’s team based 
structure was viewed as isolating grievances in small groups thus damaging the impact 
of the unions (Shadur et al. 1995). 
 
Shadur et al.’s (1995) study was conducted two years after Lean implementation. 
Questionnaires were distributed to a random sample of 445 employees. The response 
rate was 45% (200 responses). The study found that speed of work and company 
commitment were predictors of employee approval of Lean Production. Therefore, 
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companies which ensure the speed of work is satisfactory and cultivate a highly-
committed workforce may ‘enhance’ the adoption of Lean. Additionally, in some 
circumstances employee age can affect approval and therefore older employees’ needs 
should be considered. Job satisfaction, teamwork orientation, consultation and 
perceived level of stress were not identified as predictors of approval.  
 
Neumann and Dul (2010) conducted a ‘systematic’ literature search to “identify peer-
reviewed papers that presented empirical elements of both the human and the system 
effects of OS design changes in manufacturing” (p927). It was not possible to define 
system effects and human effects with a concise set of terms and therefore several 
terms were used which were considered to identify papers which discuss each concept. 
Three databases (Web of Science, Ergonomics Abstracts, and Business Source Elite) 
were used to search for relevant English language articles which were published in 
journals indexed by Thomson Scientific’s Institute of Scientific Information. A total of 
45 empirical studies were identified (through two literature search phases) which 
discuss both the system effects and human effects of operating system design. Table 2-6 
shows the types of human effects identified in the study. 
 
Table 2-6 Types of Human Effects Included in the Identified Pool Studies 
Source: Neumann and Dul (2010) 
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“The set of design choices made during system (re)design lead simultaneously to both 
human and system effects” (Neumann and Dul 2010: p926). Both human effects, and 
systems effects, can be improved by the application of Human Factors. Human Factors 
concerns the optimisation of human well-being and overall system performance 
through understating how employees interact with system elements. Human Factor 
literature is often separated from Operations Management research, rarely appears in 
business and management journals, and is primarily confined to journals which focus 
on employee well-being (Neumann and Dul 2010). Operations Management 
researchers typically study the system effects whereas human effects are the focus of 
worker health researchers. Operations Management and Human Factors researchers 
need to produce collaborative research to widen our existing knowledge and increase 
inter-disciplinary Human Factors – Operations Management studies. “Future research 
into OS design alternatives should include Human Factors aspects as well as both human 
and system effects… Collaboration between Human Factors researchers and Operations 
Management researchers can help to span the gap between Operations Management and 
Human Resource Management” (Neumann and Dul 2010: p942). 
 
For Lean knowledge to progress we require empirical studies which focus on both the 
technical and human elements of Lean in practice. The study of human elements in 
Lean is not new - “early criticism of Lean production was concerned with the effect it had 
on the worker” (Radnor and Boaden 2004: p425). Our current Lean knowledge is 
however focused on the technical elements, or ‘tools of Lean’. Radnor and Walley 
(2008b) warn against solely focusing on the implementation of Lean tools without 
considering the principles and conditions underpinning Lean. Through shifting a focus 
to these principles and conditions, including human elements within Lean, we also have 
the potential to help practitioners.  
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2.4 CRITICISMS OF LEAN 
Lean criticisms range from a focus on technical elements to discussions on the human 
impact of Lean. These criticisms are discussed in the following two sections. 
 
2.4.1 CRITICISM OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS 
The significant interest surrounding Lean is ‘unsurprising’. Highly positive results from 
the International Motor Vehicle Programme’s research combined with the studies 
based on, and in support of, their findings have cultivated interest in Lean principles 
(Lewis 2000). The production system and its constant battle against waste “made it 
seem almost axiomatic that Lean implied better” (Lewis 2000: p960). Williams et al. 
(1992) claim that the International Motor Vehicle Programme’s plant performance data 
is inaccurate as the performance gap has never been precisely measured and causes 
haven’t been identified. They view the world as comprised of good and bad companies 
which can be turned into good companies by managers, viz, “privileged agents of 
change” (p323). Womack et al. (1990) do not establish that the long run result of 
Japanese competitive success will be balanced trade and multi-regional production. 
There is also no explanation to how Japanese plants take labour out and control labour 
costs. Even though the Japanese have the advantage of better manufacturability, higher 
capacity utilisation and long hours and wages in the supplier networks their added 
performance compared to American firms was not 2:1 but was in fact marginal 
(Williams et al. 1992). 
 
There is a lack of understanding of the contingent nature required to apply Lean 
thinking (Hines et al. 2004). The shop floor is the major focus for many companies, 
particularly those in the car industry, who have yet to rely on recent integrative 
approaches. “The paradoxical situation of piecemeal Lean application is that the most 
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productive car plants in Europe produce into the highest level of finished stocks in Europe” 
(Hines et al. 2004: p998). Resulting from Europe’s build-to-forecast, rather than build-
to-order approach, was $18bn worth of unsold vehicles in European markets at the time 
of the research’s publication (Hines et al. 2004). 
 
Discussion concerning Lean has primarily focused on applying tools and techniques as 
opposed to strategic Level thinking (Hines et al. 2004). Pilkington (1998) argues that 
production managers must consider how techniques will fit into the business strategy. 
“Strategic approaches to manufacturing management have been missing in the models of 
Just-in-Time production, Lean production, flexible manufacturing and total quality 
control” (p31). Lean advocates pay little attention to external factors (i.e. business 
conditions) (Cooney 2002). Businesses must respond to these factors when making 
choices including the selection of an appropriate production system. The Lean model 
“ignores the limits of a theory which is focused solely upon the management practices of 
enterprises in that chain” (Cooney 2002: p1135) . Lean assumes that long-term supplier 
relationships will become the norm effectively smoothing the flow through the 
manufacturing chain. Short-term agreements disrupt this flow. Production levelling 
throughout the manufacturing chain is a precondition which may not always be 
achievable in practice. “Mass production practices were adjusted to conform with 
national and local institutions, as they spread in the 1930s and 1940s, and there is no 
reason to assume that the same will not apply to Lean Production practices” (Cooney 
2002: p1134). Whereas Lean seeks to manage variability and create capacity the 
system was created in a market with stable demand. Consequently demand variability 
is the main inhibitor of Lean implementation (Hines et al. 2004). 
  
Imitation is not manufacturing’s most valuable weapon; flexibility that enables the 
achievement of long-term goals is the most valuable weapon of manufacturing (Hayes 
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and Pisano 1994). Following a best practice approach can actually hinder rather than 
improve the performance of a company as was the case with Rover who implemented 
Honda’s systems. This resulted in the firm being prevented from pursuing the firm’s 
sales-led recovery. “The attractiveness of system imitation and the need for quick results 
often prevents their integration with strategic considerations” (Pilkington 1998: p40). A 
best practice approach advocates a ‘catch-up’ approach and in the long term is arguable 
insufficient. “The notion of Lean Production as a well-defined approach universally 
adopted throughout the Japanese car industry is inaccurate” (Pilkington 1998: p40). 
Pilkington (1998) argues that the individual systems of Japanese firms are not similar at 
all when analysed in isolation from each other and in more detail. Transplant factories 
also highlight differences from their respective mother plants. Both Nissan and Toyota 
plants in the UK differ from their Japanese counterparts as they are “more like the simple 
final assembly plants that any overseas firm would establish in a new market” (Pilkington 
1998: p37). 
 
2.4.2 CRITICISM OF HUMAN ELEMENTS 
The West’s largely positive view of the Toyota Production System is a result of our 
failure to distinguish between “tatemae (what you are supposed to feel or do) and honne 
(what you actually feel or do)” (Mehri 2006: p21). The realities of the Toyota Production 
System are dangerous working conditions, poor working environment, narrow 
skillsets, limited potential for innovation and creativity, excessive overtime, 
harassment of workers and isolation of workers (Mehri 2006). Mehri (2006) worked as 
a ‘covert participant-observer’ at Nizumi, an upper-level Toyota group company, for 
three years. Nizumi was considered by Toyota to be an exemplar Lean operation. At 
time of publication he reported that Nizumi had been a Toyota keiretsu affiliate (within 
the Toyota industrial pyramid) for several years. Mehri’s (2006) data collection 
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methods included direct observation, informal (unstructured) interviews and ‘more 
formally’ structured interviews. Most interviews were conducted with employees at 
Nizumi with the remainder being off-site interviews with politicians, labour scholars, 
lawyers and members of the community.  
 
Mehri (2006) claims that the true impact of Lean is the human cost. “Lean work 
consumes less space not due to a superior production system but to gross negligence by 
the company, which subordinates the safety of its workers to lowering plant costs” (p25). 
Toyota operates through a culture of rules; written (i.e. internal documents), unwritten 
(learnt through observation) and cultural (learnt by simply living in Japan). These rules 
coerce employees into sharing “attitudes, values and goals as defined by the group, the 
team or the entire corporation” (Mehri 2006: p25). These rules were either formal 
(enforceable) or informal (not enforceable), and dictated which were the correct 
gestures and language to be used in talking to superiors. Infringement of rules results 
in an employee being punished as a deterrent to others.   
 
Lean has moved beyond Toyota’s well publicised production system (cf. Schonberger 
2007). The ‘human cost’ of Nizumi’s implementation of Lean is not necessarily 
guaranteed to appear in other Lean implementations. This insight does not provide any 
indication as to whether this behaviour was present due to the way Nizumi utilises 
Lean or whether this is a side-effect of the efficiencies Lean can achieve. It is possible 
for companies to be excessively Lean resulting in adverse effects, including negative 
side-effects on the firm’s workers (de Treville and Antonakis 2006). Further research 
to assess the degree of Leanness at Nizumi could provide insight as to whether the 
‘human cost’ could be due to the company being too Lean. Williams et al. (1992) and 
Garrahan and Stewart’s (1992) also suggest that Lean can involve a ‘human cost’. “The 
experience of isolation through personal exclusion and dislocation creates a dependence 
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on the ‘Nissan Way’. This allows for commitment to personal security through working for 
devolved worker-managing strategies (Kaizen, VES and Neighbour Check). If this doesn’t 
work, passivity can be guaranteed as individuals are told to ‘put up or shut up’” (Garrahan 
and Stewart 1992: p139). 
 
There is a critical point where organisations can become excessively Lean (de Treville 
and Antonakis 2006). The result is a decrease in job rotation, training and participation 
of workers. Firms can enter the state of corporate anorexia where working conditions 
decrease and managers become addicted to increasing a firm’s Leanness (Radnor and 
Boaden 2004). Corporate anorexia can be defined as “the inability to utilise or balance 
effectively the facets/resources of the organisation” (Radnor and Boaden 2004: p424). 
Where Lean firms are optimised to compete efficiently in a specific market changing to 
serve different markets can cause the state of corporate anorexia. It is possible to gain 
an indication of a company’s state of health and in doing so prevent permanent damage 
by formulating a solution based on whether corporate anorexia was likely or not likely, 
to be permanent (Radnor and Boaden 2004).  
 
2.5 VIEWS OF LEAN TABLE 
The confusion surrounding Lean posits the need to use multiple Lean definitions to 
increase accuracy in studying the phenomenon. The complex, context-based nature of 
Lean (Taylor and Taylor 2008) has resulted in accounts that include views and mixes of 
elements which are both different and valuable in contributing to our understanding of 
Lean. Contextual factors significantly affect the use of Lean practices (Sousa and Voss 
2008). We need to understand the definition variations as these can cause problems on 
both a theoretical and practical level. Empirical studies which focus on a singular Lean 
definition risk omitting features which may not be part of the theoretical construct but 
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are, in practice, crucial to the Lean operation. Similarly, empirical studies need to utilise 
approaches which are flexible and allow for elements which we do not consider to be 
typical of Lean to emerge. Shah and Ward (2007) and Pettersen (2009) are two studies 
which aim to increase validity through use of multiple accounts of Lean. As a result, 
they provide a good starting point to bringing together further accounts of Lean, which 
view the phenomenon through differing lenses, into one Views of Lean Table. 
 
Shah and Ward (2007) used 11 existing studies to aid in identifying items and 
underlying components which represent Lean Production. “The empirical objective of 
this study is to identify the dimensional structure underlying Lean production and to 
develop reliable and valid scales to represent it” (p792). To achieve this objective, they 
conducted a detailed literature review which identified 25 measurement instruments 
from 11 articles which are “associated with the operational instruments used to measure 
the components of Lean Production” (p788). These measures where then assessed 
through a two-stage process; (i) structured interviews with 10 practitioners working in 
manufacturing firms at varying stages of Lean implementation, (ii) followed by a pre-
test of scale items with practitioners and academics. Statistical analysis and a large-
scale survey (utilising confirmatory factor analysis to analyse findings) then resulted in 
the identification of 48 items and 10 operational constructs (see figure 2.4).  
 
 
Figure 2-4 Conceptual and Empirical Mapping of Lean Production 
Source: Shah and Ward (2007) 
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Shah and Ward’s (2007) mapping of Lean Production omits elements others cite as 
belonging to Lean. For example, their study does not include Hoshin Kanri (policy 
deployment) which Womack et al. (1990) cites as an element of Lean. The focus on 
elements of Lean that reduce, or eliminate variability also results in a more technical 
mapping which contains limited detail regarding human elements. However the study’s 
outcome does identify what Shah and Ward (2007) consider to be the “dimensional 
structure underlying Lean” (p788) and not a comprehensive account of all elements 
found in Lean operations. 
 
Pettersen (2009) takes an alternative approach in aggregating what he considers to be 
key views of Lean into a single table sorted by accumulated frequency. The resulting 
data is sourced from a total of ten books from which 33 characteristics of Lean were 
identified. These sources were deemed to contain “presentations of techniques and/or 
overall goals associated with Lean Production, thus contributing to a conceptual 
discussion” (p129).  
 
There are several criticisms of Pettersen’s (2009) study. Firstly, he claims that the 20 
most cited articles containing the terms Lean Production or Lean Manufacturing from 
two citation databases (ISI and Scopus) were chosen for further study. From these 
articles the most influential books were identified based on the results of a citation 
analysis program. However, he describes the literature review as involving “two 
database searches produced a total of 37 articles… a number of books turned up in the 
literature search… an investigation of the books’ citation rankings led to a filtering 
process with 13 books remaining” (p128). 3 books were omitted from Pettersen’s 
(2009) study owing to theirspecific focus leaving 10 books in total. This suggests a far 
less rigorous process of identifying influential books. Secondly, errors were identified 
in the study’s account of Ohno (1988). As a result, the remaining 9 books were carefully 
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studied to assess the study’s accuracy. There were no errors in the accounts of the 
other 9 books. Finally, despite identifying 12 articles (table 2-7) deemed suitable for 
further analysis his views of Lean table only concentrated on the 10 books. 
 
Krafcik (1988)     Oliver et al. (1996)  
Sanchez and Perez (2001)   Lewis (2000)     
Mumford (1994)    James-Moore and Gibbons (1997) 
MacDuffie et al. (1997)    Dankbaar (1997) 
White and Prybutok (2001)   Hayes and Pisano (1994) 
Jagdev and Browne (1998)   Cusumano (1994) 
Table 2-7 Twelve Articles Deemed Suitable for Further Analysis 
Source: Pettersen (2009) 
 
Pettersen (2009) provides a good starting point to collate multiple Lean definitions and 
in doing so increase accuracy in studying Lean. However, the focus on books, omission 
of journal articles, and lack of recently published sources presents the need to further 
expand the study. Combining his study with Shah and Ward’s  (2007) findings provides 
additional insight and extends the study to also cover journal articles. However, both 
studies are primarily technical focused. It is therefore important to also include articles 
which focus on human elements and offer alternative views of Lean in forming a Views 
of Lean Table. Therefore not all of the additional 12 articles identified by Pettersen 
(2009) will be included in the expanded study.  
 
To expand Pettersen’s (2009) original dataset this research has been selective in the 
choice of articles to be included in a Views of Lean Table. A detailed search of two major 
databases (ABI/INFORM and Business Source Complete) was conducted using the key 
terms Lean, Lean Production and Lean Manufacturing. A detailed search using the 
terms Just-in-Time and Toyota Production System was also conducted for this 
47 
 
literature review but not utilised for the Views of Lean Table. This is due to the terms 
Lean, Lean Production, and Lean Manufacturing being commonly accepted as the most 
up-to-date taxonomies for the phenomenon. Articles were also identified through 
searching sources reviewed for this chapter. 
 
The following table (table 2-8) provides a list of the selected articles along with 
justification for their inclusion in the Views of Lean Table. Whereas the choice of these 
articles was subjective (as opposed to being based on the number of citations) it is 
deemed that this collection of articles provides a wide-range of viewpoints and is 
relatively recent. Two of the articles were also included in Pettersen’s (2009) original 
study but considered valuable additions due to the reasons provided. 
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Source Justification 
Schonberger 
(2007) 
Provides a more up-to-date analysis of Lean and the Western modifications to the 
phenomenon. Schonberger (2007) provides a holistic view of Lean and identifies 
elements which are not included in Pettersen (2009) and Shah and Ward’s (2007) 
studies. 
Cusumano 
(1994) 
This article was included in Pettersen’s (2009) selection of articles but chosen due 
to its negative view of Lean. Cusumano (1994) provides a concise view of Lean 
whilst identifying elements which are not included in Pettersen (2009) and Shah 
and Ward’s (2007) studies. 
Aoki (2008) Aoki (2008) provides further depth by including the possibility that communities of 
practice (COP) are commonplace in Lean systems. “In this perspective, people learn 
something through participating in a practice, and also develop their identities 
through the participation” (p523).  A COP has the drawback of creating subcultures 
with their own norms and language that may not match the company’s norms and 
language. Additionally it may be difficult to share a COP’s norms and language with 
people outside of that group. Whereas Aoki (2008) focuses on Kaizen, rather than 
Lean in general, the interesting perspective warrants inclusion in this study. 
Mehri (2006) Provides an insider perspective into the realities of Lean. The article focuses on 
human, rather than technical elements of Lean. Mehri (2006) reveals social 
mechanisms such as bullying, harassment, inter-department rivalry and an ‘old 
boys’ culture where those with a face-that-fits are the employees moving through 
company ranks. Central to the study is the idea of tatemae/honne, viz what you say 
and do in public is different. 
Lewis (2000) Lewis (2000) discusses whether Lean can provide a sustainable competitive 
advantage. He conducted an ‘opportunistic’ empirical study of fourteen 
manufacturing firms which have between 150 – 500 employees. Managers were 
asked to identify which Lean techniques (as defined by Womack et al. (1990), Oliver 
and Hunter, Schonberger (1982) and Schonberger (1986))  were utilised by their 
company. Lewis (2000) provides the results of the three top firms which were 
adopting more than 60% of the characteristics. This focuses not only on supplier 
inputs and manufacturing processes but human resources as well. The results from 
these top three firms therefore provide a good view of both the technical and human 
elements of Lean in practice. 
Table 2-8 Additional articles and justification for selection 
 
The Views of Lean Table combines Pettersen (2009), Shah and Ward’s (2007) findings, 
and the additional five articles listed in the above table. In total the Views of Lean Table 
includes 10 books and 17 articles (11 by incorporating Shah and Ward’s study). 
Whereas the Views of Lean Table does not claim to represent the gamut of views 
existing in Lean literature this dataset provides a more valuable source to utilise in 
empirical protocols which aim to identify Lean elements in existing operations. The 
Views of Lean Table is shown in table 2.9. Due to the errors identified in Pettersen’s 
(2009) account of Ohno (1988) this source was re-examined with the differences 
shown in black. Notes can be found in Appendix A (p241).  
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Table 2-9 Views of Lean Table 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
O
h
n
o
 
(1
9
8
8
)
Sc
h
o
n
b
er
ge
r 
(2
0
0
7
)
A
o
k
i 
(2
0
0
9
)₁
₀
M
eh
ri
 
(1
9
9
6
)₁
₁
L
ew
is
 
(2
0
0
0
)
C
u
su
m
an
o
 
(1
9
9
6
)
Sh
ah
 &
 
W
ar
d
 
(2
0
0
7
)
W
o
m
ac
k
 &
 
Jo
n
es
 (
2
0
0
3
) 
&
 W
o
m
ac
k
 e
t 
al
 (
1
9
9
0
)
L
ik
er
 
(2
0
0
4
)
B
ic
h
en
o
 
(2
0
0
4
)
D
en
n
is
 
(2
0
0
2
)
F
el
d
 
(2
0
0
1
)
Sh
in
go
 
(1
9
8
4
)
M
o
n
d
en
 
(1
9
9
8
) 
Sc
h
o
n
b
er
ge
r 
(1
9
8
2
)
1
K
ai
ze
n
 /
 C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s 
im
p
ro
v
em
en
t₁
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
2
Ju
st
-i
n
-t
im
e
●
●
●
●
●
●
₇
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
3
K
an
b
an
 /
 p
u
ll
 s
y
st
em
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
4
Se
tu
p
 t
im
e 
re
d
u
ct
io
n
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
5
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 l
ev
el
in
g 
(H
ei
ju
n
k
a)
●
●
●
₂₂
●
●
₆
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
6
Sm
al
l 
lo
t 
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
7
In
v
en
to
ry
 r
ed
u
ct
io
n
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
8
5
S/
H
o
u
se
k
ee
p
in
g
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
9
W
as
te
 e
li
m
in
at
io
n
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
1
0
Su
p
p
li
er
 i
n
v
o
lv
em
en
t
●
₂
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
1
1
P
o
k
a 
y
o
k
e₄
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
1
2
St
an
d
ar
d
is
ed
 w
o
rk
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
1
3
A
n
d
o
n
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
1
4
V
is
u
al
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
an
d
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
1
5
T
P
M
 /
 p
re
v
en
ta
ti
v
e 
m
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
1
6
Im
p
ro
v
em
en
t 
ci
rc
le
s
N
O
₃
●
●
●
₁₉
●
₈
●
●
●
●
A
d
d
it
io
n
al
 S
o
u
rc
es
P
et
te
rs
en
 (
2
0
0
9
)
50 
 
 
Table 2-9 Views of Lean Table (continued) 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
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Table 2-9 Views of Lean Table (continued) 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
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Table 2-9 Views of Lean Table (continued) 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
 
O
h
n
o
 
(1
9
8
8
)
Sc
h
o
n
b
er
ge
r 
(2
0
0
7
)
A
o
k
i 
(2
0
0
9
)₁
₀
M
eh
ri
 
(1
9
9
6
)₁
₁
L
ew
is
 
(2
0
0
0
)
C
u
su
m
an
o
 
(1
9
9
6
)
Sh
ah
 &
 
W
ar
d
 
(2
0
0
7
)
W
o
m
ac
k
 &
 
Jo
n
es
 (
2
0
0
3
) 
&
 W
o
m
ac
k
 e
t 
al
 (
1
9
9
0
)
L
ik
er
 
(2
0
0
4
)
B
ic
h
en
o
 
(2
0
0
4
)
D
en
n
is
 
(2
0
0
2
)
F
el
d
 
(2
0
0
1
)
Sh
in
go
 
(1
9
8
4
)
M
o
n
d
en
 
(1
9
9
8
) 
Sc
h
o
n
b
er
ge
r 
(1
9
8
2
)
4
9
P
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
 t
h
ro
u
gh
 
b
ei
n
g 
cl
o
se
 t
o
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t
●
5
0
M
an
ag
er
 i
s 
p
ar
en
t,
 
su
b
o
rd
in
at
e 
is
 c
h
il
d
 
(h
ie
ra
rc
h
ic
al
)
●
5
1
R
el
en
tl
es
s 
li
n
e 
sp
ee
d
s
●
5
2
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
s 
re
q
u
ir
ed
 t
o
 
h
av
e 
w
o
rk
 e
xp
er
ie
n
ce
●
5
3
D
es
ig
n
 f
o
r 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
re
N
O
●
5
4
In
n
o
v
at
io
n
 t
h
ro
u
gh
 
co
p
y
 a
n
d
 e
n
h
an
ce
●
5
5
In
te
n
se
 r
iv
al
ry
 a
n
d
 
re
si
st
an
ce
 t
o
 c
o
-o
p
er
at
e 
b
et
w
ee
n
 d
ep
ts
●
5
6
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 -
re
la
te
d
 
p
ay
●
5
7
P
ro
fi
t-
sh
ar
in
g 
sc
h
em
e
●
5
8
In
d
u
ct
iv
e 
p
ro
b
le
m
 
so
lv
in
g
●
5
9
H
ig
h
 l
ev
el
s 
o
f 
su
b
co
n
tr
ac
ti
n
g
●
6
0
C
u
lt
u
re
 o
f 
ru
le
s
●
₁₃
6
1
P
ro
fi
t 
o
v
er
 e
m
p
lo
y
ee
 
w
el
fa
re
●
₁₇
6
2
T
at
em
ae
/h
o
n
n
e 
(p
ri
v
at
e 
v
s 
p
u
b
li
c)
●
₁₄
6
3
In
n
o
v
at
io
n
 f
ro
m
 
o
u
ts
id
e
●
₁₅
A
d
d
it
io
n
al
 S
o
u
rc
es
P
et
te
rs
en
 (
2
0
0
9
)
53 
 
This research found an additional 30 cited Lean elements not included in Pettersen 
(2009) and an additional 48 elements not included in Shah and Ward (2007). A number 
of these additional elements are potential effects on the employee. The only 
unanimously cited Views of Lean item was Kaizen which will have different 
implications in different contexts. Twelve or more sources cited setup time reduction, 
Just-in-Time, Kanban/pull system and production levelling as Lean elements. 
Eliminating non-value adding activities is central to Lean however there is no universal 
description as to what a non-value adding activity is – its context dependent. One 
company’s waste could therefore be another’s value adding activity. 
 
Lean cannot be defined as a neat, and concise, set of tools and practices. From studying 
the Views of Lean Table it is clear that such an approach may cause more problems 
than it solves. Despite there being a wealth of research regarding Lean there is still a lot 
to learn. Human elements, or consequences, of Lean are a key criticism of the 
phenomenon yet prominence in research is still often given to technical elements. 
Radnor and Boaden (2004) and De Treville and Antonakis (2006) raise the problem of 
companies being excessively Lean, becoming fixated on constantly driving through 
Lean initiatives at a cost of entering a state of corporate anorexia whereby assets are 
unbalanced and quality of work-life decreases. Companies will not benefit from 
focusing solely on implementing Lean tools (Radnor and Walley 2008b) and, to allow 
us to benefit practice we should not focus solely on Lean tools either. We therefore 
need to include human elements in future Lean research whilst looking to increase 
collaboration between Human Factors and Operations Management researchers to help 
further our knowledge (Neumann and Dul 2010). 
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The Views of Lean Table is not intended to provide an exhaustive list of Lean views. The 
differing views of Lean represented in the table allows this research, and other 
research, to base empirical protocols on a number of views thus potentially increasing 
the value of any findings. Furthermore, the significant interest surrounding Lean and 
wealth of Lean literature make it difficult to establish a dataset which fully covers all 
views of Lean. To contribute towards our knowledge of Lean it is important to compare 
not only academic views of Lean but to also compare our knowledge with real-life 
examples of Lean operations. The following chapter therefore details the methodology 
behind this study’s empirical study at the Nissan Sunderland Plant. 
 
2.6 NISSAN PRODUCTION WAY 
The Nissan Production Way is Nissan’s global standard manufacturing system. The 
Nissan Production Way’s philosophy is “build it right the first time and do it with the 
minimum amount of resources or, better yet, quality driven, waste free” (Dodge 2004). 
Established in 1994 the system is a manifestation of lean utilising tools including kaizen 
and just-in-time (Nissan 2008b: p22). Central to the Nissan Production Way is Douki 
Seisan, viz the ideal situation. Douki Seisan advocates following a rigid production 
sequence and ensuring that product flow is consistent to avoid disruption. “It is the 
state of production where the whole manufacturing process (including the supplier base) 
receives order information at the same time, allowing them to schedule and build to 
order” (Nissan 2008b: p22).  
 
Nissan cite quality as being key aiming to be best in class and incorporating Total 
Quality Management into their production system. Through consistently and correctly 
applying the Nissan Production Way, Nissan claims to use financial resources 
effectively, improve manufacturing capability and enhance customer satisfaction. The 
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Nissan Production Way’s complementary tools and techniques also include Genba 
Kanri, Improvement Diagnostic System, and Quality Circle Stories. Genba Kanri is the 
system by which standards for running the day-to-day business are established, 
maintained, controlled and improved. Total Preventative Maintenance is a systematic 
approach involving all employees in executing maintenance with the goal of achieving 
zero breakdowns and zero defects. Quality Circle Stories are a way of ensuring that 
those outside of a Quality Circle are able to benefit from any findings. The following 
figure provides Nissan’s visualisation of the Nissan Production Way. 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Nissan Production Way 
Adapted from: Nissan (2008b) 
 
Research focusing on the Nissan Production Way and the specific practices that form 
the system is limited. Notable works published in 1987 by the Nissan Sunderland Plant 
Director of Personnel (at time of publication) Peter Wickens and in 1992 by Garrahan 
and Stewart were produced before the introduction of the Nissan Production Way at 
Nissan Sunderland Plant, Nissan’s financial crisis and the formation of the Renault-
Nissan Alliance.  
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Wickens (1987) focuses on the human resource management at the Nissan Sunderland 
Plant. “It is essential that we look at the ‘people’ part of our businesses in the same way as 
we look at investment or product – and that is strategically” (p182). He claims that, at 
the time of publication, Nissan’s management tripod consisted of teamwork, quality 
and flexibility. For teamwork to exist managers must genuinely want to involve their 
employees and keep them informed. Additionally, work practices must enable 
flexibility and terms and conditions of employment need to be standardised. Flexibility 
also involves the use of temporary staff (often employed around vehicle registration 
changes) that are carefully selected, recruited and trained prior to commencing 
employment. Nissan views such appointments as a step towards permanent 
employment. Quality forms a major part of Nissan Sunderland Plant’s human relation 
policies and is considered to be the highest priority. Quality circles, kaizen and 
employee involvement are utilised alongside formal processes designed to resolve 
bigger issues that may also require the use of statistical techniques.  
 
Wickens (1987) paints a largely positive image of the Nissan Sunderland Plant. “Quality 
standards exceed Nissan’s worldwide target, schedules are always met, the commitment 
of all staff can, according to most visitors, virtually be felt, improvements in quality and 
productivity are constantly made by the people actually doing the job, turnover and 
absenteeism is low, lateness is virtually non-existent” (p189). 
 
In contrast, Garrahan and Stewart (1992) are highly critical of the Nissan Sunderland 
Plant. They claim that the plant achieves social control through management-by-stress 
using inter-group rivalry and peer competition. Quality, flexibility, consensus and 
teamwork (viz, the Nissan Way) are used to control, exploit and monitor staff. “The 
experience of isolation through personal exclusion and dislocation creates a dependence 
on the ‘Nissan Way’. This allows for commitment to personal security through working for 
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devolved worker-managing strategies (kaizen, VES and Neighbour check). If this does not 
always work, passivity can be guaranteed as individuals are told to ‘put up or shut up’” 
(p139). Garrahan and Stewart (1992) claim that Nissan Sunderland Plant’s success can 
be attributed to national government support, union restraint and a passive workforce. 
 
Subsequent limited research focuses on individual, or related, aspects of the Nissan 
Production Way. For example Herron and Braiden’s (2006) research focuses on 
productivity improvement in manufacturing. Identified problems are addressed by 
applying lean tools which have been successfully utilised at the Nissan Sunderland 
Plant.  Reichhart and Holweg (2008) conducted a range of site visits and semi-
structured interviews at automotive plants including the Nissan Sunderland Plant. 
Their research explores co-located supplier clusters. They found, at the time of 
publication, that the NSP had loose co-location; “a number of key module suppliers (e.g. 
seats and cockpit module) are scattered loosely around the vehicle assembly plant, mostly 
within a distance of around 7 kilometres” (p65). Reichhart and Holweg (2008) also 
acknowledged that the Nissan Sunderland Plant had started to locate key suppliers on 
site in 2006. Sako (2004) studied supplier development at Honda, Nissan and Toyota 
but focuses on Nissan’s supplier relations before the Renault-Nissan alliance. 
 
To summarise there are limited studies focusing on the Nissan Production Way. 
Existing research primarily focuses on elements of the production system rather than 
taking a holistic approach. Furthermore, there does not appear to be a clear account of 
the Nissan Production Way which states exactly which elements form the production 
system.  
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2.7 LEAN LITERATURE POST-2009 
Since the completion of this study, and literature review, lean has continued to garner 
significant interest. “Lean has come a long way from its shop floor origins… it continues 
to evolve today and to infiltrate our strategic and operational management thinking into 
the twenty-first century” (Samuel et al. 2015: p1400). Lean research has continued to 
spread outside of automotive manufacturing to industries including software, food 
production, the luxury fashion market, and government services (e.g. Radnor 2010; 
Manzouri et al. 2014; Carmignani and Zammori 2015; Shah et al. 2015). There is a 
growing body of literature focused on Lean healthcare. The use of Lean tools and 
techniques within healthcare, including the NHS, is a reaction to constant pressure to 
improve efficiency and deliver value-for-money  (Radnor and Walley 2008a; Burgess 
and Radnor 2012; Burgess and Radnor 2013; Malmbrandt and Ahlstrom 2013; 
Matthias and Brown 2016). Similarly, other areas of the Public Sector (HMRC, Cabinet 
Office, HM Court Services), all facing similar pressures, are also exploring the use of 
Lean tools and techniques to help improve cost-efficiency (Hines et al. 2010; Carter et 
al. 2011b; Radnor and Johnston 2012; Waterman and McCue 2012; Proctor and Radnor 
2014; Carter et al. 2017). Despite a growing body of literature on the use of Lean in 
services studies are largely confined to larger enterprises. Research on the use of Lean 
in small to medium enterprises is limited and primarily focused on manufacturing 
(Qing et al. 2015).  
 
It is now more widely acknowledged amongst academics that an organisation’s culture 
it’s people, and the environment within which it operates, have an impact on a firm’s 
ability to implement and sustain Lean practices (Moyano-Fuentes and Sacristan-Diaz 
2012; Bhasin 2013; Jadhav et al. 2014; Proctor and Radnor 2014; Pakdil and Leonard 
2015; Wiengarten et al. 2015). It is also recognised that a country’s culture can also 
impact the success, or failure, of Lean adoption (Raffaella et al. 2011; Kull et al. 2014; 
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Oudhuis and Olsson 2015; Wiengarten et al. 2015). There is however limited research 
on the involvement of Human Resource specialists in Lean implementation, and in 
practice the benefits Human Resource Management can bring to Lean are not fully 
realised. For example, in attempts to transfer Lean Thinking to higher education 
Human Resource specialists are often left out of the process which can hinder the 
success of Lean implementation (Bamber et al. 2014; Thirkell and Ashman 2014).  
 
Academics continue to debate whether Lean has a positive or negative impact on the 
workforce. For example, Carter et al. (2011b; 2011a; 2013b; 2013a; 2017) focus on the 
human aspects of Lean as adopted by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.  Their work 
draws parallels to Mehri (2006) in that Lean is described as having a detrimental 
impact on sickness and morale, going as far as to call Lean “mean” and a “backwards 
step” for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. In contrast Proctor and Radnor (2014; 
2017) argue that the use of Lean at Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs has not been 
overwhelmingly negative. Whereas there are still challenges to Lean adoption, and 
varying levels of use across the organisation, the increased structure / predictability 
has given greater understanding as to how employees’ work contributes to the 
organisation’s overall goals.  
 
Studies on Lean continue to become increasingly multi-disciplinary. One area of 
increasing debate, in addition to human aspects in Lean, is Lean and sustainability. 
“Lean operations meet a wide range of sustainability outcomes beyond environmental 
benefits (including supply monitoring, transparency, workforce treatments, and 
community engagement” (Piercy and Rich 2015: p282). However, current studies on 
Lean and sustainability focus primarily on environmental benefits. Despite the 
“investigation of lean and sustainability interrelationships [being] perhaps one of the 
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most recently researched topics” existing studies are narrow in focus (Martinez Leon 
and Calvo-Amodio 2017: p4384).  
 
To summarise, our knowledge of Lean has advanced since the completion of this study 
in 2009. Research has moved beyond a one-dimensional focus on technical elements / 
practices of Lean to acknowledge that any implementation of Lean needs to consider 
the human aspects, and this might include the need to borrow learnings from Human 
Resource literature. The study of Lean continues to spread beyond manufacturing into 
Public Services (where healthcare is a key debate), software development, and other 
service based industries. The ever-increasing focus on the need to be responsible to our 
environment, and our communities, has arguably increased the importance around 
needing to be ‘Green and Lean’. Lean continues to generate significant debate over 40 
years since the publication of Sugimori et al. (1977). It is evident that the Lean 
philosophy, and its tools and practices, remain of significant interest to both academia 
and practice alike.  
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3 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter will review four methodologies frequently used in Operations 
Management before justifying the approach of this thesis. 
 
3.1 OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGIES 
The following four methodologies are frequently used in the Operations Management 
field; (i) modelling and simulation, (ii) survey, (iii) case study, and (iv) action research. 
This section explores each of these four methodologies and their application in 
Operations Management to inform the choice of methodology at each emergent phase 
of the research. 
 
3.1.1 MODELLING AND SIMULATION 
Quantitative methods such as model-based research are used prolifically in Operations 
Management research. Model-based theories can be defined as the development, 
analysis and testing of models of causal relationships between performance and control 
variables (Bertrand and Fransoo 2002). Model-based theory assumes that real-life 
decision problems and processes can be captured and explained through use of 
objective models. It is recognised that a change in one value in one variable will affect 
the same value in another variable, viz relationships between variables are causal. In 
contrast, in survey research, relationships between variables are often not quantitative 
and usually are not causal (Bertrand and Fransoo 2002). 
 
Bertrand and Fransoo (2002) split model-based research into axiomatic research and 
empirical research. Axiomatic research focuses on a defined model which is used to 
formulate solutions which must provide insights into the problem’s structure. 
Knowledge produced is based upon other variables within the model to produce 
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knowledge on the behaviour of specific variable(s). Empirical research aims to create a 
model which fits reality. Descriptive empirical research seeks to understand processes 
by creating a model that explains the real-life causal relationships. Prescriptive 
empirical research is concerned with improving the current situation by developing 
actions, strategies and policies.  
 
Simulation of models is often used when the problem or model is very complex and 
therefore it is not suitable to use formal mathematical analysis. Simulation often lowers 
the scientific quality but can cause a high increase in scientific relevance as a wider 
range of scientific models can be used. Simulation requires a higher degree of 
justification, an experimental design, statistical analysis of the results of the computer 
simulations and interpretations of results related to research questions (Bertrand and 
Fransoo 2002). 
 
An example of the use of model-based theory is the comparing of Kanban control with 
the theory of constraints using Markov chains (Takahashi et al. 2007). The research 
aimed to “research effective control systems for unbalanced production systems” (p3600). 
The authors compare the performance of Kanban control systems and the drum-duffer-
rope system using Markov analysis. 
 
The key criticisms of modelling and simulation are low external validity; heavy reliance 
on quantitative data could cost the chance to increase knowledge through comparing 
with qualitative data. The specific nature of the methodology allows for clarity in the 
research but at the same time is restrictive in scope. A high level of existing knowledge 
is needed which may not always be available and as reliability relies on explicit 
mathematics the skills of the researcher have a big impact on the quality of the 
research. 
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3.1.2 SURVEY 
Surveys involve the collection of data from individuals regarding the social units they 
belong to or about themselves. There are different types of survey research. 
Exploratory survey research provides an initial insight into a phenomenon and in doing 
so provides the basis for more detailed research. Confirmatory survey research is 
suitable for use when there is existing knowledge of a phenomenon which has been 
used to build theory. Research tests the validity of the existing theory developed in 
relation to the phenomenon. Finally, descriptive survey research can provide 
information to contribute to theory building and refinement but is not a theory building 
exercise. Survey research aims to describe the relevance of a phenomenon and its 
distribution in a population (Forza 2002). 
 
An example of survey research is the survey of car manufacturers’ and suppliers’ 
strategies and relations conducted by von Corswant and Fredriksson (2002). An 
identical questionnaire was administered to manufacturers and first tier suppliers to 
enable the authors to identify source related trends and to make future predictions. 
 
The use of survey research in operations management is increasing and the quality of 
survey research is also improving (Rungtusanatham et al. 2003). Surveys require 
meticulous planning and very careful wording of questions. The researcher must avoid 
bias or double barrelled questions. The language used must be universal to all to avoid 
any misinterpretations which could render the survey useless. Surveys are not an easy 
option for a researcher nor are they cheap. They require a systematic approach to be 
adopted (Marsh 1982).  
 
There is a very low degree of researcher involvement in the process and a high degree 
of control except at the survey completion stage. Generalisability can be achieved 
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through quality sampling. There is however limited control over the final respondent 
who may not be the person the survey was intended to be completed by, or the person 
best suited to answering the survey. Some respondents may have not answered the 
survey correctly or deliberately answered with misleading information. Forza (2002) 
adds that missing data is a key concern for all survey research. Despite potential 
drawbacks surveys can reach a wider audience compared to case research and action 
research and quality of the survey and sampling can reduce the chances for error. 
 
3.1.3 CASE STUDY 
Case research can be defined as a real life empirical investigation of a phenomenon (Yin 
2003).  Case studies are more flexible than surveys and models (Voss et al. 2002). 
Studies may be qualitative, quantitative or utilising mixed methods. Validity can be 
increased by triangulating data collection methods. Case studies are important in 
Operations Management research as case studies accommodate complexity and can be 
used in a number of ways. The approach “focuses on understanding the dynamics 
present within single settings” (Eisenhardt 1989: p534). Case research allows for a 
holistic perspective arising from the need to explain and understand complex 
phenomena and allow the exploration of real-life scenarios (Remenyi et al. 1998). Case 
research is “one of the most powerful research methods in operations management, 
particularly in the development of new theory” (Voss et al. 2002: p195).  
 
Case research is based on a limited number of cases where the use of statistical analysis 
might be limited (Voss et al. 2002). Whereas single cases are more suited to discovering 
a new phenomenon multiple case studies are suitable for phenomena where some 
knowledge exists but is largely unknown (Meredith 1998). Case research is personally 
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enriching for the researcher helping to provide inspiration for new ideas for both 
academia and practice (Voss et al. 2002).  
 
Yin (2003) suggests that case studies can be exploratory, explanatory, descriptive or 
both exploratory and explanatory or any other mix of exploratory, explanatory and 
descriptive. Voss et al (2002) suggest that there are four key research purposes; 
exploration, theory building, theory testing and theory extension/refinement. 
“Regardless of how cases are eventually used, research involving case data can usually get 
much closer to theoretical constructs” (Siggelkow 2007: p22). 
 
An example of mixed method case research in the automotive industry is Reichart and 
Holweg’s (2007) research in collaboration with a large vehicle manufacturer. Both 
quantitative and qualitative methods were used. The research utilised semi-structured 
interviews, secondary datasets and personal observation. The research concluded that 
there is an inherent conflict between the need to link the production pull signal to 
variable demand in the workplace and Lean manufacturing techniques. 
 
Limitations of case studies include potential bias in the case study and the ability of the 
researcher to set parameters of the research which consider available time and 
resources. Case research is challenging and not an easy option (Remenyi et al. 1998). 
Rigorous case research requires care in drawing generalisable conclusions and skilled 
interviewers (Voss et al 2002). It is for this reason that case studies need to be 
meticulously planned as many mistakes can be avoided in the planning stages 
(Remenyi et al. 1998). Case studies are costly both in time and financial resources. For 
example, Mehri’s (2006) detailed account of shortcomings in Toyota plants was only 
facilitated by his ability to use his employment to provide an insider perspective. 
However, Lewis (1998) argues that iterative triangulation can be used as a theory 
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development process using existing case studies thus reducing the financial and time 
aspects. “Iterative triangulation employs systematic iterations between literature review, 
case evidence, and intuition” (Lewis 1998: p456). Prior research has been conducted 
using existing case studies (Lewis 1998).   
 
3.1.4 ACTION RESEARCH 
Action research is not a new methodology but has been practiced as early as the mid-
1940’s (Coughlan and Coghlan 2002). In contrast to positivist thinking action research 
only aims to create knowledge whereas the term action research is generic and covers 
many forms of action-orientated research. Action research is not about researching 
action but instead researching in action. The researcher is an active participant in the 
process and takes a collaborative process in a sequential cyclical process of gathering 
data, making the data available to others in the process, analysing the data, planning for 
and taking action and finally evaluating (Coughlan and Coghlan 2002). Action research 
aims to combine action with reflection, theory and practice. It must be noted that action 
research is a systematic process of accumulating knowledge (Reason and Bradbury 
2001) and is therefore not to be mistaken for an easy option.  
 
Action research enables the researcher to explore links between theory and practice 
(Costello 2003). Although this method is an organic process researchers can anticipate 
what they need to consider by systematically designing some key variables at the 
outset (Coghlan and Shani 2005). The nature of data validation is contextually 
embedded and experimental, knowledge gained is specific and situational and the 
researcher is embedded into the process being an agent of change. Action research 
should be conducted in real time and is appropriate “when the research relates to 
describing an unfolding series of actions over time” (Coughlan and Coghlan 2002: p223). 
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An example of the use of action research regarding the evolution of manufacturing cells 
is provided by Chakravorty and Hales (2007). Their study sought to gain understanding 
of why manufacturing cells evolve over time. The authors argue that there are 
observational limitations for this research topic and therefore a real-time research 
method is required. The authors took a systematic process to using the methodology 
including a researcher-client agreement to establish relationships and to help gain 
internal validity. The researchers were actively involved in the case company. 
 
The key limitation of action research is the difficulty in gaining access. Securing access 
is more difficult than with case research due to the intensity of the researcher’s 
involvement with the company and its processes. Researchers are required to cope 
with uncertainty and are not in control of the flow of research. Coughlan and Coghlan 
(2002) claim that the key threat to action research validity is researcher bias. “As action 
researchers are engaged in the shaping and telling of a story, they need to consider the 
extent to which the story is a valid presentation of what has taken place and how it is 
understood, rather than a biased version” (p237). Quality of the overall research is 
essential; inferences need to be supported by observable data and reasoning needs to 
be explicit and open to critique. Due to the time and cost involved in undertaking action 
research there is a limited resource of action research papers in operations 
management (Coughlan and Coghlan 2002). 
 
3.2 DATA APPROACH 
Research can be qualitative, quantitative, or both. Qualitative research typically focuses 
on words whereas quantitative research focuses on numbers. Bryman and Bell (2007) 
suggest that qualitative research tends to have “an inductive view of the relationship 
between theory and research” (p402). Robson (2011) states that qualitative research is 
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generally small scale, focused on meanings and context, sees objectivity as “distancing 
the researcher from participants” (p19) and values the researcher’s self-awareness, 
openness and receptivity. Additionally, he claims that the research design is emergent 
and flexible with a focus on meanings and an importance placed on context. 
Generalisability is not a major concern (Robson 2011). The main data collections 
associated with qualitative research are interviews, narratives, focus groups and 
ethnography (Flick 2006; Bryman and Bell 2007). 
 
Quantitative research tends to be deductive with a pre-specified design that places an 
importance on reliability, generalisability, validity and replication. Objectivity and de-
contextualisation is sought to obtain a neutral position. Data analysis usually involves 
statistics (Robson 2011). Questionnaires / surveys are a key quantitative data 
collection tool. de Vaus (1991) notes that criticisms of surveys include being too 
restrictive due to rigid structures and the failure to look at the context in which 
people’s beliefs and actions occur. Questionnaires are however cheaper and quicker to 
administrate than interviews. They are more convenient for the respondent and 
remove interviewer effects and variability in administering the empirical study 
(Bryman and Bell 2007). 
 
Researchers must appreciate the value of both quantitative and qualitative as neither 
method is intrinsically better. The choice of the correct method is reliant on the 
research objectives (Silverman 2005). Hakim (1987) states that case studies usually 
employ multiple data collection methods. This research will employ the method best 
suited to each empirical stage whether that is quantitative or qualitative. The focus on 
employees, rather than being objective, posits that this research will be primarily 
qualitative. The following section discusses the level of access secured at the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant. 
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3.3 ACCESS TO NISSAN SUNDERLAND PLANT 
Access to the Nissan Sunderland Plant was obtained in September 2009 through 
contacts gained during an industrial placement at the facility and through the Press 
Office. The opportunity arose to interview production line personnel during scheduled 
downtime during Q4 2008. The downtime, a rarity, was in response to a fall in demand 
caused by the economic downturn. This level of access would have otherwise not been 
possible. In the November 2009 access was also granted to interview the two members 
of staff who work in the Nissan Production Way Office plus the senior of the Quality 
Assurance department who had completed studies focusing on the Nissan Production 
Way. The Nissan Sunderland Plant considers these individuals to have a concrete 
understanding of the Nissan Production Way.  
 
Support in administering a representative survey was also secured through the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant Press Office. Following the UK Government’s introduction of the car 
scrappage scheme in April 2009 demand for the Nissan Sunderland Plant’s models 
surged and production was increased to levels that required the hiring of 350 
temporary staff. This was in stark contrast to the beginning of the year which saw the 
Nissan Sunderland Plant lay-off 1200 staff to protect its long-term future (Massey 
2009a). This resulted in full support for this research being withdrawn due to the high 
workload at the plant. Access was however secured to administer the survey to a single 
department. Through consultation with the Nissan Sunderland Plant Press Office the 
Quality Assurance team was chosen due to their mix of production and office staff being 
the least dissimilar to that of the plant. All forty members of the team participated in 
the survey. 
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3.4 CHOICE OF APPROACH 
Restrictive access and time constraints make action research inappropriate for this 
study. Modelling and simulation relies on quantitative data and requires a high level of 
existing knowledge. The low level of existing knowledge and the aims of this research 
do not lend themselves to adopting modelling and simulation as the methodological 
approach. The access levels granted do not guarantee a representative sample or the 
volume required to be able to run statistical analyses on survey findings. This 
discounted the use of surveys as the study’s methodology.  
 
Operations Management theorists are faced with a significant challenge due to the 
evolution of managerial methods and operations technologies which may require a 
move away from the quantitative and deductive tools prevalent in operations research 
(Lewis 1998). Where there is confusion surrounding definitions of constructs (e.g. 
Lean) case studies are a useful tool (Mukherjee et al. 2000). Inductive case studies can 
be a good starting point if limited theoretical knowledge concerning a phenomenon 
exists  (Siggelkow 2007). The need for empirical studies of exemplar Lean operation, as 
identified from existing literature, posits an inductive single case study as the 
appropriate approach. This case study can be regarded as exploratory due to the 
limited existing research of both the Nissan Production Way and human factors in Lean. 
Voss et al (2002) highlights the use of case studies as a good strategy of exploratory 
investigations.  
 
Taylor and Taylor (2009) analysed all 310 articles published in the International 
Journal of Operations and Production Management during their tenure as editors (2004 
– 2009). They found that 87 papers (28% of total) used a case study method with 33% 
of this number (29 papers) using a single case. Siggelkow (2007) argues that a single 
case can be a very powerful example; “in fact, it is often desirable to choose a particular 
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organisation precisely because it is very special in the sense of allowing one to gain 
certain insights that other organisations would not be able to provide” (p20). He also 
suggests that the use of cases as illustrations is also valuable. 
 
3.5 RESEARCH PHASES 
This research contains five phases (figure 3.2). Firstly, this thesis has presented a 
detailed literature review from which a Views of Lean Table has emerged (Chapter 2). 
Chapter 4 presents data from an initial set of semi-structured interviews focused on 
gaining a view of life at Nissan Sunderland Plant. Chapter 5 presents data from a set of 
more in depth semi-structured interviews with Nissan Production Way Experts aimed 
at identifying the elements of this Lean Production system.  
 
Despite the literature identifying a view that intrinsic motivation was central to Lean 
(Sugimori et al. 1977) the first two empirical phases uncovered a focus on a continuous 
fight for survival and a lack of focus on intrinsic motivation. Chapter 6 explores this 
further through use of a small scale exploratory survey. Chapter 7 brings the results of 
the initial interviews, expert interviews, and exploratory survey together. The Nissan 
Production Way is added to the Views of Lean Table to enable comparison of 
academia’s interpretation of Lean and elements that form the Nissan Production Way. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Thesis high level overview  
 
The following subsections discuss the methodology for each of the five phases (Initial 
Interviews, Expert Interviews, and Exploratory Survey). 
Phase 1 
Views of 
Lean Table 
Phase 2 
Initial 
Interviews 
Phase 3 
Expert 
Interviews 
Phase 4 
Motivation 
Survey 
Phase 5 
Full Views of 
Lean Table 
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3.5.1 PHASE ONE: VIEWS OF LEAN TABLE 
The Views of Lean Table and the methods used to create the table, are discussed in 
section 2.5. (p43). The Views of Lean Table combines multiple views of Lean creating 
an aggregated set of elements which current literature associates with Lean. This phase 
answered RQ1: What is Lean? 
 
3.5.2 PHASE TWO: INITIAL INTERVIEWS 
The overall aim of Phase Two was to gain a holistic view of the Nissan Sunderland Plant 
and Nissan Production Way from the stance of an employee. Particular attention was 
paid to focusing on human issues. The objectives for this phase were as follows: 
 
1. To gain an understanding of the Nissan Sunderland Plant from an employee 
perspective 
2. To gain understanding of Nissan’s universal production system, the Nissan 
Production Way, from an employee perspective 
3. To gather employee perceptions of Nissan products 
4. To gather employee perceptions of how customers, perceive Nissan’s products 
5. To establish the key success factors for Nissan Sunderland Plant and Nissan 
globally from an employee perspective 
 
Initial interviews were exploratory and designed to identify the attitude of Nissan 
Sunderland Plant staff towards Nissan and the Nissan Production Way. Through 
gaining this information any human issues could be raised as prompts or direct 
questions in the subsequent expert interviews to encourage discussions covering 
human issues, as well as the more technical aspects of the system. 
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Access to personnel was gained through the Press Office who arranged the interviews 
and selected individuals based on criteria of selecting staff in both office, and 
production line, roles from different levels of seniority. Gaining access to interview 
production line staff is usually a difficult task due to the flow production system and 
Lean staffing levels. At the time of request (second half of 2008) the U.K. was in the 
midst of an economic downturn which resulted in reduced production levels including 
non-production days. This enabled access to the manager of Trim & Chassis Line 2 and 
seven members of his team. Access was also secured to four office staff. Of these twelve 
interviewees one was a manager, two were senior supervisors, two were supervisors, 
three were team leaders and four were team members. 
 
Initial interviews utilised open ended semi-structured interviews to allow the 
interviewer scope to direct the interview and prompt (probe) for more information 
where needed. Maykut and Morehouse (1994) claim that effectively using probes is an 
important skill as the purpose of qualitative interviews is to gain a deep understanding 
of interviewee views and experiences. Interviews were deemed to be the most 
appropriate data collection method due to the need to obtain employee opinions. This 
allowed for views to be individually sought and then collectively compared ensuring 
participants were not influenced by their peers. This was particularly important as 
employees of varying seniority levels were taking part and individuals may have felt 
uncomfortable expressing negative views in front of their superiors. It also took full 
opportunity of the access levels granted. At this point of the research it was vital to gain 
a general understanding and the task of formulating specific questions for a survey was 
not possible given the current level of knowledge. Open ended semi-structured 
interviews were therefore a logical choice to best gather the required information. 
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Phase two used convenience sampling, viz a sample that is accessible to the researcher. 
“In the field of business and research management, convenience samples are very common 
and indeed are more prominent than are samples based on probability” (Bryman and Bell 
2007: p198). Bryman and Bell (2007) state that convenience samples are not 
generalisable but acceptable when the gathered data is too good to miss - it can provide 
the basis for future research. Siggelkow (2007) argues that claiming to have a 
representative sample in case research is “a mismatch of method and goals: to say 
something’s representative, you need to pick a different methodology” (p21). 
  
Before conducting the actual interviews three pilot interviews were conducted with 
researchers at the University of Bradford. One of these pilot interviewees had a detailed 
knowledge of this research, one was a doctoral researcher who was in the process of 
conducting interviews and one was a seasoned academic with minimal knowledge of 
this research. The interview was also piloted with a member of staff at Nissan 
Sunderland Plant. As a result of these pilot interviews the protocol was refined. 
Feedback was also gained as to whether interviews were effectively conducted. As the 
actual interviews were conducted over two days it was possible to adjust the prompts, 
or gather data to probe into themes explored by previous interviewees. Maykut and 
Morehouse (1994) claim that flexibility, responsiveness and ability to pursue aspects of 
the phenomenon not included in the prepared questions is important. The flexibility 
offered by a semi-structured approach was therefore instrumental in maximising the 
insight gained from the interviews. Table 3-1 shows the interview protocol. 
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Question Prompts 
Why did you choose to work for Nissan UK? Was it location? Was it salary? Was it 
general interest? 
How do you think working for Nissan UK differs in 
comparison to other car manufacturers? 
Is it the manufacturing style? Is it the 
human resource policies?  
What words would you use to describe the Nissan 
working environment to an outsider? 
Morale, stress, being controlled, 
rewards, involvement, encouraging 
initiative, training 
Do you own a Nissan? If so why, or why not? Good deal? General liking for the car? 
Peer pressure? 
Why do you think customers buy Nissan vehicles? Is it their design? Is it their 
practicality? Is it their quality? 
What factors in your view make Nissan (the whole 
global company) successful? 
Employees? Range of cars? 
Manufacturing process? Service? 
What factors in your opinion make Nissan 
Sunderland successful? 
Productivity? Employee relations? 
Manufacturing process? 
Do you think that Nissan has good supplier 
relations? If so why, or why not? 
Communication? Link into 
manufacturing process? Location near 
to suppliers? 
 What do you think makes the Nissan Production 
Way different to other car production systems? 
Douki-seisan? Supplier integration? 
It’s everyone’s system? 
What do you think are the biggest challenges in 
implementing the Nissan Production Way? 
People, culture, lack of top 
management commitment? 
Table 3-1 Initial interviews protocol  
 
Interviews lasted up to one hour and were all conducted by the same researcher. Data 
was recorded by combination of transcripts and audio recordings. Maykut and 
Morehouse (1994) claim that it is essential to record interviews if they are to be used 
as the main source of data. Permission to record the interview was sought and was 
granted by all participants. The combination of transcripts and audio recordings 
allowed the interviews to proceed with a single interviewer whilst still collecting the 
required data.  
 
It is important to follow your instincts as to what seems important in data. “There is no 
right or wrong about analysis. Nor is there a set of rules or procedures that must be 
followed. Analysis is, for a large part, intuitive and requires trusting the self to make the 
right decisions” (Corbin and Strauss 2008: p71). The low sample size and need to gain a 
deep understanding of the data made it appropriate to analyse each transcript by hand. 
This enabled the full value of the data to be realised. To progressively refine the 
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analysis interview data was analysed twice. By performing a cross-interview analysis 
common themes were identified. This enabled the final account to pay more focus on 
these themes whilst comparing quotes and answers to the questions to provide a richer 
dataset. Within-interview analysis ensured that there were no contradictions in the 
transcripts and by once again comparing with the other interviews it was easy to 
ascertain whether respondents had interpreted the questions in the same way. 
 
Once the interviews were fully transcribed two additional researchers checked the 
transcripts were accurate using the original audio. Transcripts were then sent to the 
interviewees by post for validation and to encourage further comments. No feedback or 
errors were highlighted by any of the interviewees and therefore the transcripts were 
deemed to be an accurate account. 
 
3.5.3 PHASE THREE: EXPERT INTERVIEWS 
The primary aim of the expert interviews is to formulate a clear understanding as to 
what elements form the Nissan Production Way. This data allows the comparison of the 
Nissan Production Way against the common perception of Lean, viz addition to the 
Views of Lean Table. This primary objective can be broken down into seven further 
objectives. These objectives were formed by identifying the key areas of Lean 
Production systems as identified in the Views of Lean Table. ‘Add-on’ components refer 
to additional elements that are used in the system but not strictly classified as 
belonging to the Nissan Production Way. The seven objectives are as follows: 
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1. To identify resource reduction tools 
2. To identify production management techniques 
3. To identify how the Nissan Production Way manages the supply chain 
4. To identify standardisation, defects and improvement tools 
5. To identify human relations issues 
6. To identify ‘add-on’ components and levels of standardisation across 
Nissan plants 
7. To identify and other components and interviewee opinions 
 
The required participants are those responsible for the maintenance of the Nissan 
Production Way at Nissan Sunderland Plant or who have a detailed knowledge of the 
system. Access was granted through the Nissan Sunderland Plant Press Office to the 
two members of staff working in the Nissan Production Way office whose job it is to 
ensure the correct application of the Nissan Production Way. Additionally, access was 
granted to the Quality Assurance senior supervisor who has studied the production 
system in detail for his academic research. Access was easy to obtain due to the 
required personnel being office based. This phase involved Nissan Sunderland Plant 
staff with a holistic detailed knowledge of the Nissan Production Way. 
 
This phase utilised semi-structured interviews. This decision was taken due to the lack 
of existing knowledge of the phenomena to enable the formation of a detailed survey 
protocol. Using a focus group, rather than three semi-structured interviews, would not 
have enabled the gathering of individual accounts and the amalgamation of data to 
provide an accurate account. It would also have removed the ability to probe for more 
information on Nissan Production Way aspects based on the findings from the previous 
interview.  
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The interview protocol was piloted by an academic and a member of staff at Nissan 
Sunderland Plant. It was important to ensure that the pilot included a member of 
Nissan Sunderland Plant staff to test that the questions were easy to understand and 
clear in what they were asking of the interviewee. This process resulted in several 
language / terminology changes. 
 
Each interview was conducted by the same interviewer and lasted up to an hour in 
duration. Interviews were recorded by notes and audio recordings. All interviewees 
granted permission to record the interviews to aid in data analysis. Following the 
interviews, the notes and audio were combined to create a transcript for each of the 
three participants. Clarification on transcript content was sought from participants by 
email as required. An additional researcher than checked the transcript against the 
audio and notes to ensure an accurate account was logged. Transcripts were then 
finalised and sent by mail to each participant for validation and to encourage further 
comments. No issues were raised and therefore the transcripts can be seen as accurate. 
 
To progressively refine the analysis interview data was analysed twice. Within-
interview analysis ensured that there were no contradicting statements provided by 
each of the three interviewees. Cross-interview analysis was then performed to identify 
commonly cited elements and to identify the themes, and emphasis on certain Nissan 
Production Way elements. These themes then allowed the analysis to focus more on 
these areas whilst also paying sufficient attention to the other emerging elements. 
 
Interview findings were also checked by the same academic who validated the 
interview transcripts to ensure they utilised the full value of the data and to identify 
any discrepancies. Finally, the report from the collective interview findings was also 
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sent to the three participants who were asked to check the report and write back if they 
identified any errors. 
 
The aforementioned objectives were used to structure the interview protocol. The 
interview was comprised of seven sections with relevant open questions which were 
asked to all interviewees. This was supported by a number of probing questions which 
were formed during the interview to encourage a deeper level of conversation around 
topics the interviewer deemed to be of interest to this investigation. Table 3-2 provides 
the expert interview protocol. 
 
Category Questions Prompts 
Resource 
reduction 
What is the Nissan Production 
Way’s view about resource 
reduction? 
A resource can be working hours, 
movements, raw materials, space, or 
production time 
How does the Nissan Production 
Way reduce the use of resources? 
An example could be the reduction of 
setup times or the reduction of lead 
times 
Production 
management 
How is the Nissan Production Way 
organised? 
Is the system arranged by cells or 
groups? Are processes synchronised? 
Is production levelled or smoothed. 
Are products pushed to the next 
process or pulled from the previous 
process? 
To what extent is Just-in-Time 
utilised in the Nissan Production 
Way? 
Is it used factory wide? How 
important is it to the Nissan 
Production Way? 
Does the Nissan Production Way 
use tools to analyse work flows 
with the aim of increasing 
productivity? 
Such as time/work studies, multi-
manning, statistical process control, 
layout adjustments, cellular 
manufacturing 
Supply chain 
management 
To what extent are Nissan 
Production Way production 
management techniques used by 
Nissan Sunderland Plant’s 
suppliers? 
Is the Nissan Production Way used by 
first tier suppliers, second tier 
suppliers, third tier etc 
Are suppliers involved at Nissan 
Sunderland Plant and if so how are 
they involved? 
Are there joint training initiatives, 
joint product development 
programmes 
Does the Nissan Production Way 
include value stream mapping or 
flowcharting? 
Value stream mapping is the mapping 
of product and information flows and 
the analysis of this data to identify 
and eliminate wastes 
Table 3-2 Expert interviews protocol  
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Category Questions Prompts 
Standardisation, 
defects and 
improvement 
What does the Nissan Production 
Way have in place to identify, stop 
and fix defects? 
For example intelligent automation / 
autonomation, line stop, Poka-Yoke / 
failure prevention 
What does the Nissan Production 
Way have in place to standardise 
elements of the production 
system? 
Standard operations, housekeeping 
(5S), visual control and management 
/ management by sight 
What improvement strategies or 
techniques are used in the Nissan 
Production Way? 
For example continuous improvement, 
root cause analysis 
Human 
relations 
How are employees involved with 
the Nissan Production Way? 
Are they involved in improvement 
circles / group problem solving? 
How are employees managed 
within the Nissan Production 
Way? 
Appraisals, discipline, company 
hierarchy 
What development and training 
opportunities are there for 
employees within the Nissan 
Production Way? 
Training, promotion/progression, 
taking extended leave for travelling 
etc 
How does the Nissan Production 
Way get the full value from 
employees? 
 
What rewards and recognition 
schemes exist for employees? 
 
Other features / 
components 
Are there any features / 
components that the Nissan 
Production Way utilises but are 
recognised as an ‘add-on’ rather 
than part of the core production 
system? 
 
Have all of the elements of the 
Nissan Production Way we have 
discussed thus far been part of the 
Nissan Production System at 
Nissan Sunderland Plant since the 
system was first introduced? 
How has the system developed at the 
plant, what are the notable omissions 
and additions. Are the additions / 
omissions core components or add-
ons? 
Is the Nissan Production Way at 
Nissan Sunderland Plant a mirror 
image to the Nissan Production 
Way used at other Nissan plants? 
Is anything unique to Nissan 
Sunderland? 
Additional 
information 
Are there any other aspects or is 
there anything about the Nissan 
Production Way we have not 
covered? 
 
Do you have any opinions you are 
comfortable sharing with us with 
regards to the Nissan Production 
Way in general and its long-term 
viability as the way to manage 
production? 
 
Table 3-2 Expert interviews protocol (continued) 
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3.5.4 PHASE FOUR: MOTIVATION SURVEY 
Despite Lean being described as a respect-for-human system, Lean at Nissan 
Sunderland Plant may come at a human cost (Garrahan and Stewart 1992; Williams et 
al. 1992). Garrahan and Stewart (1992) claim that this cost is a focus on “personal 
security through working for devolved worker-managing strategies” (p139). The 
opportunity for further study due to good access, and a lack of focus on intrinsic 
motivators in the Nissan Production Way, prompted this research to use an adapted 
version of Hackman et al’s (1975) Job Classification Model to assess whether staff at the 
Nissan Sunderland Plant found their jobs to be intrinsically motivating.  
 
Convenience sampling was utilised in this research phase. This is a valid choice as the 
opportunity to gather data is ‘too good to miss (Bryman and Bell 2007). The low sample 
size has not permitted the data to be statistically tested. However, as previously 
mentioned, claiming to have a representative sample in case research is “a mismatch of 
method and goals: to say something’s representative, you need to pick a different 
methodology” (Siggelkow 2007: p21). Whereas the intention of this research was to 
conduct random sampling and administer a larger number of surveys this research 
phase has still been able to gather valuable information that gives further insight into 
the levels of intrinsic motivation at the Nissan Sunderland Plant.  
 
The complete survey is provided in Appendix D (p263) and its development 
documented in the following subsections. For all statements a positive and negatively 
worded statement was included to increase the quality of the results gathered. One 
doctoral researcher, one established academic and the Quality Assurance team’s 
manager participated in the pilot survey. All of them were asked to comment on the 
survey’s wording and phrasing. Based on the pilot’s feedback minor changes were 
made to the introduction / instructions section and the role of employees was changed 
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from production or office to direct (production), semi-direct (production and office) or 
indirect (office). This change in role categories was made to match the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant’s internal job role classification. Surveys were sent by post to the 
Nissan Sunderland Plant Press Office and distributed to the Quality Assurance team. All 
copies of the survey were accompanied by a self-addressed envelope which the 
participants were asked to use and seal to ensure confidentiality. These were then 
placed in the internal mail before being forwarded back to Bradford University School 
of Management for analysis.  
 
The low sample size and desire to gain an in-depth understanding of the data resulted 
in the analysis being conducted by hand. The completed analysis was checked against 
the raw data by two separate academics. The feedback from this process then enabled 
the reporting of results as detailed in Chapter 6. 
 
3.5.4.1 Original Job Classification Model 
Hackman et al’s (1975) original version of the Job Classification Model (figure 3-2) is 
the most cited and influential model of job design theory (de Treville and Antonakis 
2006; DeVaro et al. 2007). The model suggests that work satisfaction, performance and 
intrinsic motivation are all affected by three critical psychological states. These critical 
psychological states are in turn formed from one, or several, core job dimensions. The 
potential for a job to be intrinsically motivating depends on the views of workers as to 
the characteristics of their jobs. Growth Need Strength (Growth Need Strength) is a 
moderating variable relating to an individual’s need for personal development. For 
those who have a low Growth Need Strength jobs with high core job dimension scores 
may have a detrimental effect on their intrinsic motivation.  
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Figure 3-2 Job Classification Model 
Source: Hackman and Oldham (1975) 
 
To assess intrinsic motivation, and to operationalise the Job Classification Model, 
Hackman and Oldham (1975) created the Job Diagnostic Survey (Job Diagnostic 
Survey). Employees participating in the survey read a series of statements and indicate 
the level to which they either agree, or disagree, using a Likert scale. A short form of the 
survey focuses on measuring “several characteristics of jobs, the reactions of the 
respondents to their jobs, and the growth need strength of the respondents” (cf. Hackman 
and Oldham 1974: p74). The Motivating Potential Score (Motivating Potential Score) 
places a value on a job’s potential to be intrinsically motivating (see figure 3-3) based 
on the core job dimension results. Table 3-3 provides the original short form Job 
Diagnostic Survey core job dimension statements which allow the calculation of the 
Motivating Potential Score. The first statement in each category (written in green) is 
answered on a visual seven-point Likert scale. The positive and negatively worded 
statements are answered by choosing a number which corresponds to a seven-point 
Likert scale where 1 is ‘very inaccurate’ and 7 is ‘very accurate’.  
 
  
Core job 
dimensions 
Critical 
Psychological States 
Personal and Work 
Outcomes 
Skill Variety 
Task Identity 
Task Significance 
 
 
Autonomy 
 
 
 
Feedback 
 
Experienced 
meaningfulness of the 
Work 
 
Experienced 
responsibility for 
outcomes of the work 
 
Knowledge of the actual 
results of the work 
activities 
 
High internal work 
motivation 
 
High quality work 
performance 
 
High satisfaction with 
the work 
 
Low absenteeism and 
turnover 
 
Employee Growth Need Strength (GNS) 
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CJD Questions 
SV How much variety is in your job? That is, to what extent does the job require you to do 
many different things at work, using a variety of your skills and talents? 
SV The job requires me to use a number of complex or high-level skills 
SV The job is quite simple and repetitive 
TI To what extent does your job involve doing a whole and identifiable piece of work? 
That is, is the job a complete piece of work that has an obvious beginning and end? Or 
is it only a small part of the overall piece of work, which is finished by other people or 
by automatic machines? 
TI The job provides me the chance to completely finish the pieces of work I begin 
TI The job is arranged so that I do not have the chance to do an entire piece of work from 
beginning to end 
TS In general, how significant or important is your job? That is, are the results of your 
work likely to significantly affect the lives or well-being of other people? 
TS This job is one where a lot of other people can be affected by how well the work gets 
done 
TS The job itself is not very significant in the broader scheme of things 
AU How much autonomy is there in your job? That is, to what extent does your job permit 
you to decide on your own how to go about doing the work? 
AU The job gives me considerable opportunity for independence and freedom in how I do 
the work 
AU The job denies me any chance to use my personal initiative or judgement in carrying 
out the work 
FB To what extent does doing the job itself provide you with information about your work 
performance? That is, does the actual work itself provide clues about how well you are 
doing aside from any feedback co-workers or supervisors may provide? 
FB Just doing the work required by the job provides many chances for me to figure out 
how well I am doing 
FB The job itself provides very few clues about whether or not I am performing well 
Key: SV (Skill Variety), TI (Task Identity), TS (Task Significance), AU (Autonomy), FB (Feedback) 
Table 3-3 Short Form Job Diagnostic Survey Core Job Dimension Statements 
Source: Hackman and Oldham (1974) 
 
 
 
 
Job 
Diagnostic 
Survey 
Scoring 
Key 
Meaningfulness 
Skill Variety (2, 8, 11*, 14, 18*) / 5 
Task Identity (3, 7*, 16*, 22) / 4 
Task Significance (4, 13*, 20*, 23) / 4 
Responsibility Autonomy (1, 9*, 17*, 21) / 4 
Knowledge of Results Feedback (5, 6, 10, 12*, 15, 19*) / 6 
Note: For items with asterisks, reverse the score 
Figure 3-3 Motivating Potential Score and Job Diagnostic Survey Scoring Key 
Adapted from: Leonard and Hilgert (2004) & Hackman et al (1975) 
 
The following section discusses de Treville and Antonakis’ (2006) proposal for a 
variant of the Job Classification Model built for Lean contexts. 
Motivating 
Potential 
Score = 
(skill variety + task identity + task significance) 
3 
x autonomy x feedback 
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3.5.4.2  Lean Job Classification Model 
De Treville and Antonakis (2006) claim that the Job Classification Model is a good 
starting point for investigating intrinsic motivation as “much of the impact of Lean 
production implementation on motivation occurs through changes in job design” (p118). 
They argue that the Job Classification Model cannot explain intrinsic motivation in Lean 
contexts. Therefore de Treville and Antonakis (2006) proposed a variant of the Job 
Classification Model built to suit Lean’s specific context (figure 6.4). 
 
  
Figure 3-4 Lean Job Classification Model 
Source: de Treville and Antonakis (2006) 
 
There are several key differences between Lean Job Classification Model (figure 3-4) 
and Hackman and Oldham’s (1975) original version (figure 3-2). Firstly de Treville and 
Antonakis (2006) argue that autonomy is formed of two constructs rather than one; (i) 
choice autonomy, and (ii) responsible autonomy. Choice autonomy is a simple 
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renaming of the original model, viz, control over work schedules or procedures. Choice 
autonomy will always be low in Lean operations due to standardisation. Responsible 
autonomy refers to the level of active worker participation in developing standard 
procedures. Secondly, task significance (a core job dimension) has been completely 
omitted from the Lean variant. De Treville and Antonakis (2006) argue that “evaluating 
the impact of Lean job design on motivating potential is not aided by the inherent 
meaning of the task” (p109). Task significance is “the degree to which the job has a 
substantial and perceivable impact on the lives of other people, whether in the immediate 
organisation or at the world at large” (Hackman et al. 1975: p59). 
 
Thirdly, Growth Need Strength is removed due to a “lack of reliable empirical evidence 
to support the moderating effect of Growth Need Strength combined with the situational 
strength of Lean production” (de Treville and Antonakis 2006: p113). Instead de 
Treville and Antonakis (2006) propose that the degree of Leanness within the company 
has an impact on the critical psychological states and in turn the work outcomes. 
Excessive Leanness has a negative effect on intrinsic motivation as companies cut 
staffing levels to the point where the core job dimension scores decrease. For example, 
staff many no longer have the time, or ability, to give and receive feedback, rotate roles 
(skill variety), and be involved in setting standard procedures (responsible autonomy). 
 
Fourthly, a new core job dimension, work facilitation, has been included in the Lean Job 
Classification Model. Work facilitation refers to the “actions centred on removing 
obstacles that inhibit worker performance and on the provision of resources that are 
instrumental for the achievement of worker goals” (p112). This job dimension forms the 
addition of a new critical psychological state, self-efficacy. De Treville and Antonakis 
(2006) suggest that whilst job design can lead to higher satisfaction this arguably has 
no impact on job performance. The critical psychological states therefore need to be 
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expanded to include aspects which result in increased performance such as self-
efficacy. Self-efficacy refers to “beliefs in one’s capabilities to mobilse the motivation, 
cognitive resources, and courses of action needed to meet given situational demands. Self-
beliefs of efficacy affect the challenges that are undertaken, the amount of effort expended 
in an endeavour, the level of perseverance in the face of difficulties, whether thinking 
patterns take self-aiding or self-impeding forms, and vulnerability to stress and 
depression” (Wood and Bandura 1989: p408). 
 
Finally de Treville and Antonakis (2006) also explore the idea that a configural 
perspective should be used when studying Lean practices. “The configural model implies 
that the unit of analysis is a set or bundle of practices that cause motivation in workers 
and hence organisational performance, and that independent main effects account for 
less of the variation in the dependent variables – or may even lead to a completely 
different prediction” (p114 – 115). They also discuss cross-level effects. Cross-level 
effects are where a phenomenon at a lower level is influenced by a phenomenon at an 
upper level.  
 
De Treville and Antonakis (2006) claim that the Lean Job Classification Model offers “a 
testable and parsimonious representation of how organisational-level factors (i.e. the 
Lean production system) affect individual level outcomes (e.g. intrinsic motivation, work 
performance), which in turn can be linked to organisational performance” (p107 – 108). 
However, the article does not mention or provide a Lean variant of the Job Diagnostic 
Survey, nor does it provide a Lean variant of the Motivating Potential Score which 
calculates the intrinsic motivation potential based on the shorthand version of the Job 
Diagnostic Survey. For this reason, it is very difficult to ascertain whether the 
researchers propose a completely new set of questions, minor modifications or 
additional contextual questions on top of the original Job Diagnostic Survey in creating 
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a Lean variant. This leaves this study only able to infer that the Job Diagnostic Survey 
would have to be modified to match the changes in the Job Classification Model. 
Additionally it is likely the Lean practices de Treville and Antonakis (2006) cite as 
impacting on the core job dimensions would translate into additional context questions 
within an expanded Job Diagnostic Survey. 
 
3.5.4.3 Issues with Lean Job Classification Model 
Whereas it has already been identified that the Job Classification Model is suitable to 
provide an insight into intrinsic motivation in Lean settings (including Nissan 
Sunderland Plant) and can be modified to suit the Lean context there remain some 
issues with the modifications proposed by de Treville and Antonakis (2006). 
 
Task significance is not included in the Lean Job Classification Model. De Treville and 
Antonakis (2006) claim that “Lean production factory physics do not change the 
significance of the task” (p118). However, the significance of the task can also be 
affected by the social structure within the plant. Results from the Nissan Production 
Way initial interviews and expert interviews suggest that there is a high level of social 
identification within the company.  Employees express a great deal of pride for Nissan 
Sunderland Plant and the situation exists whereby both employer and employee 
depend on each other to survive. The intense fight for survival from both competitors 
and internal plants competing for new models has resulted in a situation where 
employees give up liberties for the good of the company. “Do you want a job or private 
healthcare?” (Nissan Sunderland Plant Production Employee). It’s this fight for survival 
that changes the significance of the task. Furthermore, layout changes, increased 
signposting or any other number of elements could increase task significance. It’s not as 
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straightforward and easy to discount as de Treville and Antonakis (2006) propose and 
therefore should not be removed from a Lean variant of the Job Classification Model. 
 
The Lean Job Classification Model includes a new core job dimension, work facilitation, 
and a new critical psychological state, self-efficacy. Work facilitation involves removal 
of barriers and provision of resources and training which is a vital characteristic of 
Lean (cf. Womack et al. 1990). De Treville and Ankonakis (2006) claim that the concept 
work facilitation originates from leadership and argue that jobs are made easier and 
work performance increased through practices that reduce variability. The justification 
for the addition of work facilitation is a theoretical link to self-efficacy, viz, how 
employees judge their ability to perform the job role. Self-efficacy’s inclusion is justified 
based on claims by Conger and Kanungo (1988) and Thomas and Velthouse (1990) 
who argue that “workers feelings of competence (i.e. self-efficacy) should be included in 
the Job Classification Model as a mediatory critical psychological state” (p111).  
 
Although the inclusion of work facilitation and self-efficacy is an interesting proposal it 
does not add up. In the original Job Classification Model all existing core job dimensions 
are linked to a critical psychological state. For example, the critical psychological state 
of experienced meaningfulness of the work is equal to skill variety, plus task identity, 
plus task significance. De Treville and Ankonakis’ (2006) Lean Job Classification Model, 
perhaps unintentionally, implies that by assessing work facilitation you can identify 
self-efficacy which is incorrect. Bandura (1986) states that there are two commonly 
used measurements of self-efficacy; (i) the ability for an individual to assess how the 
can perform (magnitude), and confidence at performing at that level (strength). Work 
facilitation does not assess any of these points. Although de Treville and Ankonakis’ 
(2006) intentions are clear (work facilitation could help improve self-efficacy scores 
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which in turn could improve work outcomes) the current placement of the concepts do 
not fit into a Job Classification Model.  
 
De Treville and Antonakis (2006) claim that excessive Leanness can result in worker 
alienation, increased injuries, decreased suggestions, decreased job rotation and 
worker discontent. Their Lean Job Classification Model includes the degree of Leanness 
as having a moderating effect on the core job dimensions and as a result an overall 
impact on the Motivating Potential Score. The degree of Leanness is grouped into what 
can be considered as three vague categories; (i) too Lean, (ii) somewhat right and (iii) 
just right. There is value in highlighting the potential to be excessively Lean and the 
consequences that de Treville and Antonakis (2006) claim result from being too Lean. 
However, the degree of Leanness does not take into account a firm’s particular context. 
Whereas low skill variety may be an indicator of excessive Leanness in one company in 
another it may be a necessity due to its particular context. For example a history of 
poor employee relations meant that Hyundai’s manifestation of Lean required low 
autonomy and an engineer led approach (Lee and Jo 2007). The degree of Leanness 
should not be added to a Lean variant of the Job Classification Model as the categories 
do not take into account a company’s individual context. However, it is important to 
understand that there is a balance between being Lean and excessively Lean.  
 
This research supports the decision to add responsible autonomy and in doing so 
rename autonomy to choice autonomy. This research also supports the decision to 
remove Growth Need Strength based on the lack of empirical evidence. The following 
section builds a Nissan Sunderland Plant variant of the Job Classification Model, Job 
Diagnostic Survey and Motivating Potential Score based on information in this section. 
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3.5.4.4 Nissan Sunderland Plant Job Classification Model 
This chapter has established the following key points; (i) Job Classification Model is a 
suitable tool for use in Lean settings, (ii) Job Classification Model is operationalised 
through administering the Job Diagnostic Survey from which the Motivating Potential 
Score can be calculated, and (iii) there are issues with Lean Job Classification Model 
which prevent it being used in this research ‘as is’. This research therefore needs to 
create a Nissan Sunderland Plant version of the Job Classification Model, Job Diagnostic 
Survey and Motivating Potential Score which will assess the potential for the Nissan 
Production Way at Nissan Sunderland Plant to be intrinsically motivating. This will 
address the gap from the Expert Interviews which focused on extrinsic motivators. 
Based on the Lean Job Diagnostic Survey issues in the previous section figure 3-5 
provides a Job Classification Model adapted for use at Nissan Sunderland Plant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-5 Nissan Sunderland Plant Job Classification Model 
Adapted from: Hackman and Oldham (1975) & de Treville and Antonakis (2006) 
 
Whereas the Nissan Sunderland Plant Job Classification Model (figure 3-5) remains 
largely faithful to the original Job Classification Model there are two noticeable 
differences; (i) the renaming of autonomy to choice autonomy and addition of 
responsible autonomy, and (ii) the replacement of Growth Need Strength with 
Core job 
dimensions 
Critical 
Psychological States 
Personal and Work 
Outcomes 
Skill Variety 
Task Identity 
Task Significance 
 
 
Responsible Autonomy 
Choice Autonomy 
 
 
Feedback 
 
Experienced 
meaningfulness of the 
Work 
 
Experienced 
responsibility for 
outcomes of the work 
 
Knowledge of the actual 
results of the work 
activities 
 
High internal work 
motivation 
 
High quality work 
performance 
 
High satisfaction with 
the work 
 
Low absenteeism and 
turnover 
 
Influencing Practices 
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influencing practices. Lean practices can influence the scores employees provide for the 
core job dimensions (de Treville and Antonakis 2006). Similarly, by identifying 
influencing practices we can better understand the outcome of a Job Diagnostic Survey 
(e.g. why skill variety score is low). Influencing practices let us look at the results in 
light of the Nissan Sunderland Plant’s context. De Treville and Antonakis (2006) claim 
that the following practices influence the core job dimensions (table 3-4). 
 
CJD Lean Practices Impact 
Skill Variety Group problem solving and participation Positive 
Cross training Positive but small relationship 
Job rotation Positive but small relationship 
Task 
Identity 
Short cycle time Negative 
Flow based layout Positive 
Cross training Positive 
Inventory reduction (prevents obscuring 
product flow) 
Positive 
Feedback Flow based layout (allows for easier 
communication) 
Positive 
Standardisation (easy to see if deviating 
away from plan) 
Positive 
Jidoka / poke yoke (instantly clear if figure 
not inserted correctly) 
Positive 
Choice 
Autonomy 
Lean reduces choice through 
standardisation and therefore in Lean 
systems this CJD will always be negative 
Negative 
Responsible 
Autonomy 
Decision making authority Positive 
Developing standard procedures Positive 
Personally accountable for tasks performed Positive 
Table 3-4 Influencing Lean Practices 
Adapted from:  de Treville and Antonakis (2006) 
 
The Nissan Sunderland Plant Job Diagnostic Survey will be administered to both 
production and office staff. It is therefore imperative that the influencing practices 
included in the survey are those which can be identified by these members of staff. 
Additionally, those working practices which, if included, have a high probability of 
attracting an emotional response or causing access problems (e.g. workforce reduction) 
were omitted. Table 3-5 provides the list of Nissan Job Diagnostic Survey influencing 
practices. 
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CJD Nissan Production Way 
Practice 
Impact 
Skill Variety Group improvement 
activities (inc. 
improvement circles, 
Kaizen activities) 
Positive – involvement in improving standard 
procedures or practices increases opportunities 
to use a variety of skills. 
Cross-training / education 
/ employee development 
Positive – increases the skills at a worker’s 
disposal 
Job rotation Positive – increases the number of skills 
employees use 
Task 
Identity 
Cross-training / education 
/ employee development 
Positive – enables an employee to fully 
understand, and be able, to undertake their 
tasks 
Task 
Significance 
Teamwork / Cellular 
Manufacturing / 100% 
inspection* 
Positive – team member absences or poor 
performance by that individual impacts on other 
team members 
Hoshin Kanri Positive – enables employees to see how their 
work has an impact on the overall company 
Group improvement 
activities (inc. 
improvement circles, 
Kaizen activities 
Somewhat positive – the outcomes of group 
improvement activities can have an impact on 
other members of staff 
Team-based recognition Positive – the performance of all team members 
has an impact on the overall team 
Feedback Company council Somewhat positive – if the company council is 
deemed to have a strong influence on others 
employees may have an impact on other staff 
through views and issues raised at this council. 
Team-based recognition Positive 
Teamwork Positive – if working effectively as a team it is 
proposed that team members will give each 
other feedback / help 
Hoshin Kanri Positive – clear objectives enable employees to 
compare their work against their objectives 
Group improvement 
activities (inc. 
improvement circles, 
Kaizen activities 
Somewhat positive – can provide feedback in 
the form of identifying areas for improvement 
Responsible 
Autonomy 
Hoshin Kanri Positive – knowing exactly where you fit into the 
company objectives gives responsibility to help 
achieve and overall goal 
Group improvement 
activities (inc. 
improvement circles, 
Kaizen activities 
Positive – staff are given responsibility for 
making improvements in their work area 
* Includes neighbourhood checks (checking the upstream staff member’s work) and a check and repair station at the end of 
every zone / cell 
 
Table 3-5 Nissan Job Diagnostic Survey Influencing Practices  
 
The following section discusses the Nissan Job Diagnostic Survey. 
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3.5.4.5 Nissan Sunderland Plant Job Diagnostic Survey 
Modification of the original Job Diagnostic Survey was required to ensure that the 
statements were in language that was accessible to all those who would participate in 
the survey. It was likely that the participants would have to complete the survey during 
lunch or tea breaks. Therefore, it was important to keep the format simple and concise 
preferably fitting on a double sized sheet of A4 paper. The Nissan Press Office advised 
that this would be the best approach for maximising participation. As page space was at 
a premium this study chose not to include the visual seven point scales. Where the 
original Job Diagnostic Survey’ visual scale statements (see table 3-3) were similar to 
the non-visual scale statements they were omitted (task identity, autonomy and 
feedback). Where the visual statements differed to the non-visual scale statements they 
were changed into concise positive and negatively worded statements (skill variety and 
task significance).  
 
CJD Questions 
SV My job requires me to use a number of complex or high-level skills₁ 
SV My job is repetitive₂ 
SV There is a lot of variety in my job₂ 
SV My job is always the same and never different₃ 
TS My job is one where a lot of other people can be affected by how well the work gets 
done₁ 
TS The job itself is not very significant or important in the broader scheme of things₁ 
TS The results of my work are likely to significantly impact the well-being of other people₂ 
TS My job performance has no impact on anyone else₃ 
TI My job provides me the chance to completely finish the pieces of work I begin₁ 
TI My job is arranged so that I do not have the chance to do an entire piece of work from 
beginning to end₁ 
CA My job gives me considerable freedom in how I do the work₂ 
CA My job denies me any chance to use my personal initiative or judgement in carrying 
out the work₁ 
RA I am responsible for continually improving my work area₃ 
RA I do not have the authority to make decisions that affect my work area₃ 
FB My job is arranged so that I can judge for myself how well I am doing₂ 
FB I cannot tell how well I am performing just by doing my job₂ 
₁Original Job Diagnostic Survey question  ₂Rewritten Job Diagnostic Survey question  ₃New question 
 
Key: SV (Skill Variety), TI (Task Identity), TS (Task Significance), RA (Responsible Autonomy),  
CA (Choice Autonomy) FB (Feedback) 
 
Table 3-6 Nissan Job Diagnostic Survey Core Job Dimension Statements 
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3.5.4.6 Influencing Practices 
Table 3-7 shows the Nissan Job Diagnostic Survey influencing practices. Negatively 
worded statements are shown in grey. 
Table 3-7 Nissan Job Diagnostic Survey Influencing Practices Statements 
 
The first statements on teamwork / feedback from others are not job characteristics 
and are therefore separate to the data received from the core job dimension feedback. 
Hackman and Oldham (1974) states that assessing feedback from others (or agents) “is 
not a job characteristic per se, and is included only to provide information supplementary 
to [feedback]” (p75). In other words, it provides additional information rather than 
being included in the Motivating Potential Score calculation.  
 
In addition to the Lean practices it is proposed that intense competition between 
Nissan-Renault plants and the need to fight for survival may have an impact on the 
Nissan Production Way Practice Statements 
Group improvement activities (inc. 
improvement circles, Kaizen 
activities 
I regularly participate in improvement teams 
I am hardly ever involved in improvement projects 
Cross-training / education / 
employee development 
If I would like to learn additional skills I can easily ask 
to attend extra training courses 
I am unable to ask to attend additional training courses 
if I would like to learn new stills 
I am trained to do several tasks 
I have only been trained to do one task 
Job rotation I frequently change jobs 
I am always doing the same job 
Teamwork / feedback from others Supervisors often let me know how well they think I am 
performing the job 
My supervisors almost never give me any feedback 
about how well I am doing in my work 
I frequently receive feedback from other members of 
my team 
My team never share work related tips or give each 
other advice 
Hoshin Kanri I am able to clearly see how my job contributes towards 
achieving company objectives 
My job does not contribute towards company objectives 
Team-based recognition The team I work in receives recognition if we do a good 
job 
Our team’s efforts never receive any recognition 
Company council Company council has a big impact on us 
The company council has no real power 
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Motivating Potential Score. The fight for the survival of Nissan Sunderland Plant has 
been consistently highlighted throughout all of the interviews conducted thus far as 
well as the possible foregoing of liberties with the aim of securing jobs. It can be 
inferred from these interviews that competition is a motivator driving employees to 
improve in the competitive working environment. Before the Nissan Production Way 
Expert Interviews were conducted in November 2009 a 130 item list of the best ideas 
from a global e-room (a Nissan initiative) was published. The list suggested ideas which 
every plant should consider implementing. “Instantly the first thing everyone did was to 
look down and see how many of them are ours, how many they (other plants) have got – 
why have we not got as many as them – oh we have got more than them so that’s alright 
then isn’t it?!” (Nissan Production Way Expert).  
 
The fight for survival / intense competition at the Nissan Sunderland Plant could 
potentially outweigh negative values gained from all of the job characteristics whilst 
enhancing the values achieved when measuring task significance. In other words, 
intense competition could potentially increase the perceived importance of a person’s 
job at the plant as both employee and employer fight to survive. The addition of 
statements to research this factor could provide an interesting insight and aid in the 
explanation of the Nissan Job Diagnostic Survey. Therefore, the following additional 
statements (table 3-8) will be added to explore fight for survival. 
Table 3-8 Nissan Job Diagnostic Survey Fight for Survival Statements 
 
Statements 
We do not have to compete with other Renault-Nissan plants 
There is intense competition for new models between all the company’s plants 
My job is 100% secure 
We are under constant pressure to keep improving the plant to secure our jobs 
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3.5.4.7 Nissan Sunderland Plant Motivating Potential Score 
The following figure provides an amended version of the Motivating Potential Score for 
use in the Nissan Job Diagnostic Survey, based on de Treville and Antonakis’ (2006) 
Lean Job Classification Model. 
 
 
 
Key: SV (Skill Variety), TI (Task Identity), TS (Task Significance),  
RA (Responsible Autonomy), CA (Choice Autonomy), FB (Feedback) 
 
Figure 3-6 Nissan Motivating Potential Score 
Adapted from: Hackman and Oldham (1974) 
 
See Appendix D (p263) for the full version of the Nissan Job Diagnostic Survey. 
 
3.5.5 PHASE FIVE: FULL VIEWS OF LEAN TABLE 
The final phase of this research takes the Views of Lean table created in the Literature 
Review and adds a further column detailing the Nissan Production Way’s 
implementation of lean. This is provided in the Discussion chapter. 
 
3.6 SUMMARY 
The following table provides an overview of the methodology.  
Phase Activity Outcome 
1. Views of Lean Table Literature review Aided creation of Expert Interview protocol 
2. Initial interviews Interviews with office 
and production staff 
Highlighted lack of focus on human factors, 
supplemented Expert Interview protocol 
3. Expert interviews Interviews with plant 
Lean experts. 
Identified key elements of Nissan 
Production Way, highlighted lack of focus 
on human factors resulting in phase 4. 
4. Motivation survey Survey of office and 
production staff 
Identifies low levels of intrinsic motivation 
offset by a fight for plant survival. 
5. Views of Lean Table Brings together phases 
1-4 to create a view of 
Lean at the plant. 
Highlights narrow view of lean in current 
research compared to the broad philosophy 
/ toolbox view of Lean used at Nissan. 
Table 3-9 Overview of Methodology 
 
Motivating 
Potential Score = 
(SV + TI + TS) 
3 
x (RA + CA) x FB 
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4 RESULTS: INITIAL INTERVIEWS 
It is difficult to secure access to gather data on employee attitudes towards Lean 
(Shadur et al. 1995) however access was secured to interview the staff at Nissan 
Sunderland Plant in 2009. The aim of the initial interviews was to gain an initial 
understanding of both the Nissan Sunderland Plant and its Lean Production system – 
the Nissan Production Way. These interviews not only gave this research a starting 
point given limited existing knowledge of the plant but also formed the basis of the 
Expert Interviews which are detailed in the following chapter. 
 
The following sub-sections provide the findings of the initial interviews. A total of 8 
production staff and 4 office workers participated in these interviews. The average 
interview times were 26 minutes for production staff and 20 minutes for office staff. 
Whereas all of these interviewees were asked the core set of questions they were also 
encouraged to expand on other themes that emerged during their interview or previous 
interviews. As a result, this research phase gathered a rich data set which discussed 
themes which may not have been covered by all interviewees. Table 4-1 provides a list 
of the initial interview questions, the full protocol is provided in section 3.5.2 (p75), 
and an example transcripts is provided in Appendix B (p245).  
 
# Question 
1 Why did you choose to work for Nissan UK? 
2 
How do you think working for Nissan UK differs in comparison to other car 
manufacturers? 
3 What words would you use to describe the Nissan working environment to an outsider? 
4 Do you own a Nissan? If so why, or why not? 
5 Why do you think customers buy Nissan vehicles? 
6 What factors in your view make Nissan (the whole global company) successful? 
7 What factors in your opinion make Nissan Sunderland successful? 
8 Do you think that Nissan has good supplier relations? If so why, or why not? 
9 
What do you think makes the Nissan Production Way different to other car production 
systems? 
10 
What do you think are the biggest challenges in implementing the Nissan Production 
Way? 
Table 4-1 Initial Interview Protocol 
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4.1 CHOICE OF EMPLOYER 
The pay package was the key factor in choosing to work at the Nissan Sunderland Plant. 
Whereas office staff discussed their education, interest in the job role, and job security 
as influencing their choice of employer there was no mention of these factors by 
production staff. The majority of interviewees had worked at the plant for over five 
years with several of those employees stating that they had only ever worked at the 
Nissan Sunderland Plant. Locality was not considered to be an issue for the majority of 
interviewees; only 3 participants claimed that locality was an important decision factor. 
 
A production team leader claimed that the Nissan Sunderland Plant had lived up to 
expectations “to a certain extent.” Despite being offered a promotion he was 
disinterested due to the high expectations and increase in offline work at supervisor 
level. The supervisor role had “lost its original meaning.” Several production 
interviewees claimed that their job had ‘its ups and downs’.   
 
Whereas none of the interviewees had worked for another car manufacturer they 
claimed that Nissan Sunderland Plant employees work harder, the plant has a real 
sense of team work and the working environment would be different to other plants. 
Office staff claim that human resource policies would be similar to other car plants. This 
could be due to the Nissan Sunderland Plant’s membership of the Motor Industry 
Industrial Relations Group which conducts benchmarking, and shares information on 
human resource practices. 
 
The Nissan Sunderland Plant is open and transparent with good benefits. Nissan 
Sunderland Plant staff are disciplined and unwilling to fail. The Trim and Chassis Line 2 
Manager discussed the Nissan Sunderland Plant as having a Japanese manufacturing 
ethos and, after visiting other Nissan plants in Japan, he believed that the Nissan 
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Sunderland Plant was good if not better than its Japanese counterparts. “[Nissan 
Sunderland Plant] definitely has the cultural element of how to make cars Japanese style” 
(Trim and Chassis Line 2 Manager). Office staff claimed that possible differences to 
other plants could be a flatter organisational hierarchy, open plan offices and a real 
sense of teamwork. However, they believe that there are probably more similarities 
than differences.  
 
Table 4-2 provides an overview of the key points raised by interviewees for questions 1 
& 2. Whereas production staff results are split by seniority office staff have been 
grouped into one category. This was due to the strong similarities between office staff 
answers and the desire to clearly display the difference in opinion between production 
and office staff. Production staff were far more open and willing to share their opinions 
than the office staff. There are several noticeable differences between production staff 
seniority levels. Whereas all levels expressed an interest in the pay package only the 
team leaders considered the prospects for promotion at the plant when choosing to 
work at the Nissan Sunderland Plant. 
 
Staff 
Why did you choose to 
work for Nissan UK? 
How do you think working for Nissan UK differs in 
comparison to other car manufacturers? 
TM 
• Personal interest 
• Good pay 
• Looked pretty secure at 
the time 
• Never worked for any other car manufacturer 
• Looks pretty similar 
• Different working environment 
TL 
• Wage 
• Long-term future 
• Job security 
• Prospects 
• Never worked for any other car manufacturer 
• More demanding 
• Harder working 
• Most productive plant in Europe 
S 
• Good package 
• Long-term job 
• Never worked for any other car manufacturer 
• Japanese influence – Leaner 
M 
• Main motivation was 
money 
• Joined as a trainee 
maintenance technician 
 
• Haven’t seen many other car manufacturers 
• Nissan Sunderland Plant staff work harder 
• Other Japanese plants may be getting closer but older 
car makers (i.e. Ford) would be a million miles away 
Table 4-2 Choice of Employer Overview 
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Staff 
Why did you choose to 
work for Nissan UK? 
How do you think working for Nissan UK differs 
in comparison to other car manufacturers? 
Office 
• Had university 
placement at Nissan 
Sunderland Plant 
• Interest in role 
• Close to home 
• Never worked for any other car manufacturer 
• Guessing would be similar 
• Benefits are good but expect a lot in return 
• Very open and transparent 
• Human resource policies similar 
• Real sense of team work 
Key: TM (team member n=2), TL (team leader n=3 ), S (supervisor n=1), M (manager n=1) 
Table 4-2 Choice of Employer Overview (continued) 
 
4.2 WORKING ENVIRONMENT 
Jobs at the Nissan Sunderland Plant are demanding, challenging, fast paced, and at 
times stressful. One of the production interviewees claimed that the plant tries to get 
every drop of energy from their staff and pushes them to the limit. In an off the tape 
comment one member of staff claimed that they “used to be persecuted so much that a 
supervisor lost his voice for six months – turned him into a jibbering wreck. It’s eased off 
nowadays but they still demand a lot.” A number of production staff felt that their jobs 
were repetitive.  
 
Production line workers have a lot of demands including physical and mental (the 
monotony). The Nissan Sunderland Plant always make sure new starters know how 
difficult and demanding their jobs are; they want everyone to be very clear about the 
role and what it entails. “You need to be the right person for the job” (Trim and Chassis 
Line 2 Manager). Production staff are all given a minimum of 2 hours’ production line 
experience, viz a line trial, as part of the application and interview process. Despite 
these measures there is still a dropout rate – some people are just not made for the job. 
 
“There are some people I refer to as car builders with affection – it never ceases to amaze 
me how they work – they are a special breed” (Trim and Chassis Line 2 Manager).  
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Interviewees view the workforce as key to the Nissan Sunderland Plant’s success and 
hold the plant in high regard. However, they don’t necessarily appear to feel that they 
are treated as the most important asset. In June/July 2008 an independent plant-wide 
survey revealed that employees don’t think that the company listens to what they say. 
One production interviewee expressed the belief that some suggestions are dismissed 
due to internal politics and “ridiculous reasons.” The Trim and Chassis Line 2 Manager 
expressed his disappointment over these findings stating it should be as easy as 
approaching the supervisor although its impractical to act on every suggestion. “It is 
essential that we give feedback to suggest why an idea may not have been acted upon… 
the opportunity is there; we have just got to make it happen perhaps better than it does at 
the moment” (Trim & Chassis Line 2 Manager).   
 
The following table (Table 4-3) provides an overview of the insights and opinions 
regarding the Nissan Sunderland Plant’s working environment. One production 
interviewee cited health and safety as being important to Nissan. “Nissan are big on 
health and safety at the moment… sometimes the light hurts my eyes so I asked my 
supervisor and he said no problem and got me them (tinted safety glasses) straight away.” 
He also claimed that the supervisors are always there to listen if there any problems. 
Rewards and recognition, training, and union and company council are explored in 
more detail in the following subsections.  
  
103 
 
Staff 
What words would you use to describe the Nissan working 
environment to an outsider? 
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 
TM 
• Hard work 
• In the last six months it hasn’t looked so secure 
• Don’t think people outside of Nissan understand what it is like to work on the 
line 
• Can be stressful 
• Safety conscious 
• Supervisors listen if you have problems 
TL 
• Demanding 
• Repetitive 
• Rewarding for some staff 
• Hard – more regimental than it used to be 
• Very physical 
• Not suited to everyone 
S 
• Busy 
• Hard work 
• Target orientated 
• Some days can be non-stop 
M 
• Extremely demanding 
• Extremely challenging 
• Can be rewarding as well 
• Relentless 
Office 
• Team work 
• Fast paced 
• Always changing 
• Quality focused 
• Emphasis on training 
• Challenging 
• Responsibility 
• Rigorous 
• Professional 
• Thoughtful 
Key: TM (team member n=2), TL (team leader n=3 ), S (supervisor n=1), M (manager n=1) 
Table 4-3 Working Environment Overview 
 
4.2.1 REWARDS AND RECOGNITION 
Only three of the twelve interviewees cited rewarding as a key word to describe the 
Nissan working environment. Several interviewees confused rewards with the basic 
pay package. Whereas the Trim and Chassis Line 2 manager believed that rewards and 
recognition are in place he acknowledged that the staff may have a different opinion. “It 
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is important that people understand that their efforts are appreciated and recognised… it 
is something we are always trying to work to improve” (Trim and Chassis Line 2 
Manager). The manager emphasised the overall competitive pay package with benefits 
“second to none” including pension scheme, healthcare scheme, gym, and car lease 
scheme for all staff. 
 
A production supervisor who had been with the company for 21 years claimed that 
there had been no rewards since he started working for Nissan. “If you are talking of 
something they can recognise as a reward there’s not much lying around to be honest.” 
When asked about rewards one interviewee rhetorically asked “do you want a job or 
private health?” He also claimed that the pension scheme had been changed and a lot of 
the rewards had been taken away.   
 
The Trim and Chassis Line 2 Manager felt that his job was rewarding and satisfying. He 
was recently heavily involved in a Nissan workshop management audit. The auditors 
concluded that the Nissan Sunderland Plant was as good or in many cases better than 
their Japanese counterparts. “Yes it is demanding for everyone and challenging – 
everyone is stretched to the limits but when things go well it is very rewarding.” 
 
4.2.2 TRAINING 
There appears to be a strong emphasis on worker training at the Nissan Sunderland 
Plant. At the time of interview the plant was on scheduled downtime due to lower 
demand for products caused by the economic downturn (see Chapter 1 for more 
information). During this time production staff were attending training courses which 
were primarily held in the company’s sports and social building. “The company 
obviously think that they are developing people… most of them lads are saying that they 
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don’t want to go to training today as they would rather be working. Training is a long 
day. Most of the lads are not office / training minded. Time goes quicker when on the line” 
(Production Interviewee). 
 
The production interviewees did not believe that training helped them to perform their 
jobs. One interviewee described attending an environment course as “important but 
doesn’t really impact on my job.” Staff often do not get the chance to implement ideas 
and put learning into practice. Although the company thinks training is the right thing 
to do you don’t necessarily get to use it as you are tied to the production line 
(Production Team Leader). There are no spare men on the production line as there is 
normally someone covering holidays, tied up with courses, or off ill. “I don’t think that 
people realise how much we are tied to the line now” (Production Team Leader).  
 
Production staff often viewed training as a company benefiting exercise focusing on 
attracting government grants rather than improving the skills and abilities of workers. 
“I don’t think that a lot of the lads are interested in it [training]  - it’s more an exercise for 
the company” (Production Team Leader). According to one interviewee production staff 
would rather have time off to look at something on the line. “It’s just a waste of time – I 
have to go and write things down – I come back, put the folder in my locker, and it doesn’t 
see the light of day again. For the lads who are working on the line there are very few that 
will take that as a qualification that they can get and use it – an NVQ or whatever” 
(Production Team Leader). The company is trying to do too much with too few people. 
Those in charge of training are distant from the production line – decisions should be 
made by those with first-hand experience. However, this is unlikely to happen because 
of the government incentives offered (Production Team Leader). Production 
interviewees suggested that they were able to request additional training if desired. 
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4.2.3 UNION AND COMPANY COUNCIL 
Office staff claimed that the single union arrangement with Unite was positive. A good 
support network exists with the local works councils, company council, and the union. 
The Nissan Sunderland Plant has never lost time due to industrial action. The single 
union arrangement makes negotiation easier; Nissan’s Barcelona Plant has six or seven 
unions which increases ‘complications’. 
 
Whereas office staff responded positively to the single union arrangement they did not 
comment on the effectiveness of the union or the extent to which the union has the 
ability to influence Nissan Sunderland Plant practices. Half of the production 
interviewees claimed that the union was not very active. Several production 
interviewees did believe that the union was necessarily a good thing; internal 
mechanisms (local works councils and company council) were considered to be the real 
‘union type’ setup at the Nissan Sunderland Plant. Interviews with production staff 
suggested that employees may not have a voice through trade unions and are instead 
forced to use internal channels rather than an independent external body. 
 
4.3 PERCEPTION OF PRODUCTS 
Nine of the twelve interviewees drove a Nissan. The overriding reason for driving a 
Nissan was the money employees can save by either using the car leasing scheme or the 
discounts offered by the company. However, at the time of interview the friends and 
family discount was often similar to discounts attainable by the general public due to 
the economic climate and fall in demand. One production interviewee claimed that the 
advertised percentage family and friends discount is in reality never gained; the deals 
for buying Nissans are not as good as they were in the past. This particular interviewee 
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owned a Vauxhall Meriva to accommodate the family and a Vauxhall Corsa as the deal 
was “too good to turn down.”  
 
The general consensus amongst production staff was that the deal is more important 
than the design of the car. In contrast the office staff claimed that both the deal and the 
general liking of the car were the key reasons behind their decision to drive a Nissan. 
The majority of interviewees expressed a general liking of the Nissan Sunderland 
Plant’s products. Two of the office interviewees did not have a Nissan at the time of 
interview but expressed their intensions to return to the lease scheme in the near 
future. The Trim and Chassis Line 2 Manager claimed that managers were expected to 
drive Nissans. One production interviewee stated the view that staff should own Nissan 
as otherwise they are aiding the competition and making their jobs look less secure. 
The Trim and Chassis Line 2 Manager would like to think that he would have driven a 
Nissan, be taken by it, and become sold on it even if he didn’t work for the company. 
However, several of the interviewees claimed that it was unlikely they would have 
driven a Nissan if they hadn’t of worked for the company. 
 
The design of the cars has improved since Carlos Ghosn became CEO of Nissan. The 
company has made an effort to change their brand image to make customers feel that 
their products are more appealing, sporty, interesting and adventurous. “The 350Z, 
Infinity range (Nissan’s luxury brand), and GTR are examples of deliberately adding 
products to the range to try and shift the brand. Nissan has a foundation for inbuilt 
quality but you now need more than this as even some of the low cost manufacturers are 
creating good quality cars. You need more than just good quality and that is one of Carlos 
Ghosn’s goals” (Trim and Chassis Line 2 Manager). Whereas the interviewees were of 
the opinion that the design is improving they do not appear to believe that the current 
range of cars (at time of interview) is attractive; “I nearly said attractive cars… I suppose 
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they are not too bad – there are a lot worse out there” (Production Interviewee). One of 
the interviewees claimed that staff used to get the impression that Nissan was 18 
months behind the other manufacturers. Models seemed to have the same shapes as the 
competitors’ vehicles. For example, the Micra C+C (convertible) launched after a similar 
looking Peugeot was already on the market. 
 
The interviewees believed that customers bought their vehicles for their quality and 
reliability. Whereas the Nissan Sunderland Plant previously bought expensive parts 
which had an exact fit a lot more people were buying Renaults which were fitted with 
cheaper parts. The company realised that its specifications were above what the 
customer desired. As a result, the plant switched to cheaper parts which saved money 
but also reduced the quality and were harder to fit (Production Interviewee). Value for 
money, reputation, and customer loyalty were also cited as potential decision makers 
for customers. The general consensus amongst all interviewees was that design is 
improving and increasing becoming a more significant factor. Several of the 
interviewees stated that they viewed the Qashqai as being a big success. The Trim and 
Chassis Line 2 manager suggested that customers may also buy a Nissan if they know 
friends and family working at the plant. Between his father-in-law and mother-in-law, 
they were “on about their third Nissan so far.”  
 
Table 4-4 provides an overview of the two questions relating to perception of products. 
Perceptions are very similar in each of the groupings. The key decision factor for both 
customer and employees in buying / leasing a Nissan vehicle is quality and reliability.  
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Staff 
Do you own a Nissan? If so why, or 
why not? 
Why do you think customers buy 
Nissan vehicles? 
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 
TM 
• Good car & good deal 
• Vauxhall had better offers when I 
purchased my latest car 
• Public can get deals just as good as 
the friends and family discount  
• Quality & Reliability 
• Value for money / the deals 
• Reputation 
• Must like the car designs or else they 
wouldn’t buy them 
TL 
• Mainly for the deal 
• Reliable 
• Nice cars 
• Design has improved 
• Reliability 
• Value for money 
• Quality is still there but has reduced  
• More customers now buying based 
on the car’s design 
• Brand loyalty 
S 
• It is all about having faith in the 
products you are building 
• Reliable 
• Main reason is the deal 
• Style of the car was not an important 
factor 
• Reliability 
• Reputation 
• Design has improved 
• Contradicting views on quality 
M 
• Managers expected to drive Nissans 
• Very good cars 
• Family drive Nissans 
• Friends and family scheme levels of 
discount now similar to what the 
public can get 
• Reputation for quality 
• Well built cars 
• Design used to be bland 
Office 
• 2 out of 4 drove a Nissan 
• Good scheme 
• Nice car 
• One interviewee didn’t have a 
Nissan as wanted to try something 
new 
• One interviewee had already bought 
a non-Nissan car before joining 
Nissan Sunderland Plant 
• Reputation as a quality brand 
• Brand loyalty 
• Value for money 
• Becoming more innovative 
• Moving towards good quality, well 
built, reliable and good looking cars 
Key: TM (team member n=2), TL (team leader n=3 ), S (supervisor n=1), M (manager n=1) 
Table 4-4 Perception of Products Overview 
 
4.4 SUCCESS FACTORS 
Leadership and a clear unified vision were cited as key factors behind Nissan’s success. 
Five interviewees directly attributed Nissan’s success to the Renault-Nissan Alliance 
and Carlos Ghosn’s leadership. Most of Nissan’s global workforce will be able to talk 
about similar things; brand positioning, Nissan Production Way, and the GT2012 
midterm plan. “We now all pull together in the same direction for the same cause which is 
the good of the company. I honestly believe that is a strength of this organisation on a 
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global basis” (Trim and Chassis Line 2 Manager). Workforce flexibility, the Nissan 
Production Way, and a focus on customer needs were all cited as key to Nissan’s global 
success. 
 
Quality, tight cost control and continuous improvement were cited as the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant’s success factors. Production interviewees were unanimous in 
viewing the workforce as the key success factor for Nissan Sunderland Plant. ““As corny 
as it might sound it’s the truth of the matter. I don’t think that there are many other areas 
in this country or other countries in Europe that could have produced a success story like 
Sunderland. It is all based on the efforts of the people here. You regularly hear when you 
talk to the lads on the line or management in the MD office that we all agree that 
everyone works extremely hard and we are where we are because of their efforts” (Trim 
and Chassis Line 2 Manager). Although the workforce is seen by many as integral to 
Nissan Sunderland Plant’s success a Production Team Leader argued that there is 
“always going to be a bit of resentment [from the employees] that the company makes 
them work so hard.” The ability of the plant and its staff to react to changes, low 
sickness rates, and determination were also cited as contributing to the plant’s success. 
 
Office interviewees focused on the product and plant functionality as the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant’s key success factors rather than the employees themselves. This 
included a higher number of jobs per hour compared to other Nissan plants, the use of 
Kaizen activities, good communications and the desire to overachieve on both local and 
international level targets. One office interviewee claimed that employee relations were 
increasingly challenging especially in light of the current economic climate.  
 
Table 4-5 provides an overview of the factors interviewees cite as making Nissan 
Sunderland Plant and Nissan Global successful. Interestingly one of the team leaders 
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claimed that the plant’s success could be attributed to Sunderland historically being 
home to hard-working manual workers. Whereas the office interviewees cited the 
speed of the production line and a customer focus as success factors these were not 
mentioned by the production interviewees.  
 
Staff 
What factors in your view make 
Nissan (global) successful? 
What factors in your opinion make 
Nissan Sunderland successful? 
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 
TM 
• Nissan Production Way works in 
every plant 
• Continuous improvement 
• Flexible workforce 
• Ability to meet customer demands 
• Good range of cars – Qashqai is the 
biggest thing we have 
• Rewards 
• Never fail 
• Meet every target set 
• Low sickness rates 
• Staff always turn up on time 
TL 
• Leadership 
• Renault-Nissan Alliance 
• Quality 
• Value for money 
• Focus on cost reduction 
• Continuous improvement 
• Clear plan 
• Hardworking, committed workforce 
• The plant is in an area where 
families have historically been hard 
working manual workers 
• Management team driven to succeed 
S 
• Strong leadership 
• Good reputation and quality product 
• Emphasis on cost reduction 
• Clear strategy / vision 
• Not afraid to learn off each other 
• Hardworking committed workforce 
• Ability to adapt to changes 
• Not afraid to take on new practices 
M 
• Clear strategy 
• Clear expectations 
• Carlos Ghosn 
• Renault-Nissan Alliance 
• Clear direction 
• Workforce 
• Nissan Production Way – global 
standard, clearly defined production 
system 
Office 
• Manufacturing process (Nissan 
Production Way) 
• Range of cars 
• Workforce 
• Continuous improvement 
• Commitment and meeting targets 
• Leadership 
• Clear plans 
• Customer focused 
• More cost focused than in past 
• Production line speed 
• Quick decisions 
• Employee commitment 
• Cost driven / Lean 
• Aiming to overachieve 
• Quality 
• Customer focus 
Key: TM (team member n=2), TL (team leader n=3 ), S (supervisor n=1), M (manager n=1) 
Table 4-5 Success Factors Overview  
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4.5 SUPPLIER RELATIONS 
The majority of interviewees consider Nissan Sunderland Plant to have good supplier 
relations. On-site suppliers are often considered as Nissan Sunderland Plant employees 
due to their integration into morning meetings. They also follow the plant rules and 
procedures; on-site suppliers have non-production days when Nissan Sunderland Plant 
has non-production days. The Nissan Sunderland Plant had to make certain alterations 
to accommodate suppliers moving on-site which included improving the provision of 
female toilet facilities. “We help them out if any of their equipment has broken down so 
that they don’t get told off for stopping the line” There is also a degree of cross-
functional training and there are also crisis teams for when problems occur. Office staff 
claimed that the Nissan Sunderland Plant had a lot of power in the North-East. 
Developments and issues at the Nissan Sunderland Plant can have a direct impact on its 
suppliers (e.g. fall in demand). However, office interviewees claimed that there must be 
some benefit for suppliers being associated as supplying Nissan Sunderland Plant. 
 
Table 4-6 provides an overview of interviewee opinions regarding supplier relations. It 
is particularly interesting to note the Production Team Leaders’ claims of Nissan 
Sunderland Plant staff and suppliers’ staff often lending each other a helping hand. The 
office interviewees highlighted good communication with suppliers given information 
in advance whilst noting the power the Nissan Sunderland Plant has over their 
suppliers and the link in fortunes.  
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Staff 
Do you think that Nissan has good supplier relations? If so why, or why 
not? 
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 
TM 
• Yes – they have to 
• Excellent relations with the on-site staff 
• Nissan audits suppliers and they audit Nissan 
• It all works really well 
TL 
• Yes although it can be difficult as Nissan places demands on them 
• Supplier staff and Nissan staff help each other out 
• On-site suppliers’ staff are thought of as part of the team 
S 
• Yes! 
• Supervisors are sometimes seconded to suppliers to help them implement 
Nissan style procedures 
• On-site suppliers are more involved and are almost like Nissan staff 
M 
• Yes! 
• Supplier employees are treated similarly to our workforce 
• Cross-functional working 
• Suppliers on-site 
• Suppliers attend Nissan meetings 
• We are very demanding of suppliers 
• We are all honest and transparent 
Office 
• Yes but it is quite difficult due to the power Nissan yields 
• Good communication – we bring suppliers into the plant on a regular basis 
• On-site suppliers 
• Suppliers information in advance to allow them to do their analysis 
• Sure it won’t do suppliers any harm to be a Nissan supplier 
• Sometimes feel sorry for suppliers as what happens here affects them 
• They are under as much pressure as we are to deliver 
Key: TM (team member n=2), TL (team leader n=3 ), S (supervisor n=1), M (manager n=1) 
Table 4-6 Supplier Relations Overview 
 
4.6 NISSAN PRODUCTION WAY 
Production interviewees seemed to find questions relating to the Nissan Production 
Way and its implementation easier to answer than the office interviewees. This may be 
due to their direct interaction with the production line. The Nissan Production Way is 
considered to be an important part of Nissan. Bi-monthly meetings, chaired by a 
number of executives who are responsible for the Nissan Production Way, involve 
Nissan Production Way functions from each region and each plant. During these 
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meeting best practices is shared and advances in technology are discussed. There is a 
Nissan Production Way office in Nissan HQ (Japan). The Nissan Sunderland Plant also 
has a Nissan Production Way office run by employees who have considerable 
knowledge of the production system. The Nissan Production Way is ‘drummed into 
staff’ although one of the office interviewees could only remember small parts of the 
system. The Nissan Production Way is “their way of having a good working relationship 
where everyone is kept informed, everyone appreciates the main elements and this way of 
working is also used in our appraisals” (Office Interviewee).   
 
Four interviewees believed that other manufacturers may have similar production 
systems; “differences are probably found on a local level and concerned with the staff, 
quality of management, and suppliers” (Production Interviewee). However, it is also 
claimed that the Nissan Sunderland Plant must be doing something different from the 
competition as they are regarded as Europe’s most productive plant. 
 
Supervisors often complete around four Quality Control Stories a year on top of a 
couple of two hour Kaizens. Quality Control Stories can be 4, 8 or 11 ‘steppers’; the 
number indicates the number of tools you use. In essence a Quality Control Story looks 
at the concern and identifies a few potential areas of interest. The supervisor also 
stated that big ideas tend to be put into the Improvement Diagnosis System which 
identifies and helps find ways to reduce Non-Value Added Activities Non-Value Added 
Activities. Other cited Nissan Production Way features include Just-in-Time, continuous 
improvement, and production led maintenance.   
 
The majority of interviewees consider the Nissan Production Way to be easily 
implemented. Several of the production interviewees had the opinion that 
implementation would be easier in a new plant compared to an old plant. Issues 
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surrounding the quality, flexibility and commitment of staff as well as the training they 
receive were key concerns for office interviewees. At the time of interview a new 
Nissan plant was being built in Russia. All office interviewees were confident that the 
implementation of Nissan Production Way in a new Nissan Russia plant will work given 
the right support and the hiring of a good quality workforce. It is vitally important to 
not deviate from the Nissan Production Way otherwise the system will not work. All 
employees need to pull in the same direction.  
 
Interviewees believe that initial hurdles related to culture (e.g. different mentalities) 
can be overcome through quality training. Many thought that due to a clash of cultures 
in Japan and the UK the Japanese method of working would not translate successfully to a 
UK workforce. This was proven wrong” (Office Interviewee). Before the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant opened there were jokes that employees would have to do Tai Chi 
every morning. In new implementations there may be some teething problems with 
staff acclimatising to a new way of working but the system is good and simple and is a 
common sense approach for managers to adopt.  
 
The Trim and Chassis Line 2 Manager was of the opinion that it is healthy for each plant 
to have its own identity; each culture and country has its unique elements and 
Sunderland is no different in this sense. Interestingly it was claimed that different 
plants find different elements of the Nissan Production Way harder to cope with than 
others. For example, Japanese workers find the keeping work stations clean easier than 
the Nissan Sunderland Plant’s workers. The manager was asked if the Nissan 
Production Way is a rule book. The response was to classify the Nissan Production Way 
as either a boundary or a framework. “Generally speaking it is the constants that lay 
down the standards. I think that there is always scope for variation as long as you do not 
step outside the boundaries.” An example provided to support this point was of Nissan 
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Sunderland Plant slightly modifying Quality Control Stories, a fundamental tool of the 
Nissan Production Way. The tool was introduced as an eleven step process but the 
Nissan Sunderland Plant felt that one or two steps could be combined and made the 
decision to use an eight step process (four for minor problems). The Nissan Sunderland 
Plant has not stepped outside the boundaries of what makes Quality Control Stories 
work. Their changes are just “one of the benefits of having a flexible system.”   
 
When the Nissan Sunderland Plant first opened production staff would often stay back 
for twenty minutes to replenish stock and tidy up. However, the mentality of the 
workers at the plant has changed and this no longer happens (Production Interviewee). 
Workers in Japan have the attitude that staying late after work doesn’t harm even 
though they are not getting paid. Whilst visiting a Nissan plant in Japan “we used to 
come on to shift and there used to be lads still there working... You wouldn’t get many 
people doing that here.” The plant used to be smaller and more like a family but “it’s a 
different environment we are working in now. When the buzzer goes the mentality is right 
I am getting paid now I am going out the door” (Production Interviewee). One 
production interviewee claimed that the type of person employed by the plant has now 
changed as there is no longer as much chance to pick and choose. “It’s great to say this is 
how we are going to do this but when a lad is coming in straight away and sees others not 
doing it he says hang on why am I doing it if he is not doing it? You always get those who 
conform to it straight away and say that’s my job and I will do it [and] will always get the 
ones who don’t. It’s difficult trying to get them doing it. Hard trying to motivate people to 
do it. You disagree with a lot of the things that happen now but you have to try and 
persuade people that its right even if you don’t think that’s right as it’s your job.” 
 
The following table (Table 4-7) provides an overview of the interviewees’ insights and 
opinions regarding the Nissan Production Way. 
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Staff 
What do you think makes the Nissan 
Production Way different to other car 
production systems? 
What do you think are the biggest 
challenges in implementing the 
Nissan Production Way? 
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 
T
M 
• It works 
• Workers are involved 
• Lots of training courses 
• Encouraged to put ideas forward 
• Initial struggle as it is not easy 
• Have to involve everyone 
• Don’t think management 
commitment will be a problem 
T
L 
• Most productive plant in Europe 
• Lots of improvement activities on the 
line 
• Continuously looking to improve 
• Probably similar tools but no other 
production system can be the same as 
we are doing better 
• Easy to implement in a new plant 
• Keeping it going is often more 
difficult than implementation 
• Staff need to fully understand the 
system 
• Culture could have an impact 
• All we worry about is will they be 
taking our work off of us? 
S 
• Everyone is involved 
• Synergy 
• We find the route of the problem 
• Standardisation and best practice 
• Staff can have an impact and make 
improvements 
• Some suggestions get through but often 
come forward as they think it is a 
waste of time 
• Not a problem as long as people are 
trained well 
• All Nissan Production Way does is 
group all of the best practices under 
one banner 
• Would be more difficult in a brown 
field site than a green field site 
• Cultural problems was always the 
fear here but it works 
• It’s difficult to maintain – you need 
to have people trained and setting 
the standards 
M 
• We always try to develop, improve and 
benchmark 
• Nissan Production Way office in Japan 
plus regional employees responsible 
for the Nissan Production Way 
• Global information and idea sharing 
• Staff should be able to suggest areas for 
improvement but a recent survey 
suggests that they don’t feel this way 
• Always scope for variation 
• Have to be agile 
• Need to really understand the 
system 
• Quick responses 
• If you do not stay faithful to the 
production system you will fail 
• Temptation will be to take shortcuts 
• Healthy for plants to have their own 
identity 
Office 
• There may be similarities with other 
systems 
• Focus on the customer 
• Delivering the customer what they 
want when they want it 
• Widely recognised as the most 
productive plant in Europe 
• Mantra is quality driven, waste free 
• Differences are probably on a local 
level 
• Staff can have an impact and use their 
own ideas to benefit the Nissan 
Production Way 
• Cultural hurdle – different methods 
may be used. Would other countries 
be as accepting of working 
weekends or short notice overtime? 
• Need good training 
• Culture isn’t a ‘stopper’ – it worked 
here! 
• Need to buy into the system 
• Sells itself as good sense 
• Nissan Production Way is rigorous 
and well planned 
• Need good staff and proficient 
trainers 
Key: TM (team member n=2), TL (team leader n=3 ), S (supervisor n=1), M (manager n=1) 
Table 4-7 Nissan Production Way Overview  
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4.7 SUMMARY 
The initial interview findings provide a good insight into the Nissan Production Way 
and the Nissan Sunderland Plant from an employee perspective. The Nissan Sunderland 
Plant is a successful exemplar Lean operation. The production system and the 
workforce appear to have contributed towards the plant’s success.  Nissan has become 
more cost focused since Carlos Ghosn became CEO of Nissan. The continuous strive to 
cut costs in a competitive market and the additional impact of the current economic 
climate may have taken its toll on the Nissan Sunderland Plant. A key Nissan 
Production Way principle is to reduce Non-Value Added Activities however underlying 
human issues would suggest that the Nissan Sunderland Plant may not be reducing 
Non-Value Added Activities in the workforce. Production workers appear to be coming 
increasingly negative towards the plant and its production system. Office interviewees 
appeared to be separated from the realities of the production line – production 
interviewees appeared to find it much easier to talk about the Nissan Production Way. 
 
The Nissan Production Way is praised for being clear, straightforward and flexible. The 
interviewees do not consider culture to be an issue when implementing the Nissan 
Production Way. The main criticism of the Nissan Production Way at Nissan 
Sunderland Plant was that it works its employees very hard. There also appears to be 
issues with the training production staff are offered. Interviewees felt that the training 
was not always useful and lessons learned could not be used in practice as they were 
too busy and/or increasingly tied to the production line. Whereas the majority of 
interviewees have a ‘general liking’ for the products the plant builds the key decision 
factor for driving a Nissan was the deal. 
 
The following chapter provides the results of in-depth interviews with Nissan 
Production Way Experts.  
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5 RESULTS: EXPERT INTERVIEWS 
The initial interview findings suggested that the Nissan Production Way was primarily 
focused on technical elements rather than human factors. Office staff remained 
separated from the realities of working on the production line and those working on 
the line were increasingly tied to it. This chapter provides the findings from a detailed 
set of semi-structured interviews with the Nissan Sunderland Plant’s experts on the 
Nissan Production Way. The methodology for this chapter is provided in Section 3.5.3 
(p76). Interview transcripts (in note form) are provided in Appendix C (p252). 
 
5.1 RESOURCE REDUCTION 
Resource reduction is a crucial element of the Nissan Production Way. “The Nissan 
Production Way promotes manufacturing with minimum resources” the Nissan 
Production Way Handbook’s opening gambit is to “only give the customer what he is 
willing to pay for” (Expert 1). The Nissan Production Way focuses on matching 
customer needs and providing the right specification, in part made possible by mass 
customisation; a high number of end derivatives are available to customers. Anything 
above the right specification is considered waste and surplus to requirements. The 
Nissan Production Way seeks to not only provide customers with exactly what they 
want, but to also provide it exactly when they want it. The Nissan Sunderland Plant’s 
build-to-order percentage at the time of interview was over 90%. Their target is 100% 
build-to-order. Expert 1 claimed that build to order was at the forefront of the plant’s 
business especially due to efforts to increase market share despite the economic 
downturn. The financial benefits of build-to-order compared to non-build-to-order 
could be around €348 per vehicle (Expert 1). 
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Build-to-order forms part of Douki-Seisan the Nissan Production Way’s ideal 
manufacturing system. There are several Key Performance Indicators within Douki-
Seisan. One of these is Delivery Schedule Time Achievement Ratio which compares 
delivery time against build time plus or minus a two-hour window. Delivery Schedule 
Time Achievement Ratio is measured daily. If performance against Delivery Schedule 
Time Achievement Ratio is below the required level an investigation takes place to 
identify reasons for failure and to put in place countermeasures. “In effect that does 
reduce resources in building a car right first time – saves a lot of wasted resources such as 
time and materials to repair the vehicles” (Expert 1).  
 
The Nissan Production Way’s main objective is to reduce the Total Delivered Cost, the 
overall cost of a completed vehicle. To do this the Nissan Production Way places a 
heavy emphasis on removing Non-Value Added Activities. This can include anything 
from costs to time and materials. The Nissan Production Way identifies a total of 17 
wastes (table 5.1) which fall into three categories; (i) process waste (problems with 
paperwork, information, or time), (ii) business waste (non-value adding process time), 
and (iii) pure waste (waiting time, rework and faulty materials / processing). “The key 
is to continuously examine the norm and not to rest on our laurels” (Expert 3). One 
method of removing waste is Integrated Factory Automation which has a dedicated 
team focused on reducing headcount through use of low cost automation. Integrated 
Factory Automation tries to reduce Non-Value Added Activities by taking advantage of 
both volume increases and automation. This can include shuttles, part selection 
systems or Automated Goods Vehicles. This is measured through Design Standard Time 
Ratio which compares allotted time for a vehicle’s build against actual build time. 
Design Standard Time Ratio is benchmarked with sister plants in the Renault-Nissan 
alliance. 
  
121 
 
Seven ‘Original’ Wastes 
Over Production: Manufacturing too much; too early; or ‘just-in-case’ 
Waiting: Time not used effectively (working time, delivery time etc) 
Waiting: Unnecessary movement of product and people 
Inappropriate processing: Over engineering; over processing (adding too much value) 
Unnecessary Inventory: High lead times; excess working capital; poor layout; excess 
movement 
Unnecessary Movement: Ergonomics etc Relates closely to 5S workplace organisation 
Defects: Scrap; rework; delay; warranty costs; repairs 
Ten ‘Additional’ Wastes 
Untapped Human 
Potential: 
When you hire a pair of hands you get a free brain 
Inappropriate Systems: Waste automated into the operation through the management 
system or utilising computer systems such as ERP that may create 
Muda 
Data Waste: Waste caused by untimely, incomplete or inaccurate information 
(may be a root cause of many other types of waste) 
Wasted Utilities: Excessive or inefficient use of energy – electricity, oil, gas and 
water. Poor environmental impact 
Wasted Materials: (linked to 4 above) – waste created by inappropriate or inefficient 
design or engineering or over-processing 
Wasted Space: (linked to 1,3,5,6 and 7 above) – activities expanded into excessive 
space so impacting on costs and environment 
Service and Office Waste: Wasteful service and administrative processes 
Waste of Customer Time: Delayed delivery; customer queuing; repeated requests for 
information (e.g. telephone answering cascades). Invoicing errors 
Waste of Defecting 
Customers: 
Loss of existing customers. ‘It costs 5 times more to acquire a new 
customer than to keep an existing customer’. 
Culture Waste: Waste caused by poor training or attitude of individuals (including 
managers and supervisors), high absenteeism and/or accident 
rates 
Table 5-1 Nissan Production Way 17 Wastes 
 
Non-Value Added Activities in production can be identified through process mapping 
which is used in the form of Douki-Seisan improvement. Within the Nissan Sunderland 
Plant there are a number of Improvement Engineering experts who are specially 
trained (in Japan) to perform this role. “To us it is essentially Just-in-Time… that is quite 
often the starting point for whatever we do” (Expert 2). The Nissan Production Way also 
utilises Statistical Process Control in addition to performing regular layout adjustments 
to reduce Non-Value Added Activities. For example, the Nissan Production Way Office 
has changed location within the plant every two years due to the previous space being 
valuable for other purposes. 
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Whereas inside the production environment the Nissan Sunderland Plant uses Just-in-
Time, Kaizen and seven quality tools (cause-and-effect, control chart, Pareto chart, 
stratification, scatter diagram, histogram and check sheet), off the production line the 
Nissan Sunderland Plant has V-Up (Value Up) which Expert 3 likens to Six Sigma. V-Up 
is split down into two tools; (i) V-Fast, and (ii) V-Decide. V-Fast looks at issues that only 
require low levels of statistical analysis and are cross-functional. The focus is on the 
rigour of getting people together to collect data, brainstorm, create countermeasures 
and share information. V-Decide is more complex, can last between 3 – 6 months, and 
requires higher levels of statistical analysis, significant support and resources V-Decide 
is comparable to Six Sigma’s D-make process and deals with cross-functional 
breakthrough issues with the aim to identify the problem, create a team to tackle the 
problem, identify the root cause and develop and evaluate a set of countermeasures.  
 
Production supervisors have a high degree of responsibility for reducing Non-Value 
Adding Activities. The Nissan Production Way is “about trying to get everything as tight 
as we can putting in the minimum and getting out the maximum to give it to the 
customer” (Expert 2). There is a general focus within the Nissan Production Way to 
reduce resources by improving quality, minimising stock (including safety stock), and 
lower work-in-progress and reduce lead times. Expert 2 views the Nissan Production 
Way as a series of inputs, processes, and outputs. “If you don’t use the right system in the 
middle you are not going to be successful and we are not going to be here” (Expert 2).  
 
In 1985 when the Nissan Sunderland Plant opened Just-in-Time, Total Preventative 
Maintenance, Quality Control Stories, and Genba Kanri were already in use but today 
these tools, and other Nissan Production Way tools, are considered to be part of the 
Nissan Production Way toolbox. An emphasis is placed on using the right tool for the 
right job. At the lowest level the Nissan Production Way uses 2-hour Kaizen activities, 
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or a 2-day Kaizen which will focus on resolving a small problem. Quality Control Stories 
are either 8 step or 11 step processes that incorporate various tools and techniques 
based around Plan-Do-Check-Act. The basic concept is that a team is brought together 
(can be cross-functional depending on problem) to tackle an identified problem and go 
through the rigour of Plan-Do-Check-Act to create a solution. “Quality Control Story is 
not a Nissan technique – almost every company in Japan uses it along with the seven 
tools” (Nissan Production Way Expert). All of the tools and techniques present in the 
Nissan Production Way are considered to be part of the Nissan Production Way 
Toolbox. Employees have the right tools inside the toolbox to allow them to follow the 
Nissan Production Way. There is a big emphasis on using the right tool for the right job. 
“We match the tools to the level and significance of the problem and this is key to how it 
all works and pulls together. We do not use Six Sigma to do everything – we know which is 
the right tool to respond to each issue but of course you must still be able to identify the 
issues in the first place” (Expert 3).  
 
Kaizen / Continuous improvement₁ 
Just-in-time₂₄ 
Setup time reduction 
Small lot production 
Waste elimination 
TPM / preventative maintenance 
Improvement circles₃₀ 
Employee involvement₃₂ 
Teamwork₂₈ 
Layout adjustments 
Takted production 
Autonomation (Jidoka)₃₃ 
Statistical quality control / SPC 
Work force reduction 
Root cause analysis (5 Whys)₃₁ 
Value stream mapping / flowcharting 
Lead-time reduction 
Kaizens / Kaizen events 
Profit over employee welfare₃₈ 
Build-to-order₄₀ 
17 Wastes₄₁ 
Internal competition between plants 
Ergonomics₄₅ 
Six sigma₄₇ 
Toolbox thinking₄₈ 
Genba Kanri₅₁ 
Figure 5-1 Resource Reduction NPW Elements 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
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5.2 PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT 
The Nissan Production Way is a cellular manufacturing system working on a pull 
(rather than push) system. “It’s a bit of a weird one as we have continuous production 
lines but in true theory its cellular in the sense that people would understand it” (Expert 
3). Production is organised into shops which are further broken down into zones 
(cells). The main shops are Press, Body, Paint and Trim and Chassis. Each has their own 
structures and specialised process but they all know the customer requirements 
(delivery, quality etc.). Production is smoothed and levelled across 24 hours. One 
problem prevalent at the time of interview was the disparity between diesel and petrol 
engines. This is further complicated by multiple engine variants when one (or both) of 
the production lines are building multiple models.  
Visual management exists at all levels of the Nissan Sunderland Plant. An importance is 
placed on employees understanding where they contribute to the overall plant 
objectives (Hoshin Kanri). The Nissan Production Way tries to give ownership to 
employees through employee participation. In the Genba Kanri audit conducted before 
the interviews “one shop had a list of 70 ideas in a zone they were going to try and 
implement for improvements” (Expert 2). 
 
The Nissan Sunderland Plant maintains on-site human resources, engineering, 
production control, maintenance and quality departments along with a small amount of 
local purchasing and finance. Purchasing is primarily based at Nissan Technical Europe 
(Nissan Technical Centre Europe) in Cranfield which Nissan considers to be close and 
interlinked with the Nissan Sunderland Plant. IT services are based in Nissan Europe, 
France. Within the Nissan Sunderland Plant there are working level groups, steering 
groups and steering committees which “discuss performance indices relating to the 
Nissan Production Way” (Expert 1). Expert 1 conducts monthly meetings with 
production shop managers specifically related to Nissan Production Way activity.  
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Most the production line is synchronised, viz, parts arrive on the line Just-in-Time and 
in the correct sequence. For example, on mixed-model lines the correct exhaust will be 
ready in sequence for the worker to pick up and fit. The exception to this rule is the 
plant’s limited number of batch shops, some of which are unable to be synchronised 
with the line. A recent Nissan Sunderland Plant expert training course in Japan focused 
on how to improve batch shops to work more in sequence with the main line. There 
was a focus on information, timing, reducing stocks and delivering to the main line. 
Although synchronisation is part of Douki-Seisan (ideal manufacturing system), in 
practice there are barriers. Expert 2 is involved with sharing ideas, and reporting the 
status of batch shops in company global e-rooms. Global e-rooms exist to share 
information across Renault-Nissan plants on Nissan Production Way, and other issues. 
“The sharing of our position is something that is monitored on a regular basis in the batch 
shops where we have to define what level we are at and how we sequence with the main 
line. So it’s something all plants are evaluated on essentially” (Expert 2). 
 
Just-in-Time is described as being “one of the most used tools on the shop floor because it 
can be very simple” (Expert 2). The Nissan Sunderland Plant maintains very low levels 
of inventory and receives frequent deliveries Just-in-Time with sequenced parts (i.e. 
door pads and seats) delivered by local satellite suppliers. “You are looking at no more 
than two hours’ worth of stock on site” (Expert 3). A number of the Nissan Sunderland 
Plant’s suppliers are classed as CAT3; they make to order rather than making to stock. 
These CAT3 suppliers are based both in the UK and abroad. Parts not originating from 
local suppliers are delivered into the plant from local warehouses owned by third party 
logistics companies. In most cases the stock is not owned by the Nissan Sunderland 
Plant until it is delivered to the site. “That means we do not have high stock levels, don’t 
have to pay for all of that. From a supplier point of view they are still shipping in batches… 
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our whole methodology with supply is truly Just-in-Time. The way we run all of our 
internal shops is truly Just-in-Time as well” (Expert 3).  
 
Kanban / pull system 
Production leveling (Heijunka)₂₅ 
Inventory reduction 
Visual control and management 
Employee involvement₃₂ 
Time/work studies₂₇ 
Cellular manufacturing 
Policy deployment (Hoshin kanri) 
Process Synchronisation₃₄ 
Limited batch production₄₉ 
Genba Kanri₅₁ 
Figure 5-2 Production Management NPW Elements 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
 
5.3 SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
Nissan Sunderland Plant’s suppliers are offered support and training to learn Nissan 
Production Way management techniques. “We give them encouragement, do 
benchmarking with them, offer them the training and tools but can’t force them to do it” 
(Expert 3). Suppliers have to commit to cost reduction - they play a large role in the 
Nissan Production Way’s effort to reduce Total Delivered Cost. “I think an interesting 
thing is that in the last few years with the squeeze on ourselves to make things cheaper 
the squeeze goes onto suppliers to make things cheaper” (Expert 1). The Nissan 
Sunderland Plant’s supplier support programme, Alliance Supplier Improvement 
Programme, helps first tier suppliers to improve their processes, develop their product, 
deliver a cheaper product and meet their productivity costs and targets. “We don’t just 
demand it from them we go in and help them achieve it as well” (Expert 1).  
 
The Alliance Supplier Improvement Programme has included transferring practices to 
first tier suppliers. For example, Calsonic Kansai was introduced to Improvement 
Diagnostic System. “You could see they all knew places around their workplace where 
these opportunities were but they obviously struggled to get them down on paper and 
convince the powers that be in their organisation that actually if you can let us invest the 
127 
 
time, manpower and cost into this we will get the savings out of it” (Expert 2). The 
Improvement Diagnostic System is a computerised measurement system which 
identifies capability of manufacturing a product as well as focusing on the role of the 
supervisors and their capability to deliver. All manufacturing Kaizen activities are 
managed through the Improvement Diagnostic System. Results are logged and shared 
across the Renault-Nissan alliance. “It is a proper family sharing information” (Expert 3). 
Calsonic Kansai and Unipress are examples of long-term suppliers who have embraced 
the Nissan Sunderland Plant’s way of working and have developed their own versions 
of the Nissan Production Way. “They have embraced it [Improvement Diagnostic System] 
as a measurement tool they can use to quantify performance” (Expert 1). 
 
0.5 tier suppliers are those who are based on-site and integrated into the production 
process. This includes suppliers who are based in the centre of the production line. 0.5 
tier suppliers work the same hours as Nissan Sunderland Plant staff and adopt Nissan 
Sunderland Plant practices including 5S and visual signage. It is considered important 
to implement 5S in all areas on-site including on-site suppliers. “If we tidy our areas and 
they don’t what’s the point in doing it? Our staff will instantly see that their staff are not 
doing it and say why are they not doing it if I have to do it – it won’t work” (Expert 2). 0.5 
tier suppliers can also take part in courses run by the Nissan Sunderland Plant’s 
training department and in many cases, have actively participated. The interviewees 
acknowledged the risk suppliers take in relocating to the Nissan Sunderland Plant. The 
plant works hard to accommodate the suppliers ensuring that there are adequate staff 
facilities. Most Nissan Sunderland Plant staff view 0.5 tier employees as part of the 
Nissan Sunderland Plant team, rather than employees working for another company.  
 
The Nissan Production Way includes its own version of value stream mapping “but it is 
not the type of value stream mapping say you would see if you went out and bought a 
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book” (Expert 2). Expert 1 claimed that the Alliance Supplier Improvement Programme 
team perform value stream mapping and flow-charting. “Improvement Engineering 
experts really live within the Alliance Supplier Improvement Programme function” 
(Expert 1). 
 
5S/Housekeeping 
Supplier involvement 
Visual control and management 
Value stream mapping / flowcharting 
Global idea and information sharing 
0.5 tier (on-site) suppliers 
Joint supplier-plant training₄₂ 
Decision Analysis₄₄ 
Figure 5-3 Supply Chain Management NPW Elements 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
 
5.4 STANDARDISATION, DEFECTS, AND IMPROVEMENT 
A large degree of emphasis is placed on standardisation. The Nissan Production Way 
aims to identify best practice and standardise across the plant. Standard operations are 
created to ensure that tasks are carried out in the safest and most efficient manner. 
Standardisation also helps in ensuring working practices across the site are uniform 
and allow for easy movement of staff. “We look for standardisation continuously” 
(Expert 3). For example, 5S (workplace organisation) and Genba Kanri (workshop 
management) is cited as a standardisation tool implemented plant-wide (including 0.5 
tier suppliers). Standard Operations exist to inform operators and document how to 
build Nissan Sunderland Plant’s vehicles. There is a standard format and method to be 
used when writing standard operations. “For example in terms of splitting the operation 
up into its main steps, identifying key points by underlining them, putting the reasons for 
these key points in brackets, all of that is a global standard” (Expert 1). All supervisors 
are trained to write standard operations to global standards and are issued with a three 
year standard operations licence. 5S also has a standard training plan, standard criteria 
and evaluation system for maintaining 5S. "I think it is down to the fact that we have 
very clear policies and guidelines for everything we do and those are reflected away from 
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manufacturing areas in Indirect Operations Sheets” (Nissan Production Way Expert). 
Indirect Operation Sheets provide the process flows of what you should do and who 
you should contact. Clear communication is considered vital and this includes using 
language, and terms, understood by all employees. For example, on objective 
deployment boards the Nissan Sunderland Plant tries to ensure that the language used 
is understandable to all who read it. 
 
Training both on and off the production line is standardised. New operators, including 
temporary staff, are trained using a standard 21-day model. Trainers are trained using 
standardised documents and training programmes. Guidelines exist for how long it 
should take to fully train an operator (approx. 10 – 15 shifts) but it does not matter if 
training takes longer. “At the end of the day if they are capable and confident [that’s all 
that matters]” (Expert 1).  
 
Nissan Production Way improvement tools and techniques include Total Preventative 
Maintenance. Just-in-Time, Quality Control Story, and Kaizen activities. “To promote and 
maintain these tools we tend to say keep your tools sharp” (Nissan Production Way 
Expert). An example of which is the annual Quality Control Story competition where 
winners flew over to Japan to present their activity in a global competition. On a bigger 
scale Nissan Production Way includes Hoshin Kanri (policy deployment) part of which 
is the development of strategies and the identification of key business objectives. These 
objectives are typically breakthrough items Nissan Sunderland Plant need to do over 
12 months. To support these efforts Nissan Sunderland Plant can use any of the tools 
from the Nissan Production Way toolbox including brainstorming and affinity 
diagrams.  
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The Nissan Management Way is a subsection of the Nissan Production Way and “is 
essentially Total Quality Management” (Expert 1). The Nissan Management Way focuses 
on customer satisfaction, a key measure of quality for the Nissan Sunderland Plant.  
Real time systems involving both customers and dealers provide information about 
vehicle concerns to a European database. This database also gives the plant access to 
information on trends. Faulty components are retrievable for inspection, the results of 
which are discussed with the supplier or internal plant area which caused the problem. 
“From a customer point of view we have our finger on the pulse, know exactly what is 
happening out there and we can react to that very very quickly and get robust 
countermeasures in place” (Expert 3). 
 
All vehicles are put through a comprehensive evaluation system at the end of the 
production line. This includes a series of road test checks on an outside surface road 
and inside a roller booth. Visual and dynamic inspections also take place. Vehicles are 
also selected at random and checked “against a known set of standards of expectations 
of a customer. [Results are] fed back in real time across the plant” (Expert 3). The Nissan 
Production Way also includes vehicle and process quality assurance, inspection 
standards and on-going audits (includes audits for torque and appearance). Due to the 
number of parts Nissan Sunderland Plant receives there are no goods inward 
inspections. The plant does however have the ability to intercept known defect 
deliveries. The Nissan Sunderland Plant relies on high quality suppliers meeting, or 
exceeding, stringent ratio targets to ensure that components are of a high quality. 
Suppliers are monitored on scorecards and are subject to rigorous capability type 
audits which look at their quality management systems, capability to develop products, 
capability to continuously improve their own systems, and their focus and ability to 
analyse warranty and customer complaints. 
 
131 
 
One of the initiatives Nissan Sunderland Plant are currently looking to introduce is a 
quality assurance matrix. This was highlighted in a global Genba Kanri audit. The 
quality assurance matrix will have details all of the quality checks carried out within 
the plant. This would include general information and characteristics, how important it 
is (i.e. Important A can it cause death), how it is checked and by whom, where and how 
is it checked (Standard Operations) and how many times should it be checked 
(Important A should be checked three times or 300%). The Nissan Sunderland Plant 
states that it is also important to recognise that an operator can only physically carry 
out a certain number of checks before it becomes impossible to complete tasks or 
perform checks correctly. Quality checks should therefore be reduced by using 
measures including Poka-Yoke and closed loop fault detection. The ideal is for 
automation to take away the need for an operator to perform checks. For example, 
when fitting wheels, the machine puts a yellow die on the wheel when the torque is 
achieved. If the torque isn’t achieved the line is stopped.  
 
Neighbourhood checks are an important Nissan Production Way quality check. The 
following operator will check to see if the part is fitted and functioning correctly. At the 
end of each zone a check and repair operator examines all of the components fitted in 
the zone. Where possible defects are fixed on the spot or are otherwise flagged for 
repair. The check and repair operator job rotates between different team members.  
The Nissan Sunderland Plant uses Andon cords and help cords. “In the majority of shops 
the first port of call is the help line which pulls off a siren – the operator does that” 
(Expert 2). A team leader or supervisor will then come to assist the operator. In most 
cases the team leader or supervisor will take over the job on the problem car whilst the 
operator starts on the next job. The team leader or supervisor can then decide to stop 
the line if needed. Any operator can stop the line if there is any health and safety issue. 
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There are two team leaders and a supervisor on each shift for each zone and all 
members of staff are made very clear of their roles when things do go wrong.  
 
There are several measures in place to identify, stop and fix defects. Quick Response 
Quality Confirmation is the Nissan Production Way’s quality management activity on 
the shop floor. “We have lots of policies and procedures for managing outflow of quality 
defects more importantly for monitoring occurrence and effectiveness of 
countermeasures” (Expert 1). As previously mentioned Poka-Yoke and low cost closed 
loop fault detection are also measures to prevent defects. Examples include the plant’s 
robots which have proximity sensors to ensure parts are picked up correctly and the 
use of closed loop measurement systems in the machining environment (if tolerance 
levels are not met the machine will stop). Similar systems to the machining 
environment can be found in the axle shop. Most of the automation is directly linked to 
maintenance which is informed of any problems and reacts accordingly. Expert 3 
classed Nissan Production Way’s automation as “autonomation” (automation with a 
human touch). 
 
Kaizen / Continuous improvement₁ 
Just-in-time₂₄ 
5S/Housekeeping 
Poka yoke₄ 
Standardised work₂₆ 
Andon 
TPM / preventative maintenance 
Improvement circles₃₀ 
Education / cross training (OJT) 
Autonomation (Jidoka)₃₃ 
Root cause analysis (5 Whys)₃₁ 
Policy deployment (Hoshin kanri) 
100% inspection₂₉ 
Customer focus/involvement 
Total Quality Control 
0.5 tier (on-site) suppliers 
Ergonomics₄₅ 
Production methodology used in indirect areas₄₆ 
Toolbox thinking₄₈ 
Genba Kanri₅₁ 
Figure 5-4 Standardisation, Defects, and Improvement NPW Elements 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
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5.5 HUMAN RELATIONS 
There are a small number of job titles used at the Nissan Sunderland Plant. These refer 
to an employee’s seniority rather than the job itself. The plant is split into two distinct 
areas; (i) direct / production, and (ii) indirect / office. Where plant functions require 
staff to work both directly and indirectly these jobs are considered to be semi-direct. 
All staff have a yearly appraisal linked to merit payment and a mid-year (6 month) 
review.  This process includes a Continuous Development Plan where both employee 
and manager suggest opportunities for improvement and further training. Performance 
is measured against the 5 mind-sets and 5 actions of the Nissan Way which include 
motivation, commitment and targets performance, being fugal, transparent and cross-
functional. Continuous Development Plans generally include the specific skills needed 
for a particular role or function. Through this process employees can request to attend 
additional training or revisit training courses. Opportunities also exist to study for job 
relevant external higher education courses including degrees, masters or research 
degrees. The Nissan Sunderland Plant funds 80% of the course fee but the employee 
must study in their own time; no paid study leave is given. The interviewees did not 
indicate whether the funded higher education opportunity was also available to direct 
staff.  
 
There are no opportunities for extended leave for travel. All three interviewees agreed 
that such an opportunity doesn’t exist. “It’s quite frowned upon really as we are quite 
Lean on headcount so we don’t want anybody out although we are quite flexible and we 
do job share and things like that... We tend to not encourage people going on year 
sabbaticals and things like that – it is frowned upon to be honest” (Expert 3).  
 
The Nissan Sunderland Plant’s disciplinary procedure is administered by the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant Human Resources department in line with Nissan Sunderland Plant 
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terms and conditions. Both the single union and company council (which is formed of 
elected representatives) have a degree on input in the disciplinary process. A fact-file 
system allows superiors to record both negative and positive employee observations 
on a monthly basis. This fact-file builds a picture of employee’s achievements and is 
used at appraisal.  
 
To effectively manage staffing levels (and reduce idle working hours) the Nissan 
Production Way has a flexible workforce. This allows the plant to both stand-down at 
times of low demand and stand-up at times of high demand. This includes short-notice 
overtime after their main shift or on a Saturday. Overtime / stand-ups can be offset, to a 
certain extent, by stand-downs. The flexibility the plant has is governed by an 
agreement with its employees which, at the time of interview, had been recently 
reviewed and made more flexible in light of the challenging economy. There is also a 
mix between permanent and temporary staff. The levels of temporary staff are adjusted 
according to demand with previous workers’ details kept on file to allow hiring at short 
notice if needed.   
 
In the first quarter of 2009 Nissan Sunderland Plant announced that they were to shed 
1200 jobs as a result of the economic downturn. Six months prior to this decision the 
plant had hired between 1000 – 1200 employees and extended production on its 
popular Qashqai model from two shifts to three shifts. Expert 1 was asked for the 
reasons behind this decision and how it was carried out. “We ended up with a surplus 
and had to embark in what we call right sizing for the business environment” (Expert 1). 
The process of lowering staff levels was primarily focused on early retirement and 
voluntary redundancies with the exception of temporary staff with fixed term 
contracts. The process was described as being “very very difficult” (Expert 1). Surplus 
labour was kept for up to six weeks. “This particular incident (the economic downturn) 
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caught us unaware – we probably wouldn’t have released the number of people we 
released if we had known about the scrappage allowance incentive scheme” (Expert 1). 
The Nissan Sunderland Plant had to rehire 400 employees in a short space of time to 
cope with the increase in demand caused by the incentive’s introduction. The high level 
of resources needed to train these new people meant that the task was “quite painful 
[and] very very difficult” (Expert 1). Whereas Expert 1 had no direct experience with the 
layoffs it was his/her opinions that for many permanent employees it offered early 
retirement, or a lump sum voluntary redundancy, and the opportunity to move onto 
something new. However, it was acknowledged that the situation for temporary staff 
was not good. There were many emotional discussions with temporary workers 
focusing on their financial commitments. “It is not a good situation but unavoidable” 
(Expert 1). 
 
The current and previous MD of Nissan Sunderland Plant both rose through the ranks. 
There are promotion prospects within the Nissan Sunderland Plant however, the high 
potential of many of its employees, particularly those hired in the initial intake, has 
resulted in a high degree of competition for promotion. There are also fewer 
opportunities as employees often work for the Nissan Sunderland Plant for a large 
portion of their careers.  “Clearly you are not going to recognise all of that potential as 
the jobs are just not going to be there” (Expert 3). The Nissan Sunderland Plant uses 
succession management planning and offers the opportunity for employees to 
demonstrate their potential in a temporary position. If a position is becoming vacant 
temporary positions (at any level of seniority) allow interested employees to test-run 
the job to see if they can cope and also enjoy the position. Temporary positions also 
give managers the chance to see an employee in the role before making a decision on a 
suitable candidate. As a result of this system promotion generally comes from within. 
The Nissan Sunderland Plant recognises potential by giving employees additional 
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responsibilities or standing them into a higher profile position. High potential people 
are moved around departments to aid in their development and overall knowledge of 
the plant.  
 
Full employee value is achieved through clear communication of job roles, the Nissan 
Production Way and a focus on an employee’s actual contribution. Operators are 
unlikely to know everything about the Nissan Production Way but will fully understand 
their job role and what is expected from them. “Having that right character is key to it 
all working. What you don’t want is someone with a PhD working on Trim 1 fitting 
headlamps – it just doesn’t make sense – that person would very quickly be bored out of 
their mind” (Expert 3). Supervisors are responsible for choosing new recruits which 
will fit into their team. Teams also need to be dynamic and include high potential staff 
who can think outside of the box. Those who have high potential are often challenged to 
find a solution to a current problem. The key is to develop these individuals by through 
moving them around, building skills, business acumen, Lean acumen, and product 
knowledge. “I think [getting the full value from employees] is about involvement, 
managing expectations, selecting the right people, being realistic in what they can achieve 
because ultimately we build cars – we are not building rockets and we are not going to 
Mars” (Expert 3). 
 
Employees are primarily rewarded through merit payments awarded during annual 
appraisals. Whereas individual rewards for ideas do not exist there is team based 
recognition where a team is rewarded with nights out or new rest area equipment for 
solving problems or performing well. “I don’t think we are like in Japan where I have 
heard tales of competitions and if [they use your idea] you get 10% of the savings. We are 
not about that – it’s about the way you are working – you are here to work for the 
company and you will get recognition in other ways for doing what you do” (Expert 2). 
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The Nissan Sunderland Plant does not have a formal rolling suggestion scheme. Instead 
suggestion schemes are launched sporadically due to the volume of suggestions 
received and the work required to deal with these suggestions. There is a call for 
suggestions annually which coincides with company objective setting. Each operator is 
expected to generate ideas for improvement and has a target for the number he/she 
should raise.  
 
Further rewards have been made through 5S application and Quality Control Story 
competitions. The global Quality Control Story competition was however stopped due 
to the global financial crisis.  Workers can be recognised through the company 
magazine, intranet articles, idea sharing, and through turning their solutions into best 
practice. “To some people that is enough to be honest” (Expert 3). Recognition can also 
be made through the company’s monthly DVD communication, team photographs and 
certificates.  
 
Quality Circles are included in other initiatives such as Quality Control Stories. The 
Nissan Production Way makes good use of cross-functional teams and views the 
supervisor as “the MD of his zone” (Expert 2). The supervisor is responsible for 
everything from hiring to firing, quality and cost. Team atmospheres vary as 
supervisors have their own management styles, preferences and personalities. 
Manufacturing staff are involved in Kaizen activities at a local level focusing on 
identifying possible improvements for their zone, cell or team. “That tends to be the 
main involvement from an operator point of view” (Expert 3). Team leaders and 
supervisors are involved in larger scale Kaizen activities. 5S audits and Quality Control 
Stories also include the involvement of manufacturing staff in addition to the Zero 
Injury Programme (ZIP). ZIP involves weekly behavioural audits in which staff are 
taken around processes to identify unsafe behaviour. Staff involvement in Quality 
138 
 
Control Stories was “not just involvement for the sake of involvement – they do add value 
to a lot of the activities they are involved in" (Expert 1).  
 
“We have seen over the years that you can have the most cynical guy [but when] his idea 
gets implemented all of a sudden he is over the moon and takes ownership and will be 
telling the lads on the other shift... you don’t be messing that!” (Expert 2). The Nissan 
Sunderland Plant aims to involve employees in all Nissan Production Way activities 
however it is difficult to find time to involve staff and conduct improvement exercises. 
The Nissan Sunderland Plant builds a lot of cars and staff often work overtime. The 
problem with working lots of overtime is that “guys don’t get the time... it’s either done 
through overtime on the weekends or not done at all. So you tend to find that the team 
leaders and supervisors are the ones that do the majority of the project and improvement 
work. Although even when they are doing it they still have regular discussions with the 
operators to get their views” (Expert 3).  
 
Kaizen / Continuous improvement₁ 
5S/Housekeeping 
Education / cross training (OJT) 
Root cause analysis (5 Whys)₃₁ 
Kaizens / Kaizen events 
Managerial job rotation 
Job rotation 
Seniority 
Company council or similar 
Single / no unions 
Employee development₅₀ 
Performance appraisal for all₃₇ 
Flexible working agreements₃₉ 
Few job titles 
Team based recognition₄₃ 
Decision Analysis₄₄ 
Line experience for indirect employees 
Figure 5-5 Human Relations NPW Elements 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
 
5.6 OTHER FEATURES / COMPONENTS 
Interviewees were asked whether any Nissan Production Way components are 
recognised as add-ons rather than being part of the core production system. “Total 
Quality Management was an add-on in the sense that we already had some of the pillars 
of Total Quality Management but we didn’t recognise it as a Total Quality Management 
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methodology so a lot of the add-ons, a lot of the pillars were not linked” (Expert 3). V-Up 
was also claimed to be an add-on and not a companywide understood component. 
Tools which were not initially part of Nissan Production Way have been added on, 
incorporated and often become common sense everyday tools integral to the system. 
Improvement Diagnostic System and Integrated Factory Automations could be seen as 
add-ons but are in fact central to the Nissan Production Way’s objective of transforming 
inputs into a valuable output. “The Improvement Diagnosis System is something that was 
developed within Nissan Sunderland Plant and blended into Nissan Production Way. It 
does not exist in any other Nissan plant. It is a variation of Just-in-Time – a little bit more 
detailed” (Expert 1).  
 
Not all of Nissan Production Way’s current components have been part of the system 
from the introduction of Nissan Production Way at Nissan Sunderland Plant. Whereas 
tools including Just-in-Time/Kaizen, 7 tools and Plan-Do-Check-Act were “the tacit 
knowledge that our Japanese gurus brought over” (Expert 3) tools such as Improvement 
Diagnostic System, Hoshin Kanri and Total Preventative Maintenance were only fully 
implemented at a later date. “So it has been a growing, developing, nurturing type of 
approach. We have put things in place, standardised them, got them to work and 
progressed further – we don’t progress further until we know what we have put in place 
works. I think that is the way that we have developed” (Expert 3).  Genba Kanri for 
example has been in the Nissan Production Way for around 15 years but was re-
launched and re-packaged six to eight months prior to the interviews taking place. One 
interesting point was raised about the addition of an expert training course in Japan 10 
– 15 years ago. Previously “it relied on people who had been in the company 30 – 40 
years just having the knowledge” (Expert 2). A 3S system was also in place for over 15 
years before it was replaced by 5S.  
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Just-in-time₂₄ 
TPM / preventative maintenance 
Policy deployment (Hoshin kanri) 
Total Quality Control 
Decision Analysis₄₄ 
Genba Kanri₅₁ 
Figure 5-6 Other Features / Components NPW Elements 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
 
5.7 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
The Nissan Production Way is largely standardised across plants with some 
modifications to suit culture. The types of differences could involve changing the 
frequency of an activity “but essentially it is the same” (Expert 1). Nissan’s Russia plant, 
under construction at the time of interview, will not be implementing Douki-Seisan or 
building synchronously. Chinese plants may have a higher staff count due to lower 
wage costs. “There are various bits and pieces where ideals and methods will change but 
as a concept, as a logic, it is the same pretty much globally” (Expert 2).  
 
The Nissan Sunderland Plant’s company council is elected by its employees. Elected 
members do not need to be a member of the union. Union membership is optional for 
all Nissan Sunderland Plant employees. Membership is around 30 – 35% of the 
workforce. “From a negotiation point of view the company council does all of the 
negotiations. They do not have the traditional impact that unions have” (Expert 3).  
 
Interviewees were asked if they would like to share any of their personal opinions with 
regards to the Nissan Production Way’s long term viability. All spoke passionately 
about the Nissan Production Way and were positive of a long term future for the 
system. There are still some real issues that need to be resolved. There is a danger of 
the plant believing the hype surrounding the Nissan Sunderland Plant and that does 
require a reality check. “There are some elements of our business that I think we are not 
very good at... I am not comfortable that everything is rosy in this garden – far from it” 
(Expert 3). The negativity shown throughout the pilot interviews for this research 
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around recognition and training was discussed with Expert 3. “That’s the type of thing I 
am saying about change management and when you get into that you realise that there 
are pitfalls and issues” (Expert 3). It was agreed that there is a lot of negativity some of 
which was attributed to the high degree of competition for promotion and the feelings 
of those who don’t manage to secure the promotion. However, it was also 
acknowledged that in terms of negativity at Nissan Sunderland Plant “there is much 
more than that - it goes deeper than that” (Expert 3). 
 
The high degree of competition between internal plants and competing manufacturers 
has made it essential for the Nissan Sunderland Plant to remain competitive. “We have 
to continue to compete otherwise we will not be here and don’t forget ten years ago we 
have been at the brink of survival – I mean we have learnt some valuable lessons from 
that” (Expert 1). Expert 1 felt that the plant was the strongest it has ever been. 
Paraphrasing Carlos Ghosn (current CEO and President of Renault and Nissan) Expert 2 
quoted a speech made by Ghosn in reference to the recession. “He almost said it’s not 
going to be pretty, it’s not going to be nice but at the end of this recession there will be 
some companies that aren’t there and there will be some companies that come through it 
Leaner and we have to make sure that we are one of the companies that is Leaner.” 
Flexible working hours is not a popular policy as it can require staff to work on 
Saturdays during the summer when it is hot and stand-down on Fridays in the winter 
when the weather is not good. “It is not ideal but as a company we are Leaner and doing 
more with what we have got and obviously not everyone is going to be happy but I think 
overall it is a positive situation we are in at the moment – touch wood everything keeps 
going right” (Expert 2). 
 
Single / no unions 
Profit over employee welfare₃₈ 
Flexible working agreements₃₉ 
Internal competition between plants 
Figure 5-7 Additional Information NPW Elements 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
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5.8  SUMMARY 
The whole Nissan mantra is focused on a high degree of competitiveness and the focus 
on survival. Competitiveness extends from external companies to plants within Nissan 
and Renault. There is a need at one level to survive as a firm and share information for 
the good of the company but on another level survive as a plant. Results from the three 
interviews would suggest that this leads to a strange situation where interplant sharing 
is encouraged and wilful but at the same time used as a way to showcase achievements 
and, ultimately, compete. At the time of interview a 130 item list of the best ideas every 
plant should consider implementing was published. “Instantly the first thing everyone 
did was to look down and see how many of them are ours, how many they (other plants) 
have got – why have we not got as many as them – oh we have got more than them so 
that’s alright then isn’t it?!” (Expert 2). 
 
The expert interview findings focused on extrinsic motivators including team-based 
rewards and merit payments made through appraisals. The findings also suggested that 
Nissan Sunderland Plant’s staff received a highly competitive wage, a reason why 
employees remain with the plant for the long-term. However, the interviewees did not 
discuss intrinsic motivators in any detail. Similarly, the initial interviews (Chapter 4) 
also found there to be a lack of focus on intrinsic motivators. This raised the question as 
to whether the Nissan Production Way is intrinsically motivation which forms the basis 
of the Motivation Survey the findings of which are detailed in the following chapter. 
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6 RESULTS: MOTIVATION SURVEY 
Garrahan and Stewart (1992) argue that there is a human cost to the Nissan Production 
Way and a strong focus on fighting for job security. Similarly other academics have also 
argued that Lean can be ‘mean’, creating an illusion of employee empowerment, 
whereas decisions to increase efficiency can be to the detriment of employee welfare 
(Mehri 2006; Carter et al. 2011b; Jones et al. 2013). The initial and expert interviews 
highlighted a potential focus on extrinsically motivators with little focus on intrinsic 
motivation. This is in contrast to our current knowledge of Lean which posits intrinsic 
motivation, or respect-for-humans, as a key element of Lean. The opportunity to 
further exploit the access granted, and to obtain a more rounded view of Lean at the 
Nissan Sunderland Plant, resulted in a small-scale exploratory survey, using an adapted 
version of the Job Classification Model and Job Diagnostic Survey (see section 3.5.4: 
p81), to further understand the levels of intrinsic motivation at the plant. This chapter 
details the findings of the motivation survey. A full copy of the survey can be found in 
Appendix D (p263). The raw data is provided in Appendices E (p265) and F (p277). 
 
6.1 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 
Out of a total of 40 participants 5 were female and 35 were male. The majority of 
participants classified themselves as either working directly on the line, or indirectly 
working on the line (73%). Of those surveyed 38 were team members with the 
remaining two holding the ranks of Team Leader and Senior Supervisor. 
 
The majority of participants fell into the 16 – 25 and 26 – 35 age brackets. There were 
no participants aged 56+ in this survey. 42% of participants had worked for the plant 
for under 5 years, 35% for between 6 and 10 years, and 23% had a tenure of over 10 
years. The correlation between age range and tenure at plant is shown in figure 6-1. 
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Figure 6-1 Participant tenure compared to age range 
 
6.2 CORE JOB DIMENSION FINDINGS 
The core job dimension findings (skill variety, task significance, task identity, choice 
autonomy, responsible autonomy, and feedback) are presented in the following 
subsections. For each variable there is a positive and negative statement. The scores for 
both of these statements are combined and presented as mean scores for the variable. 
Overall scores for the construct are detailed and discussed in Motivating Potential 
Score calculations.  Appendix E (p265) provides the raw data for both the individual 
statements and combined values. 
 
 
 
 
0 - 1 (4) 
21%
2 - 5 
42% (8)
6 -10 
37% (7)
16 - 25 Age Range by Years at 
Plant (n=19)
2 - 5 
36% (5)
6 -10 
43% (6)
11 - 20 
21% (3)
26 - 35 Age Range by Years at 
Plant (n=14)
6 -10 
20% (1)
11 - 20 
80% (4)
36 - 45 Age Range by Years at 
Plant (n=5)
21+ 
100% 
(2)
46 - 55 Age Range by Years at 
Plant (n=2)
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6.2.1 SKILL VARIETY 
The following four statements were included in the survey to assess Skill Variety. 
 
SV1. The job requires me to use a number of complex or high level skills 
SV2. My job is repetitive 
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of SV1 
SV3. There is a lot of variety in my job 
SV4. My job is the same and never different 
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of SV3 
 
SV 1&2 aimed to identify the extent to which participants agree that their jobs are not 
repetitive. 43% agreed that their jobs are not repetitive, 46% disagreed, and the 
remaining 11% were neutral or of no opinion. Participants with shorter tenures found 
their jobs to be more repetitive than those with longer tenures. Similarly younger 
participants were more likely to disagree that their jobs were not competitive than 
their older colleagues. This could be due to the employees’ need to undergo training 
and gain experience before increasing the variety of jobs they are able to perform. 
Additionally, there could be an element of adjustment whereby employees’ 
expectations are adjusted over time to better match the realities of the plant.  
 
Finally, those working directly on the line were more likely to disagree that their jobs 
were not repetitive. Semi-direct employees on the whole agreed that their jobs were 
not repetitive whereas Indirect employees unanimously agreed that their jobs were not 
repetitive. This suggests that as involvement with the actual production line increases 
perceptions of repetition increase. This correlates with the initial interviews where 
direct staff claimed that they were increasingly stuck to the line and therefore unable to 
partake in offline training. Figure 6-2 provides an overview of the results. 
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Figure 6-2 Skill Variety Questions 1&2 
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SV 3&4 aims to identify whether workers agree (or disagree) that there is variety in 
their job. 51% of participants agreed that there was variety in their jobs whereas 42% 
disagreed. 6% were neutral. Results by tenure suggest that the longer you work for the 
company the higher the perceived job variety. Similarly, perception of job variety 
increases with age range. This could be attributed to a longer period within which to 
learn new skills, progress, and develop. 
 
In-line with results from SV 1&2 those working directly on the production line gave 
mostly negative (~62% disagree that there is job variety) responses when asked if they 
have job variety. Semi-direct staff are largely positive (~72% agree there is job variety) 
whereas indirect staff were completely positive. This seems to support the view 
uncovered in the interviews that staff are increasingly tied to the line with limited 
chance to participate in improvement activities. Participation in these activities would 
likely have had a positive impact on the skill variety score. 
 
Figure 6-3 provides an overview of the responses for SV 3&4. When all of the four 
statements are combined together it is evident that those working directly with the 
production line perceive their jobs to be repetitive with little job variety. This improves 
as the worker gets further away from the line.  
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Figure 6-3 Skill Variety Questions 3&4 
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6.2.2 TASK SIGNIFICANCE 
The following four statements were included in the survey to assess task significance in 
line with the original Job Diagnostic Survey: 
 
TS1. My job is one where a lot of other people can be affected by how well 
the work gets done 
TS2. The job itself is not very significant or important in the broader scheme 
of things  
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of TS1 
TS3. The results of my work are likely to significantly impact the well-being 
of other people 
TS4. My job performance has no impact on anyone else 
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of TS3 
 
TS 1&2 both seek to identify whether employees consider their jobs to be important. 
39% of participants felt that their job was important, 36% felt that their jobs were not 
important, with the remainder of participants being neutral. Those with a lower tenure 
had a tendency to award a lower score / express the feeling that their jobs were not 
important. The two most populous tenures (2-5yrs and 6-10yrs) were split between 
those who felt their jobs were important and those who did not feel that their jobs were 
significant. As previously mentioned there appears to be a link between tenure and age. 
The results viewed by age therefore show a similar result. The level of positive scores, 
viz workers indicating they agree that their job is significant, increases as the distance 
between the worker and production line increases (i.e. direct to indirect). This could be 
a result of indirect workers’ ability to see the larger picture whereas direct workers are 
much more focused on their area of work. 
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Figure 6-4 Task Significance Questions 1&2 
12
%
50
%
38
%
0 to 1
7% 8%
23
%
23
%
27
%
8%
4
%
2 to 5
11
%
7
%
21
%
18
%
39
%
4
%
6 to 10
7%
22
%
14
%
36
%
14
%
7%
11 to 20
25
%
25
%
25
%
25
%
21+
8%
8%
26%
26%
29%
3%
16 to 25
7%
11%
14%
25%
32%
11%
26 to 35
10%
10%
10%
30%
30%
10%
36 to 45
25%
25%25%
25%
46 to 55
4%
6%
23%
29%
34%
2% 2%
Direct
13%
18%
14%
23%
23%
9%
Semi-Direct
20%
10%
20%
10%
20%
20%
Indirect
151 
 
TS 3&4 aimed to identify whether the participants believed that their roles had an 
impact on other colleagues. 75% of participants believed that their job performance 
had an impact on others, 9% felt that their job had no impact on others, and 16% were 
neutral. When looking at the results by tenure it is clear that those falling into the 6 – 
10 category produced a higher neutral score than the other categories. Only the age 
ranges 16-25 and 36-45 provided negative scores. All age ranges were largely positive.  
 
Participants largely felt that their jobs had an impact on others regardless of where 
they worked. However, it is evident that the negative, or neutral scores, were mostly 
made by those on the production line. This could be a result of these colleagues having 
less understanding of the bigger picture (as they are tied to the line) when compared to 
colleagues who are able to spend time off of the line. 
  
152 
 
Key: 
 
 
Tenure: 
 
 
Age range: 
 
 
Area of work: 
 
Figure 6-5 Task Significance Questions 3&4 
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6.2.3 TASK IDENTITY 
The following two statements were included in the survey to assess task identity in line 
with the original Job Diagnostic Survey: 
 
TI1. My job provides me the chance to completely finish the pieces of work I 
begin 
TS2. My job is arranged so that I do not have the chance to do an entire piece 
of work from beginning to end  
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of TI1 
 
The majority (65%) of participants disagreed that they were able to complete a whole 
and identifiable piece of work (figure 6.26). This compares to 31% who agreed that the 
results of their job were identifiable and 4% who were neutral or of no opinion. When 
viewed by tenure those with a longer tenure were more positive around their ability to 
completely finish the pieces of work they begin. All tenure groups were largely negative 
with the exception of the 21+ group which was largely positive. Most of the negative 
results appear to have come from the two lower age ranges (16-25 and 26-35) whereas 
the other age ranges were mostly positive. This could be due to the higher age ranges 
having additional responsibilities which allow them to identify with the task easier 
than their younger colleagues. 
 
When viewed by area of work it 92% of direct staff did not feel that they completely 
finish a piece of work presumably as they are on the production line focusing on a 
specific task rather than the bigger picture which the semi-direct and indirect staff may 
be better placed to observe. 
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Figure 6-6 Task Identity 
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6.2.4 CHOICE AUTONOMY 
The following two statements were included in the survey to assess choice autonomy. 
This core job dimension was called ‘autonomy’ in the original JCM but renamed in the 
Lean JCM due to the addition of responsibility and adopted in this research. 
 
CA1. My job gives me considerable freedom in how I do the work 
CA2. My job denies me any chance to use my personal initiative or judgement 
in carrying out the work 
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of CA1 
 
65% of respondents indicated that they disagreed that they had choice autonomy in 
their jobs. Only 24% indicated that they agreed that they had choice autonomy in their 
jobs whilst 11% were neutral or of no opinion. When viewed by tenure it is clear that 
participants with lower tenures disagreed that there is choice autonomy in their jobs. 
Only the few participants with a tenure of over 21 years agreed that there was choice 
autonomy in their jobs. Similarly, as identified with years at plant, the level of 
disagreement decreases as age increases. This is probably due to the aforementioned 
link between years at plant and age range. Biographical data suggests that Nissan 
Sunderland Plant is the sole or primary career for the majority of those surveyed and 
therefore years at service and age range will be closely linked.  
 
As perhaps expected direct staff largely disagreed (84%) that they had choice 
autonomy whereas indirect staff were largely positive. De Trevile and Antonakis 
(2006) claim that choice autonomy will be low in Lean operations due to 
standardisation, viz, the way in which employees do their work is largely dictated by 
standard procedures. This is particularly the case for the direct staff as standard 
procedures are designed to have minimal physical impact and ensure that worker tasks 
do not disrupt the flow of the production line. 
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Figure 6-7 Choice Autonomy 
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6.2.5 RESPONSIBLE AUTONOMY 
The following two statements were included in the survey to assess responsible 
autonomy. These questions were not included in the original Job Diagnostic Survey but 
added based on de Treville and Antonakis’ (2006) reasoning: 
 
RA1. I am responsible for continually improving my work area 
RA2. I do not have the authority to make decisions that affect my work area 
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of RA1 
 
 
67% of scores were negative suggesting that the majority of participants do not believe 
that they have responsible autonomy in their job roles. Only 22% of scores were 
positive with the remaining 11% being neutral. When the results are sorted by tenure, 
and by age range, the results were also largely negative. Direct and semi-direct staff 
produced largely negative results with indirect staff producing a high percentage of 
neutral scores (30%), 40% negative and 30% positive. 
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Figure 6-8 Responsible Autonomy 
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6.2.6 FEEDBACK 
The following two statements were included in the survey to assess feedback: 
 
FB1. My job is arranged so that I can judge for myself how well I am doing 
FB2. I cannot tell how well I am performing just by doing the job 
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of FB1 
 
A large percentage of the scores (26%) were neutral with the largest percentage of 
scores (50%) attributed to disagree categories. Overall only 24% agreed to varying 
degrees that their job roles included feedback. Tenure was linked to the ability to judge 
how participants were performing in their roles. As tenure increased so did the 
perception that workers were able to judge their performance themselves. Results 
sorted by age range show a similar picture. 
 
Once again it appears that there is a divide between those who work directly, or semi-
directly with the production line and those employees that are office based (indirect). 
Whereas indirect staff were largely neutral or positive both the direct and semi-direct 
participants provided mostly negative scores.  
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Figure 6-9 Feedback 
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6.3 MOTIVATING POTENTIAL SCORE CALCULATIONS 
This section calculates a motivating potential score using an average of the results for 
each dimension detailed in the previous section. A score is provided at a high level, by 
tenure, by age range, and by area of work. Whereas there does not appear to be a 
clearly defined scale linking the results to the potential for motivation this study has 
created one based on both the 7-point Likert scale used for this survey and Hackman et 
al (1975)’s description of the scoring. Hackman et al (1975) claim that on average  
participants will have a low score of 125 whereas 260 would be very high. Figure 6-10 
also includes a reminder of the equation for calculating the score as provided in the 
Methodology. 
 
 
 
Motivating Potential Score Scale 
Extremely Low 1 - 49 
Very Low 50 - 98 
Low 99 - 147 
Neutral 148 - 196 
High 197 - 245 
Very High 246 - 294 
Extremely High 295 - 343 
 
Figure 6-10 Nissan Motivating Potential Score Calculation and Scale 
Adapted from: Leonard and Hilgert (2004), Hackman et al (1975) 
 
Hackman et al (1975) state that you would examine the score of the target job and 
compare this against other jobs’ score. Whereas the scale shown above (and the 
Motivating Potential Score) is open to interpretation it provides a logical approach that 
allows this study to draw conclusions based on the results. Furthermore, it must be 
understood that the reasons behind the achieved scores (e.g. influencing practices) are 
arguably more important than the Motivating Potential Score itself. 
 
Motivating 
Potential 
Score = 
(SV + TI + TS) 
3 
x (RA + CA) x FB 
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The overall Motivating Potential Score was extremely low (see table 6.8). The lowest 
score was 16.53 for the 0 – 1 years at plant grouping (table 6.9) whereas the highest 
score was 191.125 for both the 45 – 55 age range and 21+ years at plant group (table 
6.10). Scores increase as both years at plant (table 6.9) and age range (table 6.10) 
increase. Similar to findings throughout this section the further you are away from the 
production line the higher the Motivating Potential Score (figure 6.11). Direct staff have 
an extremely low score of 25.108, semi-indirect staff have a very low score of 58.187 
and indirect staff have a low score of 115.467.  
 
 
Dimension Averages 
Skill Variety 3.863 
Task Significance 4.738 
Task Identity 3.025 
Choice Autonomy 2.975 
Responsible Autonomy 3.075 
Feedback 3.488 
  Motivating Potential Score Calculation 
SV + TS + TI 11.626 
SV + TS + TI / 3 3.875 
* (CA+RA/2) 11.721 
* FB = Motivating Potential 
Score 40.883 
Table 6-1 Motivating Potential Score: High level 
 
Dimension Averages 
  0 to 1 2 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 20 21+ 
Skill Variety 2.063 3.769 3.839 4.571 6.250 
Task Significance 3.875 4.596 4.768 4.929 5.625 
Task Identity 1.375 2.846 3.107 3.429 5.500 
Choice Autonomy 1.750 2.346 3.286 3.357 6.000 
Responsible Autonomy 2.250 2.923 2.750 3.643 6.000 
Feedback 3.375 3.192 3.393 3.714 5.500 
      Motivating Potential Score Calculation 
  0 to 1 2 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 20 21+ 
SV + TS + TI 7.313 11.212 11.714 12.929 17.375 
SV + TS + TI / 3 2.438 3.737 3.905 4.310 5.792 
* (CA+RA/2) 4.875 9.846 11.784 15.083 34.750 
* FB = Motivating Potential Score 16.453 31.432 39.981 56.024 191.125 
Table 6-2 Motivating Potential Score: Tenure  
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Dimension Averages 
  16 - 25 26 - 35 36 - 45 46 - 55 
Skill Variety 3.461 3.786 4.850 6.250 
Task Significance 4.658 4.589 4.750 5.625 
Task Identity 2.237 3.107 4.300 5.500 
Choice Autonomy 2.395 2.714 4.300 6.000 
Responsible Autonomy 2.368 3.071 4.600 6.000 
Feedback 3.368 3.500 3.100 5.500 
     Motivating Potential Score Calculation 
  16 - 25 26 - 35 36 - 45 46 - 55 
SV + TS + TI 10.355 11.482 13.900 17.375 
SV + TS + TI / 3 3.452 3.827 4.633 5.792 
* (CA+RA/2) 8.221 11.072 20.618 34.750 
* FB = Motivating Potential Score 27.691 38.752 63.92 191.125 
Table 6-3 Motivating Potential Score: Age range 
 
Dimension Averages 
  Direct Semi Indirect 
Skill Variety 2.958 4.909 6.100 
Task Significance 4.469 4.977 5.150 
Task Identity 1.729 5.136 4.600 
Choice Autonomy 2.208 3.545 5.400 
Responsible Autonomy 2.854 3.182 3.900 
Feedback 3.250 3.455 4.700 
    Motivating Potential Score Calculation 
  Direct Semi Indirect 
SV + TS + TI 9.156 15.023 15.850 
SV + TS + TI / 3 3.052 5.008 5.283 
* (CA+RA/2) 7.726 16.844 24.568 
* FB = Motivating Potential Score 25.108 58.187 115.467 
Table 6-4 Motivating Potential Score: Area of work 
 
The above results suggest that staff are not intrinsically motivated. As a result, Nissan 
Sunderland Plant may not be achieving full value (or removing non-value adding 
activities) from its workforce. In this regard the Nissan Production Way appears to be 
deviating from one of the original Lean principles, respect-for-human (cf. Sugimori et 
al. 1977). Despite seemingly low intrinsic motivation Nissan Sunderland Plant 
continues to thrive. This suggests that there may be other factors at play which 
override the score / replace the need for low intrinsic motivation. This is explored in 
the following section.  
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6.4 INFLUENCING PRACTICES 
This section provides the data for the practices that may provide insight as to the 
scores awarded to each of the core job dimension categories. Data is displayed as an 
overview, years at plant, age range and area of work in line with the analysis of core job 
dimension data. Raw data is provided in Appendix F (p277). 
 
6.4.1 KAIZENS 
The following two statements were included in the survey to assess whether Kaizens / 
small group improvement activities occur in practice: 
 
K1. I regularly participate in improvement teams 
K2. I do not often get the opportunity to participate in group problem 
solving activities  
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of K1 
 
The majority (57%) of the survey participants disagreed (to some shape or form) that 
they have the chance to participate in group improvement activities. 17% of employees 
were neutral whereas only 26% of employees agreed (to varying degrees) that they did 
have the chance to participate in group improvement activities. When viewed by tenure 
all groupings were largely negative with the exception of the 21+ years tenure group. 
Similarly, all age ranges were also largely negative with the exception of the 46 – 55 
group as these participants also form the 21+ years tenure group. 
 
Area of work revealed that direct and semi-direct staff do not agree that they get 
chance to participate in improvement activities whereas the indirect staff largely agree 
that they participate in improvement activities.  
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Figure 6-11 Kaizens 
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6.4.2 CROSS-TRAINING / EMPLOYEE DEVELOPMENT 
The following four statements were included in the survey to assess whether cross 
training / employee development occur in practice: 
 
CT1. I am trained to do several jobs 
CT2. I have only received training to do one job in the plant  
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of CT1 
CT3. I can attend relevant additional training courses with ease 
CT4. The plant’s training courses are a waste of time  
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of C31 
 
The results for CT 1&2 showed that only 1% of survey participants slightly disagreed 
that they were trained to do more than one job. 98% of scores were positive (agree to 
varying degrees) with the remaining 1% of scores being neutral. This was the same 
when viewed by tenure, age, and area of work. 
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Figure 6-12 Cross-Training / Employee Development Questions 1&2 
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The results for CT 3&4 showed that survey participants were largely negative about 
their ability to easily attend relevant training courses. 24% of scores were neutral and 
26% agreed (to varying degrees) with the remaining 50% disagreeing. When viewing 
the data by tenure it is instantly clear that those with a tenure of 0 to 1 years were 
primarily neutral (63%) with the 11 to 20 year group also containing a large number of 
neutral responses (36%). Age range showed a similar picture – when neutral responses 
are discounted the result is mostly negative with the exception of the 45 – 56 group. 
 
Indirect staff produced all agree (to varying degrees) scores. 57% of direct staff 
responses were negative, 14% were positive and 29% neutral. Semi direct scores were 
59% negative, 9% neutral and 32% positive. This suggests that the closer you are to the 
line the harder it is to attend training courses. 
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Figure 6-13 Cross-Training / Employee Development Questions 3&4 
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6.4.3 JOB ROTATION 
The following two statements were included in the survey to assess whether job 
rotation occurs in practice: 
 
JR1. I rotate between a number of different jobs 
JR2. Job rotation doesn’t occur in practice 
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of JR1 
 
The majority of participants agreed that job rotation occurs in practice with 77% 
responding positively. 7% of the scores were neutral whereas only 16% of the score 
was negative. Similarly all tenure groupings are positive (the majority of negative 
scores can be attributed to the 2-5 grouping) as are age range groupings.  
 
Interestingly when the data is viewed by area of work negative scores are primarily 
found in the indirect and semi-direct categories. This would suggest that although 
direct workers feel increasingly tied to the line (as identified in the initial interviews) 
they do rotate between jobs. The further away you are from the line job rotation may 
occur less frequently in practice. This influencing practice may be helping the skill 
variety core job dimension in direct staff but hindering the dimension for the semi-
direct and indirect staff. 
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Figure 6-14 Job Rotation 
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6.4.4 FEEDBACK FROM OTHERS 
Initial interviews indicated that supervisor and senior roles were attracting more 
responsibilities. Additionally, those working on the production line were becoming 
increasingly tied to the production line. This raised concerns as to whether staff had 
time to give and receive feedback within their teams. Hackman and Oldham (1974) 
includes feedback from agents, viz information about performance from team members 
and supervisors, in the Job Diagnostic Survey. Whereas this construct does not 
constitute a core job dimension (or job characteristic) it was included to provide 
further information for the feedback dimension. The following four statements were 
included based on those in the original Job Diagnostic Survey.: 
 
FBO1. Supervisors often let me know how well they think I am performing the job 
FBO2. My supervisors almost never give me any feedback about how well I am 
doing in my work 
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of TW1 
FBO3. I frequently receive feedback from other members of my team 
FBO4. My team never share work related tips or give each other advice 
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of TW3 
 
The original Job Diagnostic Survey combined supervisors and co-workers into one set 
of statements. This could lead to confusion as staff may receive feedback from 
supervisors but not co-workers (and vice-versa). This study has therefore created two 
sets of statements. FBO 1 is exactly the same as in the original Job Diagnostic Survey. 
FBO 2 is the same but omits co-workers which were originally included in the 
statement. FBO 3&4 are new statements.  
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There was no consensus as to whether the participants received feedback on how they 
are performing from their line supervisor (FBO 1&2). 25% were neutral with the 
remainder split between agreeing that feedback was received and disagreeing. When 
the results are viewed by tenure 50% of scores for 0-1 years were positive. This 
compares to 27% for 2 to 5 years, 36% for 6 to 10 years, 35% for 11 to 20 years and 
75% for 21+ years. The higher number of positive scores for 0 to 1 years at plant, in 
comparison to 2 to 5 years and 6 to 10 years, could be attributed to induction training 
and reduced support after this initial period. There were only two 21+ years 
participants, one of which was the senior in charge of Quality Assurance, which 
explains the high positive score for this construct.  
 
Age range grouping also show a mixed response with relatively high neutral scores for 
most categories Whereas the results of each individual survey were confidential the 
senior of the department helped facilitate the distribution of the surveys. This may 
have resulted in participants being less willing to share an opinion on whether they felt 
like they received feedback from their superiors. Alternatively, participants may have 
not felt that they either agreed or disagreed in any shape or form. However, the results 
when viewed by age range suggest that they may not receive feedback on their 
performance from supervisors.  
 
Data sorted by area of work shows that the levels of positivity regarding whether 
supervisors provide feedback increases as workers are working further away from the 
line. Direct positive scores are 33%, semi-direct positive scores are 36% and indirect 
positive scores are 50%. 
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Figure 6-15 Feedback From Others Questions 1&2 
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50% of participants agreed that they receive feedback from members of their team 
(FBO 3&4). 23% were neutral and 27% responded negatively. Tenures of 2-5 years, 11-
20 years, and 21+ years were largely positive whereas participants with a tenure of 6-
10 years had a split opinion (29% neutral, 36% negative, 35% positive). When neutral 
scores are discounted all majority of age ranges can also be seen to be largely positive. 
The same can also be said when looking at the data categorised by area of work. 
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Figure 6-16 Feedback From Others Questions 3&4 
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6.4.5 HOSHIN KANRI 
The following two statements were included in the survey to assess whether Hoshin 
Kanri occurs in practice: 
 
HK1. I am able to clearly see how my job contributes towards achieving 
company objectives 
HK2. My job does not contribute towards company objectives 
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of HK1 
 
When asked whether their jobs contribute to company objectives 31% of scores were 
neutral. 35% of scores were negative and 34% were positive suggesting that overall 
there is a fine balance between those who between those who feel that their jobs 
contribute to company objectives and those that don’t. When the results are grouped by 
tenure the 6-10 years and 21+ years groupings were primarily positive whereas all 
other groupings were primarily negative. Scores by age range also highlight the large 
percentage of neutral responses. Participants under 35 were largely negative (they 
didn’t believe their jobs contribute to company objectives) whereas those over 35 were 
largely positive  
 
Direct staff were largely negative (46%), semi-direct staff were largely positive (55%) 
and indirect staff were also largely positive (50%). As semi-direct and indirect staff are 
not as tied to the line they may have a greater role in objective setting. Furthermore, 
semi-direct and indirect workers are likely to be able to regularly access the company 
intranet and/or internal communications channels which will likely discuss company 
objectives whereas direct staff’s access and time to view these sources may be limited. 
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Figure 6-17 Hoshin Kanri 
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6.4.6 TEAM BASED RECOGNITION 
The following two statements were included in the survey to assess whether team 
based recognition occurs in practice: 
 
TR1. The team I work in receives recognition if we do a good job 
TR2. My team’s efforts normally go un-noticed 
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of TR1 
 
When asked whether team based recognition occurs in practice 86% of scores were 
negative. Only 5% of scores agreed with the remaining 9% being neutral. Despite the 
Nissan Production Way experts claiming that team based rewards have been given in 
the past these scores overwhelmingly suggest that it is not a regular occurrence and 
may even have not have been awarded in recent memory. 
  
When the data is sorted by years at plant it is instantly clear that all groupings are 
primarily. Similarly, when grouped by age range scores are also overwhelmingly 
negative with 16 – 25 scoring 89% negative, 26 – 35 90%, 36 – 45 80% and 46 – 55 
50%. The response is also overwhelmingly negative when looking at the work areas 
with 85% of direct staff scoring negatively, semi-direct staff 86% and indirect staff 
100%. This data would suggest that employees feel very strongly that team based 
recognition does not occur in practice.  
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Figure 6-18 Team Based Recognition 
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6.4.7 COMPANY COUNCIL 
The following two statements were included in the survey to assess whether 
employees feel that the company council has power to influence their workplace: 
 
CC1. Company council has a big impact on me at work 
CC2. The company council has no real power 
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of CC1 
 
66% of scores were negative, 13% were neutral with the remaining 21% positive. 
When the results are viewed by tenure with the exception of the 21+ years grouping 
(75% positive, 25% negative) all groupings are largely negative as to the impact the 
company council has on their life at the plant. Similarly, with the exception of the 46 – 
55 age range bracket (for which respondents also fall into the 21+ years at plant 
bracket) scores are also largely negative. Results are also primarily negative when data 
is viewed by area of work. This would suggest that on the whole staff perceive the 
company council not to have an impact on their jobs. This is despite the company 
council being a key forum for discussions between workers and plant management at 
the plant.  
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Figure 6-19 Company Council 
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6.4.8 FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL 
This section provides the scores for fight for survival. The purpose of this section is to 
gain an insight into how strongly employees perceive their need to fight to secure the 
future of the plant. Whereas this construct is not one of de Treville and Antonakis’ 
(2006) areas which could influence, or explain, the results it is important to the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant’s particular context. In both the initial and expert interviews the need 
to fight for survival was regularly mentioned. It is possible that this threat could 
override any negative Motivating Potential Score. The impact of these results will be 
discussed in detail in the discussion and conclusions chapter. 
 
The following four statements were included in the survey to assess fight for survival: 
 
FS1. We do not have to compete with other Renault-Nissan plants 
FS2. There is intense competition for new models between all the company’s 
plants 
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of FS1 
FS3. My job is 100% secure 
FS4. We are under constant pressure to keep improving the plant to secure 
our jobs 
Note: Opposite / negatively worded version of FS3 
 
The results show participants to strongly disagree that they don’t have to compete with 
other Renault-Nissan plants (FS 1&2). All 40 interviewees disagreed with 86% strongly 
disagreeing.  The splits between tenures, age ranges, and areas of work were similar. 
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Figure 6-20 Fight for Survival Questions 1&2 
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Participants also felt, on the whole, that their jobs were not 100% secure. Only a very 
small percentage of participants believed that their jobs were 100% secure (4%) with 
6% of participants having no view (neutral). The positive responses are attributed to 
those having worked at the plant for between 2 and 20 years. With regards to age range 
the positive results fall into the 16-25 and 36-45 age brackets. Direct and semi-direct 
staff produced a small percentage of positive and neutral scores with indirect staff 
being 100% negative.  
 
It is interesting to see FS 3&4 score noticeably less negative than FS 1&2 especially as 
the plant was on reduced production and employees were on stand downs at the time 
the survey was administered. It is possible that these scores would be more negative 
following the laying off of 1200 staff shortly after these results were gathered. The 
Nissan Sunderland Plant’s continued success and track record up to this blip (the 
introduction of the car scrappage scheme saw production levels increase and people 
rehired less than 6 months after this incident) could have alleviated some employees’ 
fears despite the rivalry with other Renault-Nissan plants.  
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Figure 6-21 Fight for Survival Questions 3&4 
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6.5 SUMMARY 
Despite Nissan Sunderland Plant’s successful track record, and academia’s view of 
intrinsic motivation being central to lean, the Motivating Potential Scores were low 
across all groups. The only exception was the two participants who were 44 – 55 years 
old and also formed the 21+ years tenure grouping. The average for all participants was 
40.7 which is low. 
 
Initial and expert interviews found that Nissan Sunderland Plant staff, both production 
and office based, are often employed by the plant for a long period of time. This 
suggests that there must be something offsetting the job’s low potential to be 
intrinsically motivating. This offsetting factor could be construct fight for survival. The 
focus on survival, and pulling through as a team (task significance was, on the whole, 
above neutral) could override the low scores. Intrinsic motivation may simply be 
unimportant given the need to keep the plant going. However, there may also be a 
certain element of compromise, or lock-in as Nissan Sunderland Plant staff are paid 
competitive wages and training may not necessarily be transferable.  
 
Contrary to the Nissan Production Way expert interview’s statements the employees do 
not feel that they participate in group improvement activities but they do believe that 
they are trained to do several jobs. The initial interviews highlighted negativity 
towards the training offered and this was reflected in Cross-Training / Employee 
Development Questions 3&4 which found that employees largely did not believe that 
they could attend training courses with ease. This could be a practice influencing both 
skill variety and responsible autonomy. The employee would not easily be able to seek 
training to increase variety in their job role or perhaps even be responsible for their 
own training based on these results. The participants did however give primarily 
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positive (77%) scores for job rotation which, according to de Treville and Antonakis 
(2006), will have had a positive effect on the core job dimension skill variety. 
 
Scores were relatively mixed for the construct Feedback From Others both in the co-
worker and supervisor statements. Similarly, the overall core job dimension feedback 
score was low (3.488). This suggests that if 100% inspection does indeed exist (as 
discussed at the expert interviews) the practice is not being exploited to provide 
regular constructive feedback. Feedback from others is likely to have been influenced 
by Hoshin Kanri, viz whether employees can clearly see how their job contributes 
towards achieving company objectives. There was an even split between negative, 
neutral and positive scores for Hoshin Kanri. The inability for staff to be able to see 
where they fit into overall company objectives is likely to make providing feedback 
difficult and receiving feedback not as meaningful as they are unable to view this in 
light of the overall objectives. This may also be a reason why staff disagree that team 
recognition, as highlighted in the expert interviews, occurs in practice. Without clarity 
in assessing team and individual performance against company goals there is not an 
effective way to identify and reward team effort. 
 
It is evident that this thesis now needs to draw information from all three empirical 
chapters to allow each research question and the overall objective to be effectively 
addressed. Themes have also emerged which can only be described and explained by 
bringing together all of this information. The following chapter will bring together all 
research phases and discuss key issues in further detail. Conclusions will then be 
drawn before this thesis is brought to a close. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
This thesis aims to establish whether our current view of lean (academic views) is 
reflective of Lean in practice. As an initial point of departure, a thorough review of the 
literature which existed at the time the empirical data was gathered (2009) was 
conducted. This established that there is no commonly accepted definition of Lean. Our 
current views of Lean have thus far attempted to narrow the phenomenon to a set of 
key concepts, or to create a set of design principles to aid in implementing a Lean 
system, and are focused on technical elements rather than human factors. In response, 
this study created a Views of Lean Table which aimed to provide a collective view of 
Lean and the elements we currently believe may be attributable to this phenomenon. 
This was presented on pages 49-52. 
 
The wide-ranging views of Lean, and a reliance on existing knowledge rather than new 
empirical studies, highlighted the need for the Views of Lean Table to include a view of 
an exemplar Lean facility. This study secured access to Europe’s most productive car 
plant, Nissan Sunderland Plant, and was able to conduct a set of semi-structured 
interviews with office staff and production personnel (initial interviews) followed by 
more in-depth interviews with Nissan Production Way Experts (expert interviews). The 
interviews uncovered a lack of focus on intrinsic motivators which prompted an 
exploratory survey to understand the potential for jobs at the plant to be intrinsically 
motivating, and to establish whether intrinsic motivation is necessary for a successful 
implementation of Lean. 
 
This chapter aims to bring all of the findings together to address the research questions 
which are as follows: 
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RQ1. What is our theoretical / academic view of Lean? 
RQ2. What is the Nissan Production Way? 
RQ3. How does practice compare to our theoretical / academic view of Lean? 
RQ4. Is intrinsic motivation necessary for the success of a Lean 
implementation? 
 
Research Question 1 was addressed through the creation of the Views of Lean table 
first detailed in section 2.5 (p49-52). Research Question 2 was addressed through the 
initial and expert interviews but is summarised, and added to the Views of Lean Table, 
to allow this discussion chapter to address Research Question 3. Finally, this chapter 
will address Research Question 4 through discussing the results of the Motivation 
Survey alongside the Influencing Practices which may have influenced the results. 
 
7.1 HOW DOES PRACTICE COMPARE TO OUR THEORETICAL / ACADEMIC VIEW OF LEAN? 
Chapter 2 presented a Views of Lean Table which found a total of 63 Lean elements 
cited by 16 sources. The table combined Pettersen’s (2009) study, which identified 33 
Lean elements, with 6 additional sources. A further additional source, Moyano-Feuntes 
and Sarcristan-Diaz (2012), has been identified following completion of the empirical 
research. This is included in the full Views of Lean Table presented in this chapter. This 
article provides a detailed review of Lean Literature and identifies 25 elements of lean. 
One of these items, pay based on abilities not role, was a new addition to the table. This 
increased the total number of Views of Lean Table items from 63 to 64. 
 
The Nissan Production Way expert interviews highlighted 62 features participants 
considered to be part of the Nissan Production Way. Whereas 45 of these features were 
already included in the Views of Lean Table 18 are new items. This has increased the 
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number of items in the Views of Lean Table from 64 to 82. Table 7.1 shows the latest 
version of the Views of Lean Table which includes both Moyano-Feuntes and 
Sarcristan-Diaz (2012) and the expert interviews’ account of the Nissan Production 
Way at the Nissan Sunderland Plant.  
 
Of particular note are build-to-order, Six Sigma, and Genba Kanri which the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant claims are central to their implementation of Lean. None of the 
sources included in the Views of Lean table cited these elements as being directly 
associated with Lean. The following sub-sections therefore discuss these elements in 
more detail. 
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Table 7-1 Views of Lean Table including the Nissan Production Way 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
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Table 7-1 Views of Lean Table including the Nissan Production Way (continued) 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
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Table 7-1 Views of Lean Table including the Nissan Production Way (continued) 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
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Table 7-1 Views of Lean Table including the Nissan Production Way (continued) 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
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Table 7-1 Views of Lean Table including the Nissan Production Way (continued) 
See Appendix A (p241) for notes 
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7.1.1  BUILD-TO-ORDER 
There are two never-endings within the Nissan Production Way; (i) never-ending 
synchronisation of manufacturing with customers (douki), and (ii) never-ending quests 
to identify and fix problems (Kaizen) (Nissan 2007). Build-to-order is the 
synchronisation of manufacturing with customers; providing customers with what they 
want and at the time they want it. The Nissan Sunderland Plant seeks to increase 
synchronisation of production with suppliers, internal functions and customers, viz the 
entire supply chain (Nissan 2007).  
 
Despite build-to-order not being cited as a Lean feature by any of the Views of Lean 
Table’s sources it should be considered as an element of Lean. Lean has progressed 
from its original focus on shop-floor techniques to its current focus on the entire value 
stream. From the beginning of the 21st century this has included looking beyond 
production to extend pull production to upstream and downstream entities (Hines et 
al. 2004). Whereas Hines et al (2004) do not explicitly connect the shift in focus to 
build-to-order, Holweg and Pils (2001) claim that build-to-order is part of the pull 
production strategy (see figure 7-1). It may therefore be inferred that where there is a 
mention of pull production being an element of Lean (cited by 14 Views of Lean Table 
sources), build-to-order is also a Lean feature. Similarly, where process 
synchronisation (cited by 5 Views of Lean Table sources) is cited as a Lean feature this 
may also imply that build-to-order is part of Lean as it involves customers in the 
synchronisation process (they effectively kick the process off). Insights gained from the 
expert interviews suggest that the Nissan Sunderland Plant is working towards true 
build-to-order; their build-to-order percentage was 90% at time of interview.    
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Figure 7-1 Push vs. Pull Strategies  
Source: Holweg and Pils (2001) 
 
7.1.2 SIX SIGMA 
Six Sigma is a structured approach to improving processes developed at Motorola. The 
statistical measure gained popularity following its use at General Electric in 1995 
(Pepper and Spedding 2010). Schonberger (2007) argues that Six Sigma is a western 
modification of Japanese production management which uses well-known existing 
tools presented in a positive way. “Presentation – black belts and green belts honouring 
six-sigma experts – can make statistical process improvement, and the systematic six-
sigma methodology taste good, and do good work” (p413). Six Sigma can be viewed as an 
addition to Lean rather than a tool of Lean itself (Hines et al. 2004). Other additions to 
Lean (see figure 7-2) include Total Production Maintenance which was cited as a Lean 
tool by 9 Views of Lean Table sources. 
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Figure 7-2 Lean Framework 
Source: Hines et al (2004) 
 
The phrase ‘Lean Six Sigma’ refers to the integration of the tool with Lean thus viewing 
Six Sigma as separate, but complementary to Lean Production (Pepper and Spedding 
2010). Whereas “Lean emphasises speed and waste… Six Sigma emphasises variation 
defects and process evaluation” (Antony 2011: p185). Six Sigma is a quality 
management tool which supports Lean by helping to control production processes 
(Bayo-Moriones et al. 2008). 
 
The expert interviewees claimed that Six Sigma is an element of the Nissan Production 
Way. When asked if there were any practices considered to be add-ons to the Nissan 
Production Way the only item considered to be an add-on was Improvement Diagnostic 
System (Improvement Diagnosis System). However, Improvement Diagnostic System 
was still described as a tool central to the Nissan Production Way at the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant. Whereas research considers Six Sigma to be separate to Lean (e.g. 
Hines et al. 2004; Bayo-Moriones et al. 2008; Pepper and Spedding 2010; Antony 2011) 
in practice at the Nissan Sunderland Plant there is no such distinction; Six Sigma is 
viewed as part of the Nissan Production Way Toolbox. 
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7.1.3 GENBA KANRI 
The expert interviewees cited Genba Kanri as being a feature of the Nissan Production 
Way. Genba Kanri is a disciplined approach to managing the shop-floor which is viewed 
as the main battleground for quality and productivity. To be able to take action you 
must understand how the product and the plant (including human beings who by their 
very nature are imperfect) affect each other. Making improvements and resolving 
issues is a vital role for production staff. Decisions should be made instantly on the 
shop-floor by managers and supervisors who consult with their team (Handyside 
1997). Genba Kanri is the “foundation on which its better-known offshoot applications, 
such as Just-in-Time, Poka-Yoke, Total Preventative Maintenance and Kanban, are 
constructed. It makes clear assumptions about the management of the manufacturing 
process, which it regards as the source of all real improvement, and consequently also 
about the roles and responsibilities of manufacturing personnel, particularly its First Line 
Managers and their key tasks of defining, controlling and improving that process” 
(Handyside 1997: p72). 
 
Handyside (1997) implies that Genba Kanri is an element of Lean. There is limited 
existing research discussing Genba Kanri; a search for the term “Genba Kanri” using the 
ABI/Inform database yielded less than 10 results, none of which give a detailed account 
of the concept. There appears to be a degree of confusion as to whether the concept is 
spelt Gemba Kanri or Genba Kanri; searching the ABI/Inform database for the term 
“Gemba Kanri” also yielded less than 10 results. Nissan (2007) refers to the concept as 
Genba Kanri stating that shop-floor management follows a Plan-Do-Check-Act 
approach.  
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7.1.4 OTHER ELEMENTS 
The Nissan Production Way refers to ergonomics as a method for reducing unnecessary 
movement, one of the seven original wastes (see table 5-1). Expert 3 cited ergonomics 
as being part of improving work flows along with workstation layout, low cost 
automation, lifting devices, actual automation and robotics. It is also logical to assume 
that ergonomics is also related to the plant’s Zero Injury Programme which involves 
regular weekly behavioural audits in which staff are taken around processes to identify 
unsafe behaviour. Adler et al (1997) discussed the ergonomics problems (e.g. sprains 
and repetitive strain injuries) caused by ill-fitting parts on a new model introduced to 
New United Motors Manufacturing Inc, a joint General Motors-Toyota venture in the 
United States. Whereas their research did not cite ergonomics as a Lean element it was 
claimed that poor ergonomics can decrease safety levels and employee commitment. 
Worker safety is a crucial part of the Lean’s respect for human system which also 
includes giving employees greater authority and eliminating excess worker movements 
(Sugimori et al. 1977). This would suggest that Lean literature implies the inclusion of 
ergonomics within Lean due to the focus on worker safety / well-being. 
 
The Views of Lean Table sources did not explicitly cite ‘decision analysis’ as a feature of 
Lean however it is implied that decision analysis exists through the use of tools 
including Pareto charts, one of the seven basic tools of quality. Flexible working 
agreements which allow the Nissan Sunderland Plant to schedule overtime or non-
production days, internal competition between plants and global information sharing 
are all features which the expert interviewees considered to be aspects of the Nissan 
Production Way. Whereas the expert interviews have highlighted features we may not 
explicitly attribute to Lean, the inclusion of other tools and practices as elements of 
Lean may imply their existence. For example, it may be implied that joint supplier-plant 
training is a Lean element through inclusion of supplier development. It would be 
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logical for a system that focuses on removing non-value adding activities to seek cost 
efficiencies in how they organise training courses attended by both suppliers and plant 
staff.  
 
7.1.5 SUMMARY 
Current attempts to define Lean appear to be narrow. The average number of features 
cited by each of the Views of Lean Table sources is 20. In comparison, this study 
identified 62 elements of Nissan Sunderland Plant’s implementation of Lean – the 
Nissan Production Way. 18 of these 62 elements were not cited by any other sources.  
 
The sources citing the most amount of Lean features were Ohno (1988), Dennis (2002) 
and Moyano-Fuentes and Sacristan-Diaz (2012) all with 25 items. The Nissan 
Production Way incorporates most features we consider to be stereotypically Lean (e.g. 
Just-in-Time, Kaizen). Compared to our current view of Lean the Nissan Production 
Way is a more complex system incorporating a wider array of interrelated features. The 
Nissan Production Way is a process of continuous development, additions and 
refinement. Neither the initial interviews nor the expert interviews highlighted a set of 
core Nissan Production Way elements. Nissan Production Way tools form part of the 
Nissan Production Way Toolbox, a collection of tools and techniques which are used 
when appropriate. Forming a core set of Lean components focuses researchers and 
practitioners on what is a very small area of Lean Production. This may prevent 
researchers and practitioners from being able to identify the tools and practices within 
real-life facilities if protocols are based on very specific Lean definitions. It is for this 
reason this research formed the Views of Lean Table and built the expert interviews 
protocol based on a collection of Lean views. 
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7.2 ARE NISSAN SUNDERLAND PLANT STAFF INTRINSICALLY MOTIVATED? 
The motivation survey found Motivating Potential Score results for the majority of 
categories to be low, very low, or extremely low. Only the 21+ years at plant and 45 – 
55 age range categories had neutral scores. Both categories were only represented by 
two survey participants who were the same for both categories (hence the identical 
scores). One of these participants was a senior supervisor whilst the other was a team 
member. The higher score could be due to the staff members having more 
responsibilities because of their 21+ years’ experience at plant or due to lowered 
expectations. Their scores were also above Hackman and Oldham’s (1974) average 
Motivating Potential Score of 125 suggesting that there was the potential for their jobs 
to be motivating.  
 
The Motivating Potential Score is calculated from the core job dimension scores. De 
Treville and Antonakis (2006) claimed that the outcome of the core job dimension 
scores, and subsequently the Motivating Potential Score, can be explained by a number 
of influencing practices. The Nissan Production Way Job Diagnostic Survey therefore 
included an assessment of elements which may influence the Nissan Production Way 
core job dimension results. The following sections discuss the average results for each 
of the core job dimensions and their influencing practices. Additional information from 
insights gained during the initial and expert interviews is also provided. Results were 
scored by participants on a 7-point Likert scale.  
 
7.2.1 SKILL VARIETY 
The Nissan Production Way Job Diagnostic Survey assessed three skill variety 
influencing practices; (i) Kaizen, (ii) cross-training, and (iii) job rotation. De Treville 
and Antonakis (2006) argued that these practices influence skill variety positively, viz a 
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high score (above neutral) for one of these practices may result in an increased skill 
variety score. Full details are provided in chapter 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-3 Skill Variety & Influencing Practices Scores (n=40) 
 
Figure 7-5 (above) shows the average scores for skill variety and the construct’s 
influencing practices. Skill variety’s score indicates that employees slightly disagreed 
that there was variety in their jobs (4 is neutral). Similarly, employees slightly 
disagreed that they were involved in Kaizens but were more positive with cross-
training (slightly agreed) and job rotation (agreed). Whereas Kaizens score may have a 
negative impact on skill variety, de Treville and Antonakis (2006) claims that cross 
training and job rotation should have a positive impact. Given that employees agree 
that both job rotation and cross training occurs in practice why does skill variety fall 
below neutral? 
 
Job rotation does not necessarily indicate skill variety. Employees may move between 
jobs but these jobs may be very similar in nature. This could be due to the standard 
procedures and operations set in place. Initial interviews suggested that production 
staff are increasingly tied to the line. Job rotation for these employees is therefore 
unlikely to involve offline activities. This is also a likely factor behind the slightly 
negative Kaizens score. Two of the production interviewees described the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant working environment as repetitive. It was acknowledged in both the 
initial and expert interviews that there are fewer and fewer opportunities for 
INFLUENCING PRACTICES 
KAIZENS 
3.46 
CROSS 
TRAINING 
4.82 
JOB 
ROTATION 
5.1 
SKILL 
VARIETY 
3.86 
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promotion due to employees staying in their roles for a relatively long term. When 
opportunities for promotion do arise there is a high degree of competition. This could 
also affect the skill variety result as employees have less ability to move up the 
corporate ladder and assume new responsibilities. However, progression in the eyes of 
a production team leader comes at a cost. He had been offered a supervisor role but 
declined due to the high expectations placed on supervisors and the increasing amount 
of time they spend on the production line. He believed that the original meaning for 
supervisor roles had been lost. 
 
Whilst cross-training might be expected to increase skill variety, the evidence from this 
research suggests that in practice, within the Nissan Production Way at Nissan 
Sunderland Plant, this may not be happening. It is evident that cross-training exists but 
employees may be trained to do multiple, but virtually similar jobs. Whereas the expert 
interviews suggested that employees can actively request additional training they 
might not physically have time to attend. Initial interviews suggested that training is 
often carried out for the benefit of the company in seeking government grants rather 
than increasing their own skills. Furthermore, one production team leader claimed that 
they never have chance to implement ideas gained through training as there is never 
enough time. Training is also viewed by one of the initial interviewees to be a waste of 
their time. “It’s just a waste of time – I have to go and write things down – I come back 
put the folder in my locker and it doesn’t see the light of day again.” 
 
The skill variety score is very close to neutral. To improve the overall score, the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant may see benefit in ensuring job rotation includes jobs that are varied 
and dissimilar. Managers need to give employees time to implement ideas learnt 
through training to ensure that there is a payoff for the time and resources invested. 
This could also add variety to the employee’s job role. Similarly, the inability to 
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participate in Kaizens also reduces skill variety. For office staff regular contact with the 
line could increase variety whilst also ensuring these staff are more in touch with the 
realities of the production line. “I don’t think that people realise how much we are tied to 
the line now” (Production Team Leader).  
 
7.2.2 TASK SIGNIFICANCE 
The Nissan Job Diagnostic Survey assessed four practices that may influence the task 
significance score; (i) feedback from others, (ii) Hoshin Kanri, (iii) Kaizens, and (iv) 
team recognition. The average task significance score was 4.74. This indicates that the 
survey participants agree that their jobs have a “substantial and perceivable impact on 
the lives of other people, whether in the immediate organisation or the world at large” 
(Hackman et al. 1975: : p59). Whereas employees slightly agree that feedback from 
others and Hoshin Kanri occurs in practice, Kaizens and team recognition have 
produced negative scores (see figure 7-4). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-4 Task Significance & Influencing Practices Scores (n=40) 
 
Initial interviews found production staff to be increasingly tied to the production line. 
This may have resulted in fewer opportunities to participate in Kaizens (improvement 
activities), hence the slightly negative score. Hoshin Kanri (policy deployment) scores 
were just above neutral (neutral = 4) suggesting that employees do not necessarily see 
where their job fits into the company objectives. Feedback from others, including both 
supervisors and work colleagues, was also just above neutral. This would suggest that 
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the participants feel that they don’t receive enough feedback or support which is 
supported by an internal survey which revealed that employees didn’t feel that the 
company listens to what they say. The Trim and Chassis Line 2 Manager expressed 
disappointment in these results whilst stating that although it should be as easy as 
approaching a supervisor with an idea it is impractical to act on every suggestion. “It is 
essential that we give feedback to suggest why an idea may not have been acted upon… 
the opportunity is there; we have just got to make it happen perhaps better than it does at 
the moment.” One of the initial interviewees was of the view that some suggestions are 
dismissed due to internal politics and “ridiculous reasons”. This is possibly a reason for 
the slightly negative Kaizens score. 
 
Team recognition was the lowest scoring influencing practice. A score of 2.24 indicates 
that on average motivation survey participants firmly disagreed that team recognition 
occurs in practice. The Trim and Chassis Line 2 Manager stated that “it is important that 
their efforts are appreciated and recognised.” However, the emphasis was placed on 
rewarding staff through their overall competitive pay package. A production supervisor 
who had worked for the Nissan Sunderland Plant for over twenty years claimed “if you 
are talking of something they can recognise as a reward there’s not much lying around to 
be honest.” The expert interviews suggested that team based recognition had occurred 
in the past. This result suggests that team based recognition is not a key feature of the 
Nissan Production Way and is a rarity, rather than a regularly occurring phenomenon. 
Given the neutral to low scores of task significance’s influencing practices it would be 
logical to expect the construct to have gained a lower score. However, there would 
appear to be other factors in play. The camaraderie between staff and the strong 
support for the company could have a positive effect on the task significance score. 
Production staff participating in the initial interviews were unanimous in their view of 
the workforce being the key success factor for the Nissan Sunderland Plant. However, 
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one team leader argued that “there is always going to be a bit of resentment [from the 
employees] that the company makes them work so hard.” 
 
7.2.3 TASK IDENTITY 
Hackman et al (1975) describe task identity as the “degree to which the job requires 
completion of a whole and identifiable piece of work – doing a job from beginning to end 
with a visible outcome” (p59). The Nissan Job Diagnostic Survey assessed one practice 
which may influence the task identity score; cross-training. De  Treville and Antonakis 
(2006) claim that cross-training can have a positive effect on task identity as it helps 
employees to fully understand and be able to undertake their tasks. Despite employees 
slightly agreeing that cross-training occurs in practice (4.82) the task identity score 
was low (3.02) as shown in figure 7-5 (below). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-5 Task Identity and Influencing Practice Scores (n=40) 
 
In the motivation survey cross-training statements asked participants if they were 
trained to do more than one job and if they were able to easily attend relevant training 
courses. Whereas participants agreed that they were trained to do more than one job 
they slightly disagreed that they were able to attend relevant training courses with 
ease. This suggests that staff are not finding it easy to proactively attend courses that 
could allow them to increase the number of tasks they are able to perform (i.e. 
employee development). One team leader suggested that “the company obviously thinks 
that they are developing people… most of them lads are saying that they don’t want to go 
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to training today as they would rather be working. Training is a long day. Most of the lads 
are not office / training minded. Time goes quicker on the line”. The comment was in 
light of the factory’s stand-down due to lower demand and subsequent use of employee 
time by sending them on training courses. According to de  Treville and Antonakis 
(2006) this would have a negative impact on both skill variety and task identity. 
 
The vast amount of work required to build a car, and the cellular production system 
utilised within the Nissan Production Way makes it impossible for production line 
workers to be involved in all stages of a car’s build. It is therefore possible that task 
identity is low as employees find it hard to perceive their task as completing an entire 
piece of work. The repetitive nature of their task, and low cycle times would also make 
it harder for production line workers to score highly for task identity.  
 
Whereas production line staff scored an average of 1.9 for the construct (pushing the 
score low) those working in-between the line and the office (semi-direct) scored 5.1. 
This was higher than the 3.9 average score for office based staff. The higher score for 
semi-direct staff may be due to their ability to see a holistic picture, easier access to 
information, and regular view of progress on the production line. In comparison office 
based staff may not have as deep of an understanding as to the current state of the 
production line resulting in a lower task identity score. 
 
7.2.4 CHOICE AUTONOMY 
De Treville and Antonakis (2006) define choice autonomy as freedom over procedures 
and timing. This construct is identical to Hackman and Oldham’s (1974) core job 
dimension ‘autonomy’. De Treville and Antonakis (2006) argued that choice autonomy 
is likely to be low due to the heavy use of standardisation and standard operations. 
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They did not cite any influencing practices. The average choice autonomy score was 
2.97 which suggests de Treville and Antonakis’ (2006) claim to be correct. 
 
7.2.5 RESPONSIBLE AUTONOMY 
Responsible autonomy  is “related to the degree to which the worker plays an active role 
in setting the rules by which he or she is bound” (de Treville and Antonakis 2006: : 
p110). The construct’s influencing practices are Hoshin Kanri and Kaizens. The average 
score for responsible autonomy was slightly negative (3.08). Similarly the scores for 
Kaizens and Hoshin Kanri were also relatively low (see figure 7-6). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-6 Responsible Autonomy and Influencing Practices (n=40) 
 
Production staff provided a more negative score (2.9) than their office counterparts 
(3.9). Staff who work in-between the two areas gave responsible autonomy an average 
score of 3.2. This indicates that all survey participants, regardless of work location, feel 
that they don’t have the responsibility or power to improve their work area. Production 
staff are likely to provide a low score based on the initial interview evidence that they 
are increasingly stuck to the line and thus unable to participate in these activities. 
However, this is not the case for office staff who are likely to have more freedom. The 
initial interviews suggest that bureaucracy may be preventing valid suggestions, or 
ideas, being used in practice. 
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Hoshin Kanri can have a positive impact on responsible autonomy if staff can clearly 
understand how personal objectives contribute to company goals. This could help 
employees understand any improvement targets and appreciate the potential value of 
meeting those targets. One of the initial interviewees who worked in the offices 
suggested that Nissan Production Way “is there way of having a good working 
relationship where everyone is kept informed, everyone appreciates the main elements 
and this way of working is also used in our appraisals.” Whereas “the key is to 
continuously examine the norm and not to rest on our laurels” (Expert 3) these results 
suggest that employees feel unable to influence their own work area rules (or standard 
procedures).  
 
7.2.6 FEEDBACK 
Feedback is “the degree to which a worker, in carrying out the work activities required by 
the job, gets information about the effectiveness of his efforts” (Hackman et al. 1975). The 
motivation survey included five feedback influencing practices; (i) feedback from 
others, (ii) Hoshin Kanri, (iii) Kaizens, (iv) team recognition, and (v) company council. 
Company council may have a positive impact on feedback. If it is deemed to have a 
strong influence on others this could be seen as a credible feedback mechanism. The 
average feedback score was slightly negative (3.49). Similarly, the construct’s 
influencing practices are also either negative or close to neutral (see figure 7-7). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-7 Feedback and Influencing Practices Score (n=40) 
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The feedback score indicates that the survey participants disagree that they are able to 
tell how they are performing by just doing their job. Chapter 6 suggested that if the 
company council is deemed to have a strong impact on other staff there may be a 
somewhat positive effect on feedback. According to the average company council score 
survey participants do not agree that the council has any real power, or impact on 
themselves. In contrast expert interview participants claimed that the company council 
is elected by the Nissan Sunderland Plant employees and has a degree of input into the 
disciplinary process. However, “they do not have the traditional impact that unions 
have” (Expert 3).  
 
Standard operations and procedures should result in staff feeling that they are able to 
assess their own progress. If the staff member is consistently not adhering to, or 
meeting, standard operations and procedures this is an indicator of their performance. 
The lack of rewards (both intrinsic and extrinsic) and focus on the ‘competitive 
package’ does not allow for positive reinforcement. According to Expert 3 staff may be 
recognised in the company magazine, intranet, or through turning their solutions into 
best practice. “To some people that is enough to be honest” (Expert 3). Whereas the 
appraisal process can also provide feedback and recognition in either the yearly 
appraisal or mid-year review if, as the initial interviews suggest, production staff are 
increasingly tied to the production line they may not have time to consider their 
progress and needs for development. The focus for rewards appears to be on the 
competitive package and merit payments. This does not necessarily help in positively 
influencing the feedback score. 
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7.2.7 MOTIVATING POTENTIAL SCORES 
Motivating Potential Score results (figure 7-8) suggest that the potential for Nissan 
Sunderland Plant staff to be intrinsically motivated is low, viz, Nissan Sunderland Plant 
employees have a low likelihood of being intrinsically motivated. Motivating Potential 
Score increases as both time at plant and age range increases. This could be due an 
increase in responsibilities for higher age range / time at plant ranges or due to 
employees having more accurate job expectations. Motivating Potential Score also 
increases as participants work further away from the production line. Employees 
working on the line have commented on being increasingly tied to the line, and having 
little spare time to implement training teachings or to be involved with Kaizens. This 
could be a reason why the Motivating Potential Score increases as participants work 
further away from the production line. The majority of results are low and fall under 
Hackman et al’s (1975) average Motivating Potential Score of 125. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: DIR (direct) work directly on the production line, SEMI (semi-direct) work between 
the production line and offices, and INDIR (indirect) work in the offices. 
 
Figure 7-8 Motivating Potential Score by Categories (n=40) 
 
Adler and Cole (1993) argue “when products are fairly standard and mass produced, and 
when automation is still not cheap enough to eliminate labour-intensive methods of 
production, then efficiency requires narrowly specialised job assignments and formalised 
standard methods – a form of work organisation that precludes the very high intrinsic 
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work satisfaction that would, for example, stimulate workers to come in without pay on a 
day off to tackle a production problem” (p91-92). When the plant was first opened 
employees would stay back twenty minutes to stock up and tidy up. However, “it’s a 
different environment we are working in now. When the buzzer goes the mentality is right 
I am not getting paid now I am going out the door… You disagree with a lot of the things 
that happen now but you have to try and persuade people that it’s right even if you don’t 
think that’s right as it’s your job.” 
 
De Treville and Antonakis (2006) argued that Lean Production has the potential to be 
intrinsically motivating but will differ significantly depending on Lean configuration. 
They suggest that Lean configurations can fall into three categories; (i) too Lean, (ii) 
somewhat right, and (iii) just right (see figure 7-9). Excessive implementations of Lean 
will result in a negative impact on the critical psychological states and work outcomes 
(performance, absenteeism, satisfaction). Whereas these configurations provide a 
valuable discussion point they are also somewhat confusing. What is considered to be a 
‘low’ score and a ‘high’ score? Figure 7-3 shows the Nissan Production Way’s skill 
variety score. At 3.89 the score slightly low but only 0.11 away from being neutral (4). 
If we assume that low equals <4 and high equals >4, skill variety is low but only 0.12 
away from being considered to be high. All core job dimensions with the exception of 
task significance would also be classed as low in which case it is unclear whether de 
Treville and Antonakis (2006) would consider the Nissan Production Way to be too 
Lean, or perhaps not Lean at all. 
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Key: SV (skill variety), TI (task identity), FB (feedback), RA (responsible autonomy), 
CA (responsible autonomy), WF (work facilitation).   
 
Notes: WF was not included in this study (cf. chapter 6). 
 De Treville and Antonkais (2006) did not include task significance in their JCM 
whereas this study does (cf. chapter 6).  
 
Figure 7-9 Lean Configurations 
Adapted from: de Treville and Antonakis (2006) 
 
It would appear that tatemae (what you are supposed to feel or do) and honne (what 
you actually feel or do) exists within the Nissan Sunderland Plant (Mehri 2006). One of 
the Nissan Production Way’s 17 wastes (table 5-1) is untapped human potential which 
would include active involvement in improvement activities (Kaizens score was slightly 
negative – 3.46). However, in practice the Motivating Potential Score results suggest 
that the Nissan Sunderland Plant is not maximising the value it gains from employees, 
viz there appears to be untapped human potential. Initial interviews suggested that 
production staff don’t necessarily believe that current training courses are useful to 
their development. According to a production team leader there are a large number of 
training courses but the ‘lads’ have no interest in them. “It’s an exercise more for the 
company than the staff… it’s just a waste of time”. Where courses provide staff with 
ideas to take back to their work areas there often isn’t actually any time to implement 
or explore using these ideas in practice. This may lead to narrow skillsets and limited 
potential for innovation which Mehri (2006) cited as key criticisms of Lean. 
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Lean is not inherently stressful. Low job control (choice / responsible autonomy) can 
actually decrease stress by removing frustrations caused by the inability to locate 
correct parts. Stress levels are however affected by management decisions concerning 
the design and operation of production systems (Conti et al. 2006). Within the Nissan 
Production Way stress could be caused by the constant fight for survival and intense 
competition between plants. Figure 7-10 shows the motivation survey’s fight for 
survival results. Survey participants firmly stated that they do not agree that their jobs 
are 100% secure and that there is little competition between Renault-Nissan plants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: DIR (direct) work directly on the production line, SEMI (semi-direct) work between 
the production line and offices, and INDIR (indirect) work in the offices. 
 
Figure 7-10 Fight for Survival Results (n=40) 
 
Given the low potential for jobs to be intrinsically motivating why do people work for 
the Nissan Sunderland Plant and why do they stay with the plant for the long term? The 
constant fight for survival could outweigh the low Motivating Potential Score scores. 
The initial interviews and expert interviews identified not only negative opinions of the 
plant and its production system but also pride and determination. For many employees 
the Nissan Sunderland Plant is a long-term employer or sole job. As previously 
mentioned this is a reason behind reducing opportunities for promotion however, it 
may also explain the camaraderie and apparent focus on the plant’s future rather than 
individual job security.  This has led to a scenario where workers may forgo certain 
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liberties for the good of the plant. It is a mutually beneficial relationship where both 
employee, and employer, needs each other to survive. 
 
Another possible explanation is the pay scheme. Expert interviewees focused on the 
‘competitive pay package’ which, coincidentally, was the key factor in choosing to work 
for the Nissan Sunderland Plant cited by the majority of initial interviewees. It is 
possible that staff become locked-in and are not prepared to move to a new employer 
who may offer an inferior pay package which will lower their standard of living. Their 
personal financial commitments and the money they save using the company’s car 
leasing scheme are also factors to consider. One manager stated that the benefits are 
second to none and include excellent pension scheme, healthcare scheme, gym and car 
lease scheme. However, one employee suggested that this might not be widely 
applicable as he rhetorically asked “do you want a job or private healthcare?”   
 
7.3 SUMMARY 
The Nissan Production Way is a complex, context-based production system which 
incorporates a wide range of tools and practices academia considers being associated 
with Lean. The expert interviewee’s definition of the Nissan Production Way includes 
62 items, a much higher figure than the Views of Lean Table sources’ average number 
of cited features – 20.  The main purpose of the Views of Lean Table was to collate 
multiple Lean definitions to increase accuracy in studying Lean in practice; the Views of 
Lean Table does not claim to represent the gamut of views existing in Lean literature. 
Sources included in the Views of Lean Table typically provide a relatively detailed 
definition, or description of what Lean entails. Articles were also included which didn’t 
necessarily provide a holistic view of Lean, but provided an alternative view of the 
phenomenon (e.g. Mehri (2006)).  
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This discussion suggests that the presence of one Views of Lean Table item may infer 
the presence of another. For example, supplier development may also infer that joint 
supplier-plant training is a Lean feature. This could be a reason why a number of the 
items cited as part of the Nissan Production Way were not explicitly described as a 
Lean element in the Views of Lean Table. The expert interviewees consider the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant’s manifestation of Lean (Nissan Production Way) to be more inclusive 
than our current view of Lean. There was no emphasis on a set of core elements or 
mention of any tools being viewed as an add-on (separate to the Nissan Production 
Way but complimentary) with the exception of the Improvement Diagnostic System 
which was still considered to be a central component. 
 
The motivational survey results found there to be a low potential for intrinsic 
motivation amongst Nissan Sunderland Plant workers. The exceptions to this rule were 
the two participants who both fell into the 21+ time at plant and 45 – 55 age range 
bracket. Despite the low Motivating Potential Score scores Nissan Sunderland Plant 
staff continue to stay with the plant for the long term. Moyano-Fuentes and Sacristan-
Diaz (2012) suggest that social relationships form the basis for worker motivation. This 
may be the case for Nissan Sunderland Plant whose staff focus on fighting for the 
survival of the plant as a whole, rather than their individual positions. Fight for survival 
could outweigh these low Motivating Potential Score results. The competitive pay 
package may effectively lock-in employees where alternative employment provides a 
less attractive package. 
 
Since the completion of this study human factors have increasingly become a key area 
of interest in Lean research. Jones et al (2013) argue that employee empowerment in 
Lean automobile plants is an illusion, promoted under the guise of consensus decision 
making, whereas in reality management manipulates the process to secure cost 
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reductions and efficiencies over employee welfare. At Nissan Sunderland Plant the 
intense focus on fighting for survival, and competing with other internal plants, does 
appear to promote improvement over intrinsic motivation. This isn’t at a detriment to 
pay and benefits which appear to be very competitive. However, the slightly low 
Responsible Autonomy scores do suggest that employees are not actively involved in 
decision making. Rather than being an illusion this fight for survival / whatever-it-takes 
mentality appeared to be a uniting goal that kept the plant striving forward. 
 
Carter et al (2011b) argue that Lean has a detrimental effect on employees. Whereas 
staff are often expected to participate in Lean activities, including Kaizen initiatives, 
suggestions from workers are often ignored. Interviewees in this study were often 
unable to participate in Lean activities as they are increasingly tied to the line. There is 
however a similar opinion that suggestions are dismissed, or ignored, due to ridiculous 
reasons and internal politics. This is arguably more of an issue with management, 
rather than Lean itself, with managers at Nissan Sunderland Plant recognising that they 
need to do more to provide feedback for suggestions made.  
 
Radnor (2011) notes that Lean is about both tools and behaviours, it’s about managing 
to do more with less, however there is a danger of finance / taking money out becoming 
the focus. Lean is not inherently stressful however management practices can create 
stress (Conti et al. 2006). Whereas Nissan Sunderland Plant’s fast line speeds and tough 
targets have created a very demanding environment within which to work there was 
little mention of unwelcome stress. Instead there was great pride in achieving the 
unachievable, continuing to grow the success of the plant, and an appreciation for the 
job security and compensation this has provided. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
Existing studies of Lean operations are often focused on the technical (rather than 
human) elements of Lean. This may be due to the difficulty researchers are likely to 
face in securing access to gather data on employee attitudes towards Lean (Shadur et 
al. 1995). Despite being instrumental to the success of the Nissan Sunderland Plant, an 
exemplar UK Lean automotive manufacturer, Nissan Production Way research is 
currently limited. A unique and rare opportunity was secured to gain access to office, 
production, and cross-function staff at the Nissan Sunderland Plant. This included the 
opportunity to interview three members of staff who had a detailed knowledge of the 
Nissan Production Way. The data gathered has allowed this thesis to provide a valuable 
contribution to knowledge, viz, to establish whether our current knowledge of Lean 
sufficiently encapsulates the concept’s many facets. 
 
This is an exploratory single case study. The use of case studies is a good strategy for 
exploratory investigations (Voss et al. 2002). It is often desirable to utilise a single case 
(Siggelkow 2007). This thesis used convenience sampling which, in management 
research, is a very common approach used more prolifically than probability sampling 
(Bryman and Bell 2007). Convenience samples are not generalisable but acceptable 
when the gathered data is too good to miss (Bryman and Bell 2007). Claiming to have a 
representative sample in case research is “a mismatch of method and goals: to say 
something’s representative, you need to pick a different methodology” (Siggelkow 2007: 
p21). 
 
At the time of study our current view of lean waS confused and not aided by the use of 
multiple terminologies to define what is essentially the same phenomenon. Debate 
continues as to what constitutes a Lean practice and whether Lean is a system or an 
overarching philosophy. This has become increasingly complex as Lean has been 
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adapted for different tasks (e.g. distribution, healthcare) and adapted for different 
cultural contexts (Lee and Jo 2007).  Existing attempts to define lean have previously 
focused on technical elements or have attempted to identify a core set of universally 
applicable lean tools. The human impact of Lean has become a key topic for discussion 
since the completion of this study. This research has shown that it is often incorrectly 
assumed that intrinsic motivation (respect-for-human) is core to any Lean 
implementation.  
 
The literature review concluded that Lean cannot be defined as a neat and concise set 
of tools and practices. The Views of Lean Table aggregated a number of sources into a 
table comparing our knowledge of Lean. When combined with a view of the Nissan 
Production Way, Nissan Sunderland Plant’s implementation of Lean, it was evident that 
our attempts to create tightly defined definitions of Lean have resulted in a narrow 
interpretation of Lean. In practice, however it became evident that Lean cannot be 
restricted to a specific set of tools but instead is best viewed as a philosophy with a 
wide associated set of tools which are often adapted to suit an organisation’s culture, 
constraints, and strengths. 
 
The Nissan Production Way initial interviews and expert interviews found a unique 
environment where employee and employer mutually agree that they need each other 
to survive. This to a great extent outweighs the low motivating potential score 
highlighted in the motivation survey. Competition between plants is fierce and the 
sharing of information is one way the Renault-Nissan plants compete. Most survey 
participants agree that their jobs are not 100% secure and the initial interviews 
uncovered negative opinions towards the plant and its production system. However, 
the interviews also uncovered a degree of pride and determination along with a strong 
team ethos. This is reflected in staff remaining employed by the plant for the long-term. 
222 
 
 
Empirical results suggested that the Nissan Sunderland Plant has untapped human 
potential, one of its 17 wastes. According to the expert interviewees there is also a 
relatively high degree of potential across the plant with high competition for 
promotion. In this regard, the Nissan Sunderland Plant may be a victim of its own 
success. Several initial interviewees felt that their jobs were getting harder and that 
they were increasingly pushed to the limit. This seems to have resulted in production 
staff being increasingly tied to the production line. Subsequently they have been less 
able to participate in improvement activities. 
 
The Nissan Sunderland Plant is a successful but imperfect plant. Both the Trim and 
Chassis Line 2 manager and expert interviewees were keen to highlight this fact. There 
seems to be a big focus on the technical elements with very little focus on human 
elements. Rewards seldom exist, suggestion schemes are sporadic, staff consider 
training to be ineffective and the potential for intrinsic motivation is low. However, the 
plant continues to seek ways to increase plant efficiency and this extends to 0.5 tier and 
1st tier suppliers. The Nissan Sunderland Plant is successful because of the sheer 
resilience and hard work of its dedicated workforce, the fight for survival culture, and 
effective supply chain management. It would appear that the plant has a bright future. 
 
This chapter concludes this thesis by readdressing the research questions.  
Contributions to knowledge and practice are provided before research limitations and 
opportunities for future research are clearly outlined.  
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8.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research aimed to answer four research questions. These are revisited below to 
clearly demonstrate how this thesis has delivered against these questions: 
 
1. What is our theoretical / academic view of Lean? 
Chapter Two (page 12) provided an in-depth literature review. This included 
using Pettersen (2009) and Shah and Ward (2007) as a basis for building the 
Views of Lean Table (Section 2.5: p43). This detailed our academic view of Lean, 
combining multiple sources, to enable a clear presentation of the tools and 
principles academia commonly associates with Lean. This table formed the 
basis of the Expert Interviews, and enabled the comparison of our academic 
view of Lean to Lean in Practice (Research Question 3). 
 
2. What is the Nissan Production Way? 
Section 2.6. (p54) reviewed literature focused on the Nissan Production Way.  It 
identified a limited number of studies, focusing on specific elements of the 
Nissan Production Way, rather than giving a holistic view. The Initial Interviews 
(Chapter 4: p98) provide an account of life at Nissan Sunderland Plant from an 
employee perspective (direct, and indirect staff). The Expert Interviews 
(Chapter 5: p119) provide an in-depth view of the Nissan Production Way, from 
a series of semi-structured interviews with the plant’s experts, which used both 
the Initial Interviews (Chapter 4: p98) and Views of Lean Table (Section 2.5: 
p43) as a basis for the interview protocols. The Motivation Survey (Chapter 6: 
p143) capitalised on access to further explore whether the Nissan Production 
Way, and life at Nissan Sunderland Plant, was intrinsically motivating. This was 
all brought together in the full Views of Lean Table (Section 7.1: p192-196) 
which lists the tools and practices which form the Nissan Production Way. 
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3. How does practice compare to our theoretical / academic view of Lean? 
The empirical studies (Chapters 4 – 6) identified the tools, features, and human 
aspects which form the Nissan Production Way at Nissan Sunderland Plant. 
This was added to the Views of Lean Table (see p49-52 for original version) 
alongside an additional source, Moyano-Feuntes and Sarcristan-Diaz (2012), 
which like Pettersen (2009) and Shah and Ward (2007) brings a number of 
sources together in an attempt to define Lean. The full Views of Lean Table is 
provided in Section 7.1. (p192-196) and compares academic views of Lean, with 
Lean at the Nissan Sunderland Plant.  
 
It must be acknowledged that since the completion of this study Lean has 
continued to evolve both outside of the automotive industry (e.g. Lean 
healthcare), and to more widely recognise the human aspects within Lean 
operations. Section 2.7. (p58) acknowledges the development in Lean literature 
since this study was completed in 2009. 
 
4. Is intrinsic motivation necessary for the success of a Lean 
implementation? 
The Motivation Survey (Chapter 6: p143) was a small-scale survey capitalising 
on access to Nissan Sunderland Plant. Its purpose was to ascertain whether the 
working environment at Nissan Sunderland Plant was intrinsically motivating. 
This study suggests that intrinsic motivation might be low with a bigger focus 
on extrinsic motivators (e.g. overall package) and a continuous intense fight for 
survival against other Renault-Nissan plants. Section 7.2. (p203) provides a 
detailed answer to this research question suggesting that in Nissan 
Sunderland’s case the low intrinsic motivation does not seem to have a negative 
impact on the success of its Lean implementation. 
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8.2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
This study has made the following contributions to knowledge; 
 
1. Views of Lean Table 
The Views of Lean Table demonstrates the need to understand the wide range 
of Lean views. It also emphasises the need to use multiple Lean definitions in 
building empirical protocols for Lean studies. There is no common agreement 
as to what constitutes Lean but there are a range of regularly cited tools (i.e. 
Kaizen, waste reduction). Whereas the expert interviewees view the Nissan 
Production Way as containing a wide variety features the individual Views of 
Lean Table sources have a more focused view of Lean. 
 
2. Provides a detailed analysis of the Nissan Production Way 
There are a limited number of studies which focus on the Nissan Production 
Way from a holistic perspective. Two notable works (Wickens 1987; Garrahan 
and Stewart 1992) were published before the Nissan Production Way was 
introduced in 1994. This study provides an in-depth description of the 
production system and compares the Nissan Production Way to our current 
views of Lean. 
 
3. Intrinsic motivation can be offset 
This study built a contextualised version of Hackman and Oldham’s (1974) Job 
Classification Model (JCM) and Job Diagnostic Survey (Job Diagnostic Survey) 
based on the findings from de Treville and Antonakis (2006). This enabled this 
study to assess both the potential for Nissan Sunderland Plant jobs to be 
intrinsically motivating and the impact of influencing practices. Whereas the 
potential for jobs to be intrinsically motivating was low it was found that the 
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Nissan Sunderland Plant’s environment of intense competition can offset the 
low scores as workers focus on survival. Moyano-Fuentes and Sacristan-Diaz 
(2012) suggest that social relationships form the basis for worker motivation in 
Lean settings. This could also be the case at the Nissan Sunderland Plant. 
 
8.3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRACTICE 
This study has made the following contributions to practice: 
 
1. Lean is not a one-size fits all system, but instead is a philosophy with a 
toolbox of well-regarded practices 
The Nissan Production Way Experts highlighted that Lean at the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant is regarded as a philosophy with a toolkit of tools and 
practices they use where appropriate. Not all plants have the same 
implementation of the Nissan Production Way – whereas the setup / tools may 
differ the overall philosophy remains the same. 
 
2. Intrinsic motivation is not a pre-cursor to a successful Lean 
implementation 
This study identified low levels of intrinsic motivation at the Nissan Sunderland 
Plant. Initial Interviews and Expert Interviews instead focused heavily on 
extrinsic motivators (e.g. overall package) and the continued fight for survival 
appeared to override the need for intrinsic motivation. Employees have a 
shared cause in doing whatever it takes to keep the plant going and expressed 
great pride in the plant’s achievements. As a result, the plant continues to thrive 
and attract further investment suggesting that intrinsic motivation is not a pre-
cursor to a successful Lean implementation. 
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3. The Nissan Sunderland Plant has untapped human potential 
This research suggests that the Nissan Production Way may not be reducing 
one of its 17 wastes; untapped human potential. Production staff are being 
increasingly tied to the line and, as a result, increasingly unable to participate in 
improvement activities. Suggestion schemes are sporadic and employees do not 
often feel that their ideas are valued. However, both employee and employer 
need each other to survive. The Nissan Sunderland Plant can use this research’s 
findings to help increase the potential for intrinsic motivation to occur. This 
may also help in reducing the amount of untapped human potential as several 
of the influencing practices involve employee participation (e.g. Kaizens). 
 
8.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
This section details the limitations of this research. The following sub-sections discuss 
limitations in; (i) access, and (ii) the views of Lean table.  
 
8.4.1 ACCESS 
As mentioned in Chapter 3 access to the Nissan Sunderland Plant was obtained through 
contacts gained during an industrial placement at the facility, and through the Press 
Office. This research capitalised on the Nissan Sunderland Plant’s scheduled downtime 
during the second half of 2008 which enabled this research to gain access to production 
personnel. This scheduled downtime was a response to a fall in demand for the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant’s products. Following the analysis of initial and expert interview 
results, access and support was granted in principle for the motivation survey. The 
intention was to conduct random sampling and administer the survey plant wide. 
However, full support was withdrawn due to the Nissan Sunderland Plant’s workforce 
reduction in January 2009 (1200 staff made redundant) and the subsequent rehiring of 
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staff (April 2009) to cope with increased demand as a result of the UK Government’s 
Car Scrappage Scheme. Access was secured to administer the survey to a single 
department. Through consultation with the Nissan Sunderland Plant Press Office the 
Quality Assurance team was chosen due to their mix of production and office staff being 
the least dissimilar to that of the plant. The low sample size (40) did not permit the 
data to be statistically tested.  
 
8.4.2 VIEWS OF LEAN TABLE 
The Views of Lean Table’s purpose is to highlight the need to consider multiple views 
when building Lean empirical protocols. The Views of Lean Table does not claim to 
represent the gamut of views existing in Lean literature. The sources in this thesis’ 
Views of Lean Table iteration were primarily chosen for their holistic view of Lean. 
Sources were also chosen for their particular insight or different approach in discussing 
Lean. Research in the current Views of Lean Table iteration is focused on Lean in 
manufacturing. Further learning and insight may have achieved through widening the 
focus to include Lean operations in general (i.e. services, logistics). 
 
Expanding the Views of Lean Table to cover a larger number of sources encompassing a 
wider range of views may have had an impact on this study’s comparison of Lean and 
the Nissan Production Way. This may also have also added further detail and/or 
questions to the expert interviews protocol. Increasing the level of detail or questioning 
in the expert interviews may have required longer interview sessions, or multiple 
interview sessions. This could have impacted on this study’s ability to gain access to 
staff with a detailed holistic knowledge of the Nissan Production Way. 
 
229 
 
8.5 FUTURE RESEARCH  
Empirical Lean research is in its infancy (Shah and Ward 2007) and the majority of 
existing studies focus on technical elements. This may be due to the difficulty in gaining 
access to assess workers’ opinions of Lean operations (Shadur et al. 1995). In hindsight 
where an opportunity for access exists, both researcher and subject would benefit from 
committing to a research contract, viz a document clearly defining the responsibilities 
and expectations of both parties. However, this was not possible with the Nissan 
Sunderland Plant as the press office was hesitant to formally commit to access. Future 
research at Nissan Sunderland Plant should seek to administer the Nissan Production 
Way motivation survey on a larger scale. Questions remain as to why employees stay 
working at Nissan Sunderland Plant for the long-term despite the low potential for 
intrinsic motivation. It is also not clear whether the fight for survival culture within the 
Nissan Sunderland Plant is engineered or genuine. 
 
The Views of Lean Table should be continually updated and expanded. Future Lean 
research should consider how other Lean operations compare to the views of Lean, and 
the Nissan Production Way. This should not be confined to the manufacturing industry 
but expanded to cover the use of Lean in a wide variety of contexts. The use of this 
format allows researchers to clearly identify differences between our existing 
knowledge of Lean, and Lean in practice. Researchers must also pay particular 
attention to identifying both the technical and human elements of Lean 
implementations. Existing Lean literature is focused on technical elements; this also 
appeared to be the case in the expert interviewees’ accounts of the Nissan Production 
Way. Information on human elements may not be forthcoming and researchers may 
need to seek novel approaches to elicit this kind of information. 
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“Collaboration between HF (human factor) researchers and OM (operations 
management) researchers can help to span the gap between OM and HRM” (Neumann 
and Dul 2010: p942). Considering the complex, context-based nature of Lean it would 
make sense to utilise the experiences and expertise of other researchers outside of 
Operations Management. Collaborative research could prove to be crucial in furthering 
our understanding of the Lean phenomenon. “Lean should be regarded as more than a 
set of mechanistic hard tools and techniques and the human dimensions of motivation, 
empowerment and respect for people are very important” (Hines et al. 2004: p998). 
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APPENDIX A: VIEWS OF LEAN TABLE NOTES FOR TABLES 2.9 AND 7.1  
Note 
ID 
Refers to Notes 
1 
Kaizen / 
Continuous 
improvement 
Does not include Kaizens / group improvement activities 
2 
Supplier 
involvement 
Planning documents sent to suppliers as and when 
developed 
3 
Improvement 
circles 
Improvement circles / QCs are a separate movement 
4 Poka-Yoke₄ Fail safes 
5 
Education / 
cross training 
(OJT) 
Including cross functional teams 
6 
Production 
levelling 
(Heijunka) 
Continuous flow, daily scheduling adherence 
7 Just-in-time 
Just-in-Time links with customers and Just-in-Time 
delivery by suppliers NOT Just-in-Time principles 
8 
Improvement 
circles 
Group problem solving 
9 
Communities of 
Practice 
COP needed for implementation for Kaizen activities and 
as Kaizen events are claimed to be part of Lean 
subsequently COP is by default 
10 Aoki (2009) 
Aoki (2009) discusses Kaizen events and doesn’t discuss 
Lean in general. However by stating that Kaizen events are 
part of TPS/Lean inferences can be made 
11 Mehri (1996) 
Mehri (2006) offers an insider view of the TPS and as such 
is an important insight. However, the article is based on 
experience rather than giving a comprehensive account of 
the system components  
12 
Layout 
adjustments 
Plant uses less space due to “gross negligence by the 
company, which subordinates the safety of its workers to 
lowering plant costs” (Mehri, 2006: p25). 
13 Culture of rules 
Rules fall into three categories; (i) written, (ii) unwritten, 
and (iii) cultural, viz, learned by being Japanese or living in 
Japan. Rules are also formal or informal. “All the rules help 
construct an expected code of behaviour” (Mehri, 2006: 
p25). 
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APPENDIX A: VIEWS OF LEAN TABLE NOTES FOR TABLES 2.9 & 7.1 (CONTINUED) 
Note 
ID 
Refers to Notes 
14 
Tatemae/honne 
(private vs. 
public) 
Tatemae is what you are supposed to feel or do. Honne 
means what you actually feel or do. Mehri (2006) argues 
that there is a big difference between the two 
15 
Innovation 
from outside 
Innovation bought from external companies. Creativity 
dampened by cultural and organisational structure 
16 
Education / 
cross training 
(OJT) 
Employees are sometimes required to work on products 
they don’t normally work on with little or no training 
17 
Profit over 
employee 
welfare₁₇ 
Line speed too fast, institutionalised rule of must come to 
work even if ill to hide sickness and absenteeism from 
accounts  
18 
Open office 
arranged by 
seniority 
Those sitting close to management are the power group 
who will move up the ranks of the company (Aoki, 2008) 
19 
Improvement 
circles 
Referred to as quality improvement teams 
20 Teamwork 
Implies teamwork through citing team briefings as a 
component 
21 
Value stream 
mapping / 
flowcharting 
Implied through emphasis on defining the value stream 
22 
Production 
levelling 
(Heijunka) 
Implied through emphasis on maintaining production flow 
23 
Autonomation 
(Jidoka) 
Implied through fool-proof automation devices  
24 Just-in-time Global deliveries also received Just-in-Time 
25 
Production 
levelling 
(Heijunka) 
Including production smoothing 
26 
Standardised 
work 
Standardisation at all levels including training and 
documentation 
27 
Time/work 
studies 
Including process mapping 
28 Teamwork Autonomous teams 
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APPENDIX A: VIEWS OF LEAN TABLE NOTES FOR TABLES 2.9 & 7.1 (CONTINUED) 
Note 
ID 
Refers to Notes 
29 
100% 
inspection 
Doesn’t include goods inward inspection. Includes 
neighbourhood checks, check and repair operators and 
final line checks and testing. Focus on replacing operator 
based checks with automated checks 
30 
Improvement 
circles 
Incorporated within other features 
31 
Root cause 
analysis (5 
Whys) 
Forms part of Quality Control Stories (quality control 
stories) 
32 
Employee 
involvement 
Primarily at local job role based level. Limited due to 
employees being increasingly tied to the production line 
33 
Autonomation 
(Jidoka) 
Automation with a human touch 
34 
Process 
Synchronisation 
Synchronisation includes some suppliers (referred to as 
CAT3 suppliers) 
35 
Communities of 
Practice 
Supervisors are considered to be the MD’s of their zone. 
Nissan Production Way expert interviews acknowledged 
that team dynamics vary between the different teams each 
of which have their own rest areas and slightly different 
working practices (although sticking to the standard 
operations). Supervisors are responsible for hiring and 
ensuring employees are a good fit for their team. This may 
suggest that COPs are present but is inconclusive 
36 Seniority 
Observed whilst interviewing office staff and confirmed 
with the plant's press office 
37 
Performance 
appraisal for all 
Includes possible annual merit payment based on 
performance. Also includes Continuous Development 
Plans and employee fact files which record all positive and 
negative issues 
38 
Profit over 
employee 
welfare 
Not in a negative way! Nissan Production Way expert 
interviews suggest that an intense level of competition 
brings a general agreement from employees that Nissan 
Sunderland Plant has to do whatever it can to survive. This 
view was also expressed by some individuals I the Nissan 
Production Way initial interviews 
39 
Flexible 
working 
agreements 
Flexible working agreements are in place to enable Nissan 
Sunderland Plant to ask workforce to stand-down or 
stand-up depending on business need (Nissan Sunderland 
Plant vehicles’ demand levels) 
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APPENDIX A: VIEWS OF LEAN TABLE NOTES FOR TABLES 2.9 & 7.1 (CONTINUED) 
Note 
ID 
Refers to Notes 
40 Build-to-order 
Currently over 90% with Qashqai. Nissan Sunderland 
Plant aims to achieve 100% build-to-order  
41 17 Wastes 
Includes the original 7 wastes plus 10 additional Nissan 
Production Way wastes 
42 
Joint supplier-
plant training 
0.5 tier (on-site) suppliers receive Nissan Sunderland 
Plant training on cross plant initiatives. Other suppliers 
are also offered some Nissan Sunderland Plant training 
courses 
43 
Team based 
recognition 
Whereas the expert interviews suggested that team 
recognition has occurred in practice both the initial 
interviews and motivational survey claim that this is 
abnormal (i.e. rewards don't exist) 
44 
Decision 
Analysis 
Improvement Diagnostic System (Improvement Diagnostic 
Tool) is cited as being a decision analysis tool   
45 Ergonomics 
Cited as a way of reducing waste (e.g. worker movements 
and reducing absenteeism through injury) 
46 
Production 
methodology 
used in indirect 
areas 
Nissan Production Way philosophy extended to indirect 
areas including standardisation, clear documentation and 
reducing non-value adding elements 
47 Six Sigma V-Decide is cited as being a Six Sigma type tool 
48 
Toolbox 
thinking 
The idea that there are a range of tools available which 
operators use according to suitability for the job in 
question 
49 
Limited batch 
production 
Although considered to be not ideal a limited number of 
batch shops exist within the Nissan Sunderland Plant 
50 
Employee 
development 
Employee development through training, department 
rotation, additional responsibilities for high potential 
employees, and standing-up temporarily into higher 
positions 
51 Genba Kanri 
Genba Kanri is a disciplined approach to managing the 
shop floor. 
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APPENDIX B: INITIAL INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT EXAMPLE (ABBREVIATED) 
 
Trim & Chassis Line 2 Manager 
 
1. Why did you choose to work for Nissan UK? 
 
• Been at Nissan since 16 (21 years) 
o Joined straight from school 
• Honest answer – all friends had jobs and they had money and I didn’t have money 
o At the time Nissan were advertising for a trainee maintenance technician scheme 
▪ Uncle tipped him off about it 
• The main motivation was the wanting to have money at 16 but it is one of the best things that has 
ever happened to me 
 
 
2. How do you think working for Nissan UK differs in comparison to other car manufacturers? 
• Haven’t seen many other car manufacturers – visited the odd one such as Vauxhall 
• I don’t  know whether it is unique but some of the strengths that we have here are… 
o Team working 
o Discipline 
o Pride in what we do 
o Fact that we never want to fail in anything we do 
o I do think that we have the Japanese manufacturing ethos where everything has to be 
Lean and has to have a purpose, to a standard and as efficiently as possible 
▪ I have visited many Japanese plants and I believe that this plant is just as good 
if not better 
▪ Definitely have the cultural element of how to make cars Japanese style 
▪ Visited Nissan plants in Japan – Suzuki would not let me visit their plant when 
I was over there – I tried but I think it is because I am a competitor 
 
 
3. What words would you use to describe the Nissan working environment to an outsider? 
 
• W 
• Quite an easy question to answer and I am sure you will have similar answers from other staff 
you have spoken to today… 
o Extremely demanding 
o Extremely challenging 
o We push everyone to the limit regardless of where they work – we try and get every last 
drop of energy from them 
▪ At the same time it can be very rewarding as well 
▪ On a personal level my job is demanding, long hours and pressured but when 
things go well you get a great feeling of pride 
• Example: Recently had an audit from a Japanese group of auditors to 
look at our shop floor control systems / workshop management 
• An awful lot of effort went into it – I was heavily involved as were my 
seniors – the whole team was 
• We got the best result any plant has had globally so far 
• We were compared to the Japanese plants and again were told that 
we were as good as and in many cases better than the Japanese 
plants 
• This is what I mean by getting a great level of satisfaction when 
things go well 
• Yes it is demanding for everyone and challenging – everyone is 
stretched to the limits but when things go well it is very rewarding 
• When first came into the manufacturing section it was as a supervisor – went around making sure 
I knew exactly what the jobs were 
o In fact the lads make it look so easy but it is actually very hard 
▪ You have the mental demands – the monotony 
▪ You have the physical demands, the time, the pressure 
▪ The phrase a colleague uses is that it is the pressure cooker of the shop floor 
o I would like to think that the lads go home and think that they have achieved something 
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• The line speed doesn’t get turned down because of the time of night or because people may be 
tired – it is relentless 
• This place is built on being Lean and I don’t think we ever hide the fact from anybody at the first 
minute they walk through the door we impress on them how difficult and demanding it is – 
hopefully everyone comes in with their eyes open 
 
So you definitely need to be the right person for the job? 
• I believe so 
• The best illustration I can think of is that in despite of all of our efforts – we give them line 
experience, subject them to a line trial – a minimum of 2 hours on the line actually building the 
cars, interviewing and testing and impress on them the job 
• There is still a fall out rate 
• We understand how difficult it is and offer support but some people are just not made for the job 
• There are some people I refer to as car builders with affection – it never ceases to amaze me how 
they work – they are a special breed 
 
 
4. Do you own a Nissan? If so why, or why not? 
 
• Very fortunate to be eligible for company lease cars 
o I drive a Qashqai and my wife has a Micra 
▪ They are both very good cars  
 
Did you choose a Nissan due to the value for money the scheme offers? 
• Yeh at the moment 
• Managers are expected to drive Nissans rightly so 
o Only Nissans on the scheme – even though we are in an alliance with Renault there are 
no Renaults on the scheme 
• Before I was promoted and eligible for the company car scheme I drove Nissans as well 
o Because I was proud that I worked here and the products we make are very good 
 
If you had never worked at Nissan do you think you would have bought a Nissan or is it because you have 
the appreciation through working here? 
• I am not sure 
• My parents, father in law and mother in law drive Nissans 
o Previously they haven’t  
o I have had influence over them 
o These days anyone can go to a car dealer and get similar levels of discount to what the 
friends and family scheme offers especially in the current economic climate 
o Father-in-law driven a lot of different makes of car but between him and my mother in 
law they are on about their third Nissan so far 
• I would like to think that if I hadn’t of worked here I would have driven a Nissan and be taken by 
it and become sold on it 
 
 
5. Why do you think customers buy Nissan vehicles? 
 
• Long standing reputation for quality like many of the other Japanese manufacturers have 
• Cars we build are very reliable and generally well built – that is first and foremost 
• Since Carlos Ghosn took the reins and since the alliance with Renault 
o Embarked on a fairly long term strategy to change the brand image 
o Trying to shift the brand image to make them feel that our cars are a bit more appealing, 
bit more sporty, interesting, adventurous 
o To some extent trying to compete with premium brands such as Lexus and BMW 
o As a result the whole of the company is trying to develop a new brand but we are getting 
there 
▪ 350Z, Infinity range, GTR  
▪ Deliberate products being put into our range to try and shift the brand 
▪ Over time Nissan is becoming more of a sexy brand – we have the 350 soon to 
be the 370, the Infinity range, GTR, Mirrano and we have got some pretty good 
designs out there that are available 
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Do you think that the design has been changing since the plant first opened? 
• I think so 
• To be honest with you when I first started here Nissan had an extremely well built but fairly 
bland product range 
o Bluebird, Almeria, old style Primera, old style Micra – none of them were particularly 
good looking cars if we are being honest but they are all very reliable and most of them 
will still be running today and they were very well built 
o So we have this foundation for inbuilt quality 
o Unfortunately I think that you need more than that in this day and age 
▪ Other car manufacturers, even some of the low cost ones, are creating good 
quality cars 
▪ So you need more than just good quality and that is one of Carlos Ghosn’s 
leadership goals 
 
 
6. What factors in your view make Nissan (global) successful? 
 
• I believe that this company has a very clear strategy 
o Most people around the world will be able to talk to you about similar things 
▪ Brand positioning 
▪ Nissan Production Way 
▪ Quality of management 
▪ GT2012 midterm plan 
• Before the alliance and Carlos Ghosn I don’t think that the company had a united direction 
globally but now I think we have 
o I think because we have this everyone knows what is expected from them 
• We also had what is now affectionately  known as the near death experience where we almost 
went out of business 
o I think that this really focused everyone’s mind and we now pull together in the same 
direction for the same cause which is the good of the company 
o Honestly believe that is a strength of this organisation on a global basis 
 
 
7. What factors in your view make Nissan Sunderland successful? 
 
• Already touched on some of them 
• You already know what I am going to say first of all... it’s the workforce 
o As corny as that may sound it is the truth of the matter 
o I don’t think that there are many other areas in this country or other countries in 
Europe that could have produced a success story like Sunderland 
▪ It is all based on the efforts of the people here 
▪ You regularly hear when you talk to the lads on the line or management in the 
MD office we all agree that everyone works extremely hard and we are where 
we are because of their efforts 
• Most productive plant in Europe 
• Compared in the same breath as other Japanese plants on a quality perspective due to the efforts 
of the people who work here 
o I think this is the single most important factor 
 
Do you think that the manufacturing process has a big impact? 
• Yes I think it is key 
• The staff are the foundation that everything is built on but at the same time if we did not have a 
successful manufacturing process that is right for the business we wouldn’t be here 
• Nissan Production Way 
o Clearly defined 
o Global standard 
▪ Earlier mentioned audit was to check whether we are applying the Nissan 
Production Way correctly 
o It is another pillar that the company is built on and the success of the company is based 
on  
 
Do you think it is any different to any other Japanese manufacturing plants? 
• I think from what I can understand Toyota have the TPS, Honda have their version 
o There are a lot of similarities with subtle differences 
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o Generally I would think the same rules apply 
▪ Good workshop management in place 
▪ Total Quality Management 
▪ Kaizen as part of everyday life 
o All of these things are common 
 
 
So you have a core group of basics and around that are the differentiating factors? 
• Yes exactly 
• If you look at the Nissan Production Way model it talks about 
o Genba Kanri at the bottom 
o Nissan Production Way tools and techniques such as Kaizen, Quality Control Story, Just-
in-Time, PLM 
▪ All tools and techniques you apply to make sure you build the cars in the best 
way 
o Total Quality Management is the umbrella above all of them 
▪ Make sure you have all of the systems in control and they are delivering the 
right results 
• I suspect that this basic model is the same but that there are subtle difference 
o i.e. one of our key measures is how timely we are – Delivery Schedule Time 
Achievement Ratio 
▪ Target is that 98% of all of our cars reach the compound in point within two 
hours of the set schedule 
▪ So we have Douki Seisan, ideal manufacturing principles 
• Ultimately it is the same backbone with subtle differences 
 
Do you think Nissan treat people well as a company and are there a lot of rewards to recognise peoples’ 
efforts? 
• I suspect you will have a different answer from myself than from the other interviewees 
• I genuinely believe that the rewards and the recognition are there 
o It is something we are always trying to work to improve 
o It is important that people understand that their efforts are appreciated and recognised 
▪ Personally I like to receive recognition if I feel that I have done something well 
o Generally the terms and conditions are pretty good compared to other UK car 
manufacturers of local industries – we are very competitive in that respect 
o Benefits are second to none 
▪ Excellent pension scheme 
▪ Excellent private healthcare scheme 
▪ Gym 
▪ Car lease scheme for all staff 
o The package is very good 
o Working environment 
▪ Always mindful to give the lads the best possible environment to work in 
▪ Closely linked to safety and their well being 
• Zero accidents target by 2010 
• Benchmarking with world leaders in health and safety Dupont in 
Northern Ireland 
• Taken many of their systems and developed them for application at 
Nissan 
• Overall I think we make a hell of an effort 
o People are one of our best assets – if we do not look after them we will not get the best 
from them 
• I honestly believe that we do have a good HR package overall for the guys that work here 
• Recently completed a global survey 
o Conducted by Hays Consultancy 
o Everyone answered the same questions 
o June/July 2008 
o Survey to be repeated next year 
o Results 
▪ Every department, every manager and director given task to come up with an 
improvement plan to address the issues that were raised or negative 
comments 
▪ Guys have said that we can improve in looking after their wellbeing and their 
welfare  
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▪ Always try and improve and listen to what the guys want 
• Overall not bad but we can always do better 
 
8. Do you think that Nissan has good supplier relations? If so why, or why not?? 
 
• Yes generally speaking we have 
• I think that it is a very similar situation to our own workforce 
o Very demanding of suppliers 
o But very honest and transparent 
▪ Nobody is under any miss-illusion of their role, responsibilities and Nissan’s 
expectations and their expectations of Nissan 
o They know what we expect from them and what they need to deliver 
o Most local suppliers have similar systems 
▪ Employ similar Total Quality Management systems 
o We do a lot of cross functional working with them 
o Suppliers on-site i.e. Karsonic Kansai 
o Attend meetings, start of shift meetings, safety meetings 
o We make them feel part of this shop and this department 
o We work very closely with them 
▪ That’s true when you move away from this region and even abroad 
• We have a very close working relationship with our suppliers and that’s the key to it 
 
 
9. What do you think makes the Nissan Production Way different to other car production systems? 
 
• Not familiar enough with other car company systems 
• The one thing which I think is the strength of ours is whilst it is a strong manufacturing system at 
all levels within our organisation we are always trying to develop it, improve it, benchmark it 
• Nissan Production Way office in the Japanese head office 
• Executives who are responsible for the Nissan Production Way 
o They have bi-monthly global meetings where all of the Nissan Production Way functions 
from each region, each plant, get together and share best practice and advances in 
technology 
• Nissan Production Way computer infrastructure in place where we can go and look at activities 
that have been carried out in any plant around the world 
o Pinch and share ideas 
• Nissan Production Way strength is that although the world is such a big place it is a tight knit 
community in terms of the Nissan Production Way function 
 
If any staff notice any problems or areas of improvement is there a system in place to make these concerns 
known? Is it an open environment? 
• It should be 
• I am a little disappointed as the Hays survey I referred to give us a bit of unexpected bad news 
o The lads don’t think we listen to what they say, their ideas 
• In terms of the mechanism it should be no more complicated than them approaching their 
supervisors 
o Regular meetings i.e. start/end of shift meetings 
o Constant contact with supervisors 
o Should be able to approach supervisors with any suggestions or comments 
o In my opinion a big part of the supervisor role is to listen, give recognition for their 
comments 
▪ May not act on every single one – this is not practical 
▪ It is essential that we give feedback to suggest why an idea may have not been 
acted upon 
• The forum is there, the opportunity is there, we have just got to make it happen perhaps better 
than it does at the moment  
 
 
10. What do you think are the biggest challenges in implementing the Nissan Production Way? 
 
Perhaps take Russia or India as an example 
• Challenges we face to be able to apply them on a daily basis 
o Biggest thing we have is that working in the motor industry at the moment you have to 
be so agile (buzz word going around the plant at the moment) 
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o You have to be able to respond to what is going on in the wider world with speed and 
efficiency 
o All the time you are trying to do this within the boundaries of the Nissan Production 
Way 
▪ Sometimes the two things don’t go hand in hand 
▪ Sometimes agility doesn’t fit in with the Nissan Production Way and that is a 
tough challenge 
▪ If you do not stay true to the manufacturing system you end up falling foul 
• In the short term it may be the right decision 
• Always the temptation to take shortcuts but you end up falling foul 
• Greenfield site trying to apply Nissan Production Way 
o Cultural thing 
▪ Need to believe in it 
▪ Need to know that it will work 
▪ Need to be passionate about it 
▪ If it is something new to you that is the single most important thing 
▪ Need to fully understand it – why it works, why it is important – this is 
probably the toughest thing the guys in Russia will have to cope with as they 
are gearing up for start of production 
• Been to Nissan Sunderland Plant to witness it 
• It’s a whole different animal putting it together 
• I guess it will be the same temptation for them to take shortcuts 
• Temptation and not understanding it are probably the two biggest 
challenges 
 
Do you think that cultural issues will have an impact? 
• I think that it is healthy for the company on a global basis that each plant has some of its own 
identity 
• Each country and culture has its unique elements 
• Sunderland is not different 
o There are something’s we have to work harder at than perhaps Japanese guys do 
o i.e. Japanese workers find 5S principles and keeping their place in an orderly fashion 
easier it comes more naturally to them than it does to our guys 
o However 5S is part of the DNA of the Nissan Production Way and our guys do 
understand the importance of it and have seen how successful it can make us so they get 
on with it 
o Maybe more of an effort here than in Japan but this is not such a bad thing 
o There are things that we are very good at that maybe the Japanese guys perhaps 
struggle with and I am sure that it will be the same with the India project, Morocco, 
Russia 
o I don’t think it is such a big problem as long as people understand the Nissan Production 
Way, how important it is, how vital it is to making a good quality product efficiently at 
the cheapest cost and the best quality  and you always remember that and understand 
that I don’t think you will go far wrong 
 
Do you think that the Nissan Production Way is the rulebook and as long as you follow the rules it is up to 
you what you do? 
• I think Nissan Production Way is like a boundary or the framework you operate in 
• You need to have the ability to make your own decisions and make your own versions maybe 
differences to something that happened in Japan 
• Generally speaking it is the constants that lay down the standards 
• I think that there is always scope for variation as long as you do not step outside the boundaries 
 
So basically anywhere you go the essence of the Nissan Production Way would still be there but there will 
be some slight cultural differences i.e. they may be quicker using different types of tooling? 
• I will give you an example 
• Quality Control Stories are a common global tool 
o Just finished our local Quality Control Story competition in Sunderland 
o Our winning entry is from our shop and will be entered into a global competition 
▪ Proud to speak about it as it is from my shop 
o Compared against all plants across the world 
• QCS is a fundamental part of the Nissan Production Way 
o Problem solving tool we should use to get to the root cause of the problem 
• QCS when was first introduced was an 11 step process but it is now an 8 step process in this plant 
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o Other plants around the world still apply the 11 steps 
o We decided that at Sunderland there are one or two steps that can be combined and that 
is acceptable 
o Still have the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle within the 8 steps the same as you have with the 
11 steps 
▪ Haven’t stepped outside of the boundaries of what makes Quality Control Story 
work 
▪ But we have changed within and make the decisions ourselves 
• One of the benefits of having a fairly flexible system that can be applied differently around the 
world 
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APPENDIX C: EXPERT INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT EXAMPLE (ABBREVIATED) 
 
Expert 1 Transcript 
Part One: Resource reduction 
 
1. What is the Nissan Production Way’s view about resource reduction? 
Prompt: A resource can be working hours, movements, raw materials, space, or production time 
 
• Essentially the Nissan Production Way promotes manufacturing with minimum resource and we 
have a Nissan Production Way handbook and one of the opening gambits in there is to only give 
the customer what he is willing to pay for 
• So in terms of resource reduction it is essentially what Nissan Production Way is all about – 
everything is reduction of non-value added, moving waste away from the main line processes 
• In terms of working hours we are constantly trying to improve productivity as our history of 
productivity is that we are the most productive plant in Europe and have been for the last 13 or 
so years. 
o We can only maintain these levels by constantly improving the operator’s efficiency and 
we can only do this by taking waste out 
o What we try and do is to present the parts to the operator within a strike zone so he has 
very minimal movement 
o We try and reduce the number of choices he has to make we present a part to him so 
that he doesn’t have to move very far to it which makes it a lot quicker to fit 
• In terms of overall cost everything contributes to Total Delivered Cost which is our main 
objective 
o Current economic climate we are competing with all of our sister plants and Renault 
(who are in an alliance with, and own a stake in Nissan) for future new models 
o The only way we can do this is to continue to reduce costs and resources 
• One of the main roles of the supervisor is to minimise waste and take away non-value added 
processes 
• Andrew: Just coming back on what you said about only giving the customer what they are willing to 
pay for is there a certain level of customer involvement anywhere? 
o Within Douki Seisan which is our ideal manufacturing system we aim to / have a 
philosophy of build-to-order 
▪ We try and give the customer exactly what they want and when they want it 
▪ This is one of the ways we can reduce waste by giving them the specification 
vehicle they require and nothing else as that is what they are willing to pay for 
▪ We have many end derivatives of vehicle to suit customers’ requirements 
▪ We are particularly good at this time and achieving over 90% build to 
customer order 
• We are aiming, and it is at the forefront of our business to aim for 
100% 
• In this current climate we are looking to increase our customer share 
by giving the customer what he wants and when he wants it 
• Andrew: Unfortunately you had to lay off some staff. Was that mostly by voluntary redundancy – is 
that how that happens? 
o We ended up with a surplus and had to embark in what we call right sizing for the 
current business environment 
▪ We entered recession and ended up with an excess of approximately 800 to 
1000 employees because not six months prior to the recession hitting us we 
hit peak production and actually launched three shifts and in launching three 
shifts we hired up to 1000 – 1200 people during that period and had to release 
them again 
▪ It was very difficult. Most of it was done through voluntary redundancy and 
early retirement or combination of both 
▪ Apart from temps with the fixed term contracts everything else was voluntary 
• Andrew: One of the things appearing in the news was why Nissan were reducing staff whereas other 
factories are keeping the staff and making do. Now I obviously have my own opinions being a Lean 
thinking person but is this continuous change in staff numbers part of the Nissan Production Way. Is 
matching staff numbers to production a big issue? 
o Definitely – it is definitely the way that we operate within Nissan Production Way 
▪ We try to maintain upward and downward flexibility wherever possible 
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▪ Initiatives such as the scrap incentive scheme caught us a little bit unaware 
having just released up to a thousand people then all of a sudden we had to 
recruit very quickly over 400 people for the line speed going back up. 
▪ For that reason we try and hold temps for downward flexibility but also in 
terms of upward flexibility try and keep those temps’ details so we can get 
them back quickly and we also were very good at recruiting now at short 
notice in terms of being able to pull a recruitment team together from the 
various functions and shops 
• Andrew: Do the temps go through the same training process as any other employee when they come 
in? 
o Yeh 
• Andrew: Say if you employ 400 or so more people it takes time to employ them and train them. Do 
you know how long it takes on average to train an employee for the production line? 
o Yes we have a 21 day training programme that includes 5 days induction 
▪ This is a standardised training package / programme regardless of what 
production environment they go into in Nissan 
▪ It does consist of induction and offline basic skills training and also online 
training 
▪ There is no real limit to the online training period – we have guidelines of how 
long it should take for the operator to be fully trained on an assignment and it 
is approximately 10 – 15 production shifts but if it goes longer it doesn’t 
matter we are fine with that as long as at the end of it they are capable and 
confident. 
• Andrew: There must be some way you need to figure out the cost of laying off in terms of how much 
it costs and employing new people. Do you have to make an assessment to say are we better off in 
keeping people as obviously if you are reducing staff and increasing staff you obviously have to do a 
certain amount of training even if they have been there before. How do you take that into account? 
o We will do it on sales predictions so in the past we have maintained surplus labour for 
up to 4 to 6 weeks because it means it is costing extra to hold onto the labour but we 
haven’t got the risk of not employing the right person and not being able to train them in 
time.  
o But this particular incident caught us unaware – we probably wouldn’t have released 
the amount of people we released if we had known about the scrappage allowance 
incentive scheme. 
o I don’t think we would have done that as to recruit and train 400 people in the timescale 
we did it was quite painful in terms of resource from the supervisor in having to train 
these people – very very difficult. 
 
2. How does the Nissan Production Way reduce the use of resources? 
Prompt: An example could be the reduction of setup times or the reduction of lead times 
 
• In terms of what we have previously discussed in terms of headcount for example or working 
hours / actual hours we use a Key Performance Indicator called design standard time ratio 
(DSTR) 
o We benchmark this Key Performance Indicator with our sister plants and with Renault 
as well and ultimately it is a measure of how productive we are 
o So built up within the ratio of actual time versus design standard time which is the 
amount of time you are allowed to build a vehicle versus how long it does take to build 
the vehicle you then have an element of time that is non-value added and we focus on 
reducing this non-value added element of design standard time 
o It is simple – we just take out non-value added operations and if we continue to chip 
away at this and taking advantage of volume increases and automation 
▪ We have got a system at the moment called IFA which is Integrated Factory 
Automation and we have a dedicated team which their primary focus is to 
reduce headcount through reduction of DSTR 
▪ Their main task is to introduce low cost automation in terms of shuttles, parts 
selection systems, AGVs etc taking headcount out of the process so that is 
DSTR 
• In terms of Lean manufacturing we have a Key Performance Indicator called Delivery Schedule 
Time Achievement Ratio which is Delivery Schedule Time Achievement Ratio 
o We know how long it takes to build a car and we measure ourselves against this plus or 
minus a two hour window 
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o We measure this Key Performance Indicator daily and I guess instances where we fail 
this particular Key Performance Indicator we look at the reasons why and put in 
countermeasures to resolve that issue 
o In affect that does reduce resources in building a car right first time – saves a lot of 
wasted resources such as time and materials to repair the vehicles 
• In terms of reducing inventory we operate a system called Douki Seisan 
o Within Douki Seisan you have got Delivery Schedule Time Achievement Ratio but you 
have also got lead time as well and we are constantly trying to reduce lead time 
▪ To do this, and going back to our Nissan Production Way ethos it is to identify 
concerns and then put in place solutions so whenever we are trying to reduce 
lead time you need to improve OEE, improve quality and reduce stock in terms 
of safety stock, online WIP, transportation stock etc 
▪ So we constantly preach that we should be bringing to the surface these 
problems and then fixing them and then we can reduce lead time 
▪ This has been a constant activity for the last 8 – 10 years now 
• Andrew: What is the impact on staff as obviously you are saying that it is flexible staffing levels and 
you are trying to closely match your staffing levels to production to reduce cost? What is the effect 
on staff there... is there an effect? In terms of job security and feeling secure in their jobs 
o In terms of my position I do not witness it first hand as I do not have many direct 
reports but from my experience as a production senior and supervisor before that I 
think that having a certain level of temporary labour is good because they are very very 
keen to impress. 
▪ Their goal is to achieve full time employment which we promote and 
encourage 
▪ I think for the first time recently we found ourselves in a position where 
people in the company who had been in the company for up to 25 years were 
then in a situation where they were reaching just over 51 – 52 and thought this 
is actually an opportunity for early retirement as well as redundancy 
▪ So in terms of motivation for current permanent staff it was quite good as it 
presented an opportunity for an early retirement, a lump sum redundancy to 
allow them to retire or move abroad or do something different 
▪ I think it worked for both permanent and temporary employees 
▪ Obviously if you are a temp and get laid off it is not very good and we have had 
some very emotive discussions with temps that have got mortgages and it is 
not a good situation but unavoidable 
 
Part Two: Production Management 
 
1. How is the Nissan Production Way organised? 
Prompts: Is the system arranged by cells or groups? Are processes synchronised? Is production levelled or 
smoothed. Are products pushed to the next process or pulled from the previous process? 
 
• Yeh we have very specific functions in support departments such as production control, 
engineering, maintenance and then production 
o Certainly within the production department they tend to be self-sufficient in terms of 
process such as press shop, body shop, paint shop, trim and chassis all have their own 
structure and specialised process 
o All pull together in the same direction rather than the push system 
o Each knowing what their customer requires in terms of delivery, quality requirements 
etc 
• In terms of structure for Nissan Production Way we have steering committees, steering groups 
and working level groups to discuss performance indices relating to Nissan Production Way 
o I chair a meeting every month with the production manager for each production shop 
o I also chair a meeting with the production seniors specifically regarding Nissan 
Production Way activity and probably more specifically our manufacturing capability in 
terms of how affective are we at building the car and that is discussed at regularly, 
monthly meetings – our performances are communicated as well 
• Andrew: Douki-seisan is a process of synchronising everything isn’t it? 
o Yes 
• Andrew: Do you still smooth / level production? 
o That still has to happen. I think the biggest problem we have now is the disparity 
between petrol and diesel 
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o When you are building on a multi-model line such as our line 2 facility at one time they 
were building 3 vehicles down one line and you didn’t have to just smooth variants of 
one model you had to smooth models as well 
▪ At one point we had Micra C+C, Note and Micra down the same line 
▪ Build content between Micra and Note although similar size car there is quite a 
disparity there and we have to be very careful with model mix 
• Andrew: It terms of what you produce over days is that levelled out as well? Say if you have so many 
orders in a week you will level it across the days? 
o Yes we will level it across 24 hours 
 
2. To what extent is Just-in-Time utilised in the Nissan Production Way? 
Prompt: Is it used factory wide? How important is it to the Nissan Production Way? 
 
• I think it is to a large extent really. Just-in-time in the sense of building to customer order but the 
term Just-in-Time for the production department really relates to an improvement technique for 
the elimination of waste from the process 
o Certainly we will produce in the right quantities at the right time but in terms of Just-in-
Time we definitely refer that / associate that with an improvement tool or an 
improvement activity where we will map the process in terms of process flow, 
inventory, time etc then look to take out the wastes 
• Andrew: How far is it integrated into your supply chain then? 
o I think certainly within first tier supply chain we have a support function for suppliers 
called Alliance Supplier Improvement Programme – alliance supplier improvement 
programme – they go into suppliers and help them meet their productivity costs and 
targets and help them improve the process and help them develop the product and also 
deliver a cheaper product 
o We constantly try and reduce Total Delivered Costs which includes our parts and 
suppliers have to commit to cost reduction but we don’t just demand it from them we go 
in and help them achieve it as well 
▪ In terms of process mapping and Just-in-Time they are part of the tools that 
are used in that process 
• Andrew: Do you have any idea whether suppliers beyond first tier take the same kind of steps or 
attitude as you take as say roll it down? 
o I don’t actually – it is probably not as deep routed as we would like but that is just a 
guess 
o I have seen it to a certain extent 
• Andrew: I just wondered whether you would try and roll it down the supply chain as far as you could 
as obviously you have achieved cost reductions and things like that... 
o I believe we have recently gone into second tier but I couldn’t confirm it 
• Andrew: So it’s something you have at least thought about 
o Yeh definitely 
o For the first time this year we have actually taken Nissan Production Way diagnosis 
system which is a measurement system of how capable you are at manufacturing a 
product and it looks as the whole row of the production supervisor in terms of their 
capability to deliver production volume, safety, quality etc 
▪ We have recently just taken that into first tier suppliers this year and it has 
proved quite successful 
▪ We have identified scope for significant improvement and they have embraced 
it actually as a measurement tool they can use to quantify their performance 
• Andrew: Are your first tier suppliers normally suppliers you have had for years or do they change? 
o They do change 
o We have had suppliers that have been with us for a long time such as Unipress 
▪ They have their own UPS system very similar to TPS and Nissan Production 
Way – they are all very very similar 
o We also have CK who have been supplying us for a long time but we do get new 
suppliers all the time particularly with new model – new processes, new design features 
sometimes require new suppliers 
 
3. Does the Nissan Production Way use tools to analyse work flows with the aim of increasing productivity? 
Prompts: Such as time/work studies, multi-tatistical process control, layout adjustments, cellular 
manufacturing 
 
• Lots of systems I have just spoken about Just-in-Time that does map the process 
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• We also use a system that evolved from Just-in-Time called Improvement Diagnostic System – 
improvement diagnosis system 
o It is a little bit more detailed than Just-in-Time in terms of quantifying the actual process 
but what it essentially does it tell us through decision analysis of what we find in the 
process flow to what tools we need to use to improve the process to reduce non-value 
added activity etc 
• We also use process mapping in the form of douki seisan improvement 
o Mapping the process to identify process flow in terms of inventory levels, lead time etc 
and we have various what we call IE experts that are trained to carry out that activity – 
those people were trained in Japan 
▪ Which is different to IE engineer – different function 
 
Part Three: Supply Chain Management 
 
1. To what extent are Nissan Production Way production management techniques used by Nissan 
Sunderland Plant’s suppliers? 
Prompt: Is the Nissan Production Way used by first tier suppliers, second tier suppliers, third tier etc 
 
• Through Alliance Supplier Improvement Programme again we do take standard operations, 
introduce them to 5S, job observation, some of the simple tools we use in Nissan Production Way 
• Andrew: So are on-site suppliers more integrated into your way of thinking than off site suppliers 
o Definitely yeh 
o For example in terms of site standards such as when we launched 5S two years ago we 
knew that we couldn’t launch 5S without the full involvement of every employee on site 
and that included on-site suppliers 
▪ That was one of the first time we introduced a companywide strategy 
simultaneously which it did include all on-site suppliers and they embraced it 
and to be fair to them maintained it as well so it was a good activity 
o Joint training initiatives yes – the onsite suppliers have the added advantage of being 
able to utilise some of our training programmes 
▪ We as an Nissan Production Way office have been involved in development of 
on-site suppliers 
• Andrew: If suppliers have had an idea that has been used and worked well in their own version of the 
Nissan Production Way do they get involved with you guys and sometimes bring anything over to 
you? To what extent are the suppliers involved in terms with that kind of thing 
o I cannot recollect anything that we have utilised from suppliers but at the same time we 
do not force them to use NMUK initiatives either 
o Sometime we have very similar systems – 9 times out of 10 the only difference is the 
performer they use to calculate or carry out the activity 
o I cannot think of anything we have taken from the suppliers – no 
• Andrew: Are they always involved in new product development 
o Yes all suppliers are involved in new product development 
▪ We have a design stage called S-LOT – suppliers are involved from an early 
stage. 
▪ It’s crucial really – I don’t think we could build a vehicle without involving 
them very early on in the process 
 
2. Are suppliers involved at Nissan Sunderland Plant and if so how are they involved? 
Prompt: Are there joint training initiatives, joint product development programmes 
 
Note: See previous section/s 
 
 
3. Does the Nissan Production Way include value stream mapping or flowcharting? 
Prompt: Value stream mapping is the mapping of product and information flows and the analysis of this data 
to identify and eliminate wastes. 
 
• Yeh in terms of Alliance Supplier Improvement Programme they’ll map the full process – IE 
experts really live within the Alliance Supplier Improvement Programme function and they do 
value stream mapping and flow-charting 
 
Part Four: Standardisation, Defects and Improvement 
 
1. What does the Nissan Production Way have in place to identify, stop and fix defects? 
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Prompts: For example intelligent automation / autonomation, line stop, Poka-Yoke / failure prevention 
 
• We have within Nissan Production Way a function called quick response and Quick Response 
Quality Confirmation (quick response quality confirmation) which is essentially our quality 
management activity on the shop floor and we have lots of policies and procedures for managing 
outflow of quality defects more importantly for monitoring occurrence and effectiveness of 
countermeasures 
o This may well include closed loop fault detection, automating the process to ensure 
defects don’t occur, it may include poke yoke type low cost automation to detect and 
prevent faults from reoccurring 
o We have rules and standards and systems for stopping the line pulling the help cord for 
assistance, lots of rules and systems that prevent outflow 
• Andrew: Are your robots able to sense when there are defects? 
o In terms of the automated processes part detection is generally the main method we use 
for detecting whether the parts in the correct orientation or position before it is picked 
up and fed into automated presses for example 
o Handling robots have proximity sensors to make sure they pick them up correctly etc 
o In the machining environment such as some of the head machining or some of the head 
casting they do have closed loop type measurement systems in there so that every 
single part if it is critical feature will be measured in line and if it does not meet 
tolerance levels the machine will stop which is effectively closed loop. It is feeding back 
results all of the time to the machine 
o But it is mainly in the machining environment some of the head machining in unit shop 
and we also have similar systems in our suspension (axles) shop 
 
2. What does the Nissan Production Way have in place to standardise elements of the production system? 
Prompts: Standard operations, housekeeping (5S), visual control and management / management by sight 
 
• Certainly within Nissan Production Way our main documentation is standardised so from the 
way we train operators using the 21 day model to the documents we use to train operators such 
as standard operation these are standard in every shop and process. 
o It is also global standard. 
o We call it NTWI which is Nissan Training Within Industry 
o There is a standard set of documents that are used for documenting how to build the 
car, how to instruct the operator to build the car 
o Not only is there a standard format there is a standard method for writing these 
documents as well 
▪ For example in terms of splitting the operation up into its main steps, 
identifying key points by underlining them, putting the reasons for these key 
points in brackets all of that is a global standard 
▪ We send our supervisors on an internal training course to be able to write 
these correctly to global standards – they are then issued with a standard 
operations license which lasts for three years and then they have to be 
reaccredited 
• In terms of housekeeping 5S we have again standards in terms of criteria – we have a standard 
evaluation system for sustaining 5S, we have a standard education for our manned staff on 5S 
• Visual management control we have company procedures for concern management – there is one 
for visual control and management 
• We have a standard Total Quality Management system across departments – not just in 
production – it is called the Nissan Management Way but it is essentially Total Quality 
Management 
• Andrew: Would you say that a lot of the management here is by sight? So people actually going and 
being involved in what they are managing? 
o Yeh I mean our management tends to be very visual, very transparent all the way from 
NMUK top level objectives on the DMD’s Total Quality Management board all the way 
down to supervisors’ Total Quality Management board – those objectives are clear 
▪ Everybody knows what everybody’s objectives are and everybody should 
understand what the link is and their contributions to the company level 
objectives 
▪ Ultimately through Total Quality Management you cascade from NMUK top 
level all the way down and at the bottom level should be the supervisors’ 
objectives then be able to link check back to how that is contributing to top 
level objectives 
▪ This is an activity we do every month in every process 
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3. What improvement strategies or techniques are used in the Nissan Production Way? 
Prompts: For example continuous improvement, root cause analysis  
 
• Lots – the main ones are Just-in-Time as we have already mentioned Total Preventative 
Maintenance, Quality Control Story – Quality Control Story is our problem solving tool, Genba 
Kanri which is essentially work shop management. Within that we use Kaizen using two day 
improvement activity, two hour Kaizen so lots of improvement techniques at the supervisors’ 
disposal 
• We essentially we call these tools and they keep them in the toolbox and bring them out when 
they need to 
• To promote and maintain these tools we tend to say keep your tools sharp 
o For example Quality Control Story we have an annual Quality Control Story competition 
which promotes involvement, keeps their skills honed and is an opportunity for reward 
and recognition as well 
o So we have cross-functional competition involves people of all departments and all 
shops and in recent years until we ran up to the economic crisis the winners went to 
Japan to present their activity in a global competition 
▪ It was a really good activity 
▪ Andrew: lucky for the winners! 
▪ Some of them thought it was lucky some of them didn’t  
 
 
Part Five: Human Relations 
 
1. How are employees involved with the Nissan Production Way? 
Prompts: Are they involved in improvement circles / group problem solving? 
 
• We try to involve manufacturing staff in improvement activities such as 2 hour Kaizen, 2 day 
improvement which tends to be focused on a very small area mainly their man assignment 
o If we are carrying out an activity to improve line balance, productivity or efficiency we 
will generally involve the operators within that activity 
o Also 5S improvement, 5S audits would involve manufacturing staff 
o We have a company philosophy called ZIP which is our zero injury programme which 
involves weekly behavioural audits which again we involve the manufacturing staff in 
▪ We take them around the process and ask them if they can observe any unsafe 
behaviour 
• Andrew: So would you say that there is a  high level of employee involvement then? 
o Definitely yes 
o Also Quality Control Story – because we tend to use them in Quality Control Story not 
only for involvement but for their experience of the actual process 
o Sometimes it is so obvious that you don’t see it and it takes an operator to say have you 
looked at that and they can contribute  
o So it’s not just involvement for the sake of involvement – they do add value to a lot of the 
activities they are involved in 
 
2. How are employees managed within the Nissan Production Way? 
Prompts: Appraisals, discipline, company hierarchy 
 
• We recently developed / launched the Nissan Way which is essentially a subsection of the Nissan 
Production Way as is Nissan Management Way as is Nissan Recycling Way 
o NW is a global initiative to make people aware of their actions and mind-sets 
o We have 5 mind-sets and 5 actions which we explain to all of our staff and explain 
exactly what they mean to them 
o We then based their performance appraisal on these mind-sets and actions 
▪ For example motivation, commitment and targets performance, being fugal, 
transparent, cross-functional – most of those appear in the performance 
appraisal as headings 
• Each employee receives a performance appraisal every year 
o Based on their performance they will receive a merit award which can result in a pay 
award 
• In terms of discipline we do have a disciplinary procedure supported by our HR department in 
line with our terms and conditions supported by the union and company council 
• In terms of company hierarchy not sure what you mean by that 
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o Note: Andrew explains 
o We do have a set hierarchy and it’s the same in every department from DMD – directors 
– managers – seniors – supervisors – team leaders – ultimately man staff 
▪ It is a recognised hierarchy system 
• Andrew: So where do you fit in this chain is there a manager above you? 
o Yes I have a manager then it is the production director and then it is the DMD who is 
essentially the managing director of this company who reports to Trevor Mann who is 
the MD of this company and our Spanish organisations as well 
• Andrew: He is the VP of European Manufacturing? 
o Yes he is the VP 
• Andrew: If you have your manager and then the production director if you needed to go and speak 
to anybody about anything could you easily go up and speak to the production director? 
o Yes – I can go straight up to Kevin Fitzpatrick our MD and approach him 
• Andrew: So you don’t have to go through the chain? 
o No there is no process 
o For manned staff to go directly to Kevin Fitzpatrick would be awkward and we generally 
say if you want to speak to Kevin or ask a question it will be done through the 
supervisor 
▪ But if anybody in the company wanted to express an opinion then Kevin will 
have an audience with them 
• Andrew: So it is very open 
o Yes 
o I would say it doesn’t happen very often (referring to Kevin)  
o But they are provided with the opportunity to air their views, opinions at half yearly 
communication sessions in the canteen where the MD and in some cases Trevor will 
address the full company in bite size chunks because of the venue 
▪ They do have an opportunity to speak directly to Trevor or Kevin about 
anything they want basically – in an open forum 
▪ Outside of that they can also do it on a one to one 
 
3. What development and training opportunities are there for employees within the Nissan Production 
Way? 
Prompts: Training, promotion/progression, taking extended leave for travelling etc. 
 
• Lots exist 
• We have what we call a Continuous Development Plan for every employee which is a continuous 
development plan 
o One of these exists for every level within the company 
o It is generally specific skills required of that specific role or function (48:38) 
• Part of the appraisal is development opportunities section 
o Either the person superior would can say I would like to develop you in this area and so 
can put you on these training courses  
o Or the appraise can ask for development in a particular area and can put comments on 
his appraisal to that affect 
▪ The appraiser will 9 times out of 10 agree to this resource permitting etc. 
• Andrew: What about promotion and things like that – is it all done from within? 
o Generally promotion comes through internal promotion generally due to succession 
management planning 
▪ We have a system whereby we can offer the opportunity to demonstrate their 
potential in a stand-up position 
▪ For example as a senior supervisor I could be asked to stand up as a manager if 
there was a position vacant – it gives them the opportunity to view a person in 
that role and gives the person standing the opportunity to see whether they 
can cope or manage and like the position 
▪ Certainly that opportunity exists – you can stand up at all levels – it is 
essentially a test run 
o In terms of succession management certain levels of the company will recognise 
potential and then promote that potential by giving them additional responsibilities, 
standing them into a higher profile position, even moving departments. 
▪ They could move you production to QA, from QA to engineering for their 
development – we call them highly potential people and it’s a way of 
promoting that development 
• Andrew: Hypothetically if you wanted to take a sabbatical and go to Australia / see the world are 
there options for people to take extended time off? 
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o I don’t think so 
o I certainly haven’t heard of it other than legislation for child care and stuff like that I do 
not know of any sabbatical type arrangements – definitely not 
 
4. How does the Nissan Production Way get the full value from employees? 
 
Andrew: Obviously the whole focus is on removing non-value added from the production line so do you try and 
transfer that over to your staff? 
• Yeh I think from manned staff everybody in my opinion recognises their role and what is 
expected of them 
o We clearly communicate this through the introduction of the Nissan Production Way 
where we explained what our expectations of them where and also what they should be 
thinking of in terms of their contribution 
o We ask them to focus on their actual contribution whether it be building a car or 
planning the schedules 
o Yeh I think it works 
• In terms of whether the manned staff building the car know everything about Nissan Production 
Way – probably not but I think they certainly know what is expected from them and we tell them 
what their role within Nissan Production Way is 
 
5. What rewards and recognition schemes exist for employees? 
 
• Yeh in terms of monetary recognition we do give merit awards through appraisal so there is 
certainly reward and recognition through appraisal 
• We also have reward and recognition for Quality Control Story competitions 
• We also have it for 5S application – recently held an NMUK 5S competition 
• Recognition through monthly communication DVD, monthly publications, photographs of team, 
certificates rewarded and rewarded by having a working lunch provided, sometimes cinema 
tickets for the team involved. 
o In the past we have given new fridges and microwaves for the rest areas 
o That type of activity 
 
Part Six: Other Features / Components 
 
1. Are there any features / components that the Nissan Production Way utilises but are recognised as an 
‘add-on’ rather than part of the core production system? 
 
• I think the only one that I could think of is Improvement Diagnostic System 
o The improvement diagnosis system is something that was developed within NMUK and 
blended into Nissan Production Way 
o It doesn’t exist in any other Nissan Plant 
o It’s a variation of Just-in-Time – a little bit more detailed 
• Andrew: Do you think Total Quality Management is part of the core of the Nissan Production Way or 
is it an add on? 
o I think it complements 
o Total Quality Management here is called the Nissan Management Way and we have the 
Nissan Recycling Way, the Nissan Way which is mind-sets and actions – I guess they all 
complement each other 
▪ Whether they actually all live under the Total Quality Management banner is 
difficult to say as I know Total Quality Management within different Nissan 
organisations as slightly different 
• Andrew: Do things just get blended in? You have added in the Improvement Diagnostic System – is 
that now just blended into the system? 
o It is introduced in such a way that it’s sold as an improvement to Nissan Production Way 
current systems and tools that we already have 
o It is blended in such a way that we demonstrate its effectiveness and then the 
representatives from each shop – managers and shop seniors are then informed and 
educated about these new processes 
▪ Total Quality Management was a good example many many years ago it was 
introduced as the new way we were going to measure and manage our 
objectives, cascade and deploy our objectives 
▪ It was introduced and almost just blended into NMUK’s Nissan Production 
Way culture 
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2. Have all of the elements of the Nissan Production Way we have discussed thus far been part of the 
Nissan Production System at Nissan Sunderland Plant since the system was first introduced? 
Prompt: How has the system developed at the plant, what are the notable omissions and additions. Are the 
additions / omissions core components or add-ons? 
 
Andrew: Improvement Diagnostic System was introduced after the system was first introduced... is that a 
regular occurrence? 
• Things are either added or tools evolved 
o We’ve had for example Genba Kanri diagnosis is a measurement of manufacturing 
capability – we have had Genba Kanri diagnosis for probably 15 years but that has 
evolved over the 15 years and we have re-launched and repackaged it only 6/8 months 
ago 
o It never stands still – always evolving, always changing 
 
 
3. Is the Nissan Production Way at Nissan Sunderland Plant a mirror image to the Nissan Production Way 
used at other Nissan plants? 
Prompt: Is anything unique to Nissan Sunderland? 
 
Andrew: Presumably based on your answer to question one you would say that that is a no? 
• I would say it’s a yes but modified slightly to suit our culture 
• We have definitely seen differences in the way it has been managed and applied mainly due to 
culture and work ethic 
o Those types of differences mean that we may change the performer, frequency, focus of 
an activity 
o But essentially it is the same 
 
 
Part Seven: Additional information 
 
1. Are there any other aspects or is there anything about the Nissan Production Way we have not covered? 
 
Andrew: Is there any aspects we have majorly missed here in asking the questions I have asked you? 
• I don’t think so 
• Pre-reading of the questions and in my answers I think we have covered just about everything 
 
2. Do you have any opinions you are comfortable sharing with us with regards to the Nissan Production 
Way in general and its long-term viability as the way to manage production? 
 
Andrew: Also are there any problems you have noticed... is everything rosy? 
• I think in terms of is it necessary and will it be viable for the future absolutely so 
o Recently this office function has been involved in future mid-term plans which we are 
calling challenge mid-term plans 
o We are essentially challenging for new models, new business and we are finding 
ourselves in a climate now where we are competing with our sister plants and Renault 
our alliance partner 
▪ The only way to reduce Total Delivered Cost and to demonstrate 
manufacturing capability and viability to produce these new cars is through 
consistent application of Nissan Production Way 
▪ We have proven that it does deliver – it definitely works 
▪ All the tools that production use to manage the process, improve the process 
exist within Nissan Production Way we just get better at using them – we have 
to – our future depends on it, our livelihood depends on it 
• Andrew: Just as one last key point would you say there are any areas you have highlighted that need 
working on? Areas where you are not so strong? Or would you say that you are strong across the 
board? 
o I think at this moment in time we are probably the strongest we have ever been 
o In recent times we have had to reintroduce certain systems, we have had to reinforce 
certain systems and tools because they weren’t being used correctly – Total Quality 
Management being an example 
▪ Over the years knowledge has been eroded for how the Total Quality 
Management process worked – we’ve addressed that very recently over the 
last few years 
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o We’ve operated a 3S system for 15 years and we have recently introduced 5S and then 
had to reintroduce it again and reinforce it because it is a system that relies on 
behaviour and attitude – we found ourselves having to reinforce that 
o I think currently we are in the best shape we have ever been but we have to be as we are 
fighting for our survival 
o It’s been acknowledged by the various top people within the organisation that NMUK is 
as good as if not better than most Japanese plants and we have to remain that way 
o There is no question – when we are competing against the likes of Nissan China who 
have very low wage bills and are very competent and capable it’s a frightening prospect 
that they’re catching us up 
o We have to continue to compete otherwise we will not be here and don’t forget ten 
years ago we have been at the brink of survival – I mean we have learnt some valuable 
lessons from that 
o I certainly believe in it 
 
  
263 
 
APPENDIX D: MOTIVATION SURVEY 
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APPENDIX E: CORE JOB DIMENSION RAW DATA 
SV1: The job requires me to use a number of complex or high level skills 
 
 
SV2: My job is repetitive 
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SV1&2 
 
 
SV3: There is a lot of variety in my job 
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SV4: My job is the same and never different 
 
 
SV3&4 
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TS1: My job is one where a lot of other people can be affected by how well the work 
gets done 
 
 
TS2: The job itself is not very significant or important in the broader scheme of things 
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TS1&2 
 
 
TS3: The results of my work are likely to significantly impact the well-being of other 
people 
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TS4: My job performance has no impact on anyone else 
 
 
TS3&4 
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TI1: My job provides me the chance to completely finish the pieces of work I begin 
 
 
TI2: My job is arranged so that I do not have the chance to do an entire piece of work 
from beginning to end 
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TI1&2 
 
 
CA1: My job gives me considerable freedom in how I do the work 
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CA2: My job denies me any chance to use my personal initiative or judgement in 
carrying out the work 
 
 
CA1&2 
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RA1: I am responsible for continually improving my work area 
 
 
R2: I do not have the authority to make decisions that affect my work area 
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RA1&2 
 
 
FB1: My job is arranged so that I can judge for myself how well I am doing 
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FB2: I cannot tell how well I am performing just by doing the job 
 
 
FB1&2 
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APPENDIX F: INFLUENCING PRACTICES RAW DATA 
 
K1: I regularly participate in improvement teams 
 
 
K2: I do not often get the opportunity to participate in group problem solving activities 
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K1&2 
 
 
CT1: I am trained to do several jobs 
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CT2: I have only received training to do one job in the plant 
 
 
CT1&2 
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CT3: I can attend relevant additional training courses with ease 
 
 
CT4: The plant’s training courses are a waste of time 
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CT3&4 
 
 
JR1: I rotate between a number of different jobs 
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JR2: Job rotation doesn’t occur in practice 
 
 
JR1&2 
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FBO1: Supervisors often let me know how well they think I am performing the job 
 
 
FBO2: My supervisors almost never give me any feedback about how well I am doing in 
my work 
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FBO1&2 
 
 
FBO3: I frequently receive feedback from other members of my team 
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FBO4: My team never share work related tips or give each other advice 
 
 
FBO3&4 
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HK1: I am able to clearly see how my job contributes towards achieving company 
objectives 
 
 
HK2: My job does not contribute towards company objectives 
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HK1&2 
 
 
TR1: The team I work in receives recognition if we do a good job 
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TR2: My team’s efforts normally go un-noticed 
 
 
TR1&2 
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CC1: Company council has a big impact on me at work 
 
 
CC2: The company council has no real power 
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CC1&2 
 
 
FS1: We do not have to compete with other Renault- Nissan plants 
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FS2: There is intense competition for new models between all the company’s plants 
 
 
FS1&2 
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FS3: My job is 100% secure 
 
 
FS4: We are under constant pressure to keep improving the plant to secure our jobs 
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FS3&4 
 
